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Points of Departure
James Sumberg1, Justin Flynn1, Marjoke Oosterom1, Thomas Yeboah2,  
Barbara Crossouard3 and Dorte Thorsen1
1Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK; 2Bureau of Integrated Rural  
Development (BIRD), Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology 
(KNUST), Kumasi, Ghana; 3University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
Introduction
How do young people across Africa engage with 
the rural economy? What are the implications of  
this engagement for their efforts to build their 
livelihoods, and for their futures, for society and 
for rural areas? These are the questions that 
motivate this book and the research that underpins 
it. Such questions will be of  interest to researchers, 
policy makers, development professionals and 
others concerned with the well-being and aspir-
ations of  young people, with their search for 
employment and decent work, and with the 
relationship between schooling and work. Indi-
viduals working on rural poverty and food security, 
agriculture and rural development – and rural 
transformation more broadly – should certainly 
be interested in rural young people’s lives and 
livelihoods, and the futures they imagine for 
themselves. Finally, a more nuanced under-
standing of  young people’s engagement with the 
rural economy can help to ground debates about 
demographic change, including migration and 
urbanization, and provide a much needed reality 
check of  common assumptions and narratives 
concerning youth, conflict and radicalization.
The fact that a number of  these same 
concerns – including education, decent work 
and migration – are integral to the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), and that several of  
the SDGs speak directly to the situation of  youth, 
demonstrates the central place that young 
people have come to occupy in development 
debates and policy. Indeed, there is a growing 
body of  youth- focused scholarship, policy ana-
lysis, implementation guidance and programme 
evaluations – as well as a plethora of  youth- 
targeted development initiatives. Taken together, 
these suggest that youth in rural Africa are 
being taken seriously, and it appears that this 
focus will continue well into the future. Whether 
they are being taken seriously for the right 
reasons, and whether they are well served by the 
policy and development investments made in 
their name, are important points of  debate.
The book’s ambition is to advance the under-
standing of  young people as social and economic 
actors in rural Africa. It does this through new 
empirical analyses, both quantitative and quali-
tative, involving a significant number of  rural 
young people across multiple countries. These 
new analyses are brought to bear on the narra-
tives and debates that frame and channel much 
of  the current interest in youth-specific policy 
and investment.
At this point, readers might be asking them-
selves, ‘With the recent publication of  Creating 
Opportunities for Rural Youth (IFAD, 2019) and 
Youth and Jobs in Rural Africa: Beyond Stylized 
Facts (Mueller and Thurlow, 2019), do we really 
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need another book on African rural youth?’ Our 
response is an emphatic ‘Yes’, based primarily 
on the fact that neither of  these two works bring 
the histories, lives, voices or imagined futures of  
rural youth into the equation. Youth and the 
Rural Economy in Africa: Hard Work and Hazard 
begins to address this critical lacuna.
To allow the voices of  young people to emerge, 
this book both starts with different questions 
and draws from an expanded set of  intellectual 
and conceptual traditions, and data sources. For 
example, the first question Mueller et al. (2019) 
pose in Youth and Jobs in Rural Africa: Beyond Styl-
ized Facts is, ‘Are rural youth active participants 
in the national growth process?’ They go on to 
ask how their involvement in agricultural tech-
nology adoption, rural income diversification 
and urban migration ‘affect rural transform-
ation’ (Mueller and Thurlow, 2019, p.3). It is 
clear from this that while the book investigates 
‘the role of  rural youth in sub-Saharan Africa’s 
(SSA) development’ (Mueller and Thurlow, 
2019, p.3), the primary interest is in national 
growth processes and rural transformation, not 
youth. This explains the prominence given to 
Timmer’s four-stage model of  agricultural trans-
formation (Timmer, 1988) and the striking ab-
sence of  any theoretical or conceptual treatment 
of  youth as social and economic actors. Mueller 
and Thurlow (2019) and IFAD (2019) rely almost 
exclusively on survey data collected through ex-
ercises that generally were not designed with a 
particular youth focus in mind.
In contrast, in Youth and the Rural Economy 
in Africa: Hard Work and Hazard we start with the 
simple question, ‘What are rural young people 
doing?’ In placing their actions, and their views 
about those actions, at centre stage, we make no 
assumptions about what they should be doing, 
how or where they should be doing it, or what 
their motivations should be. This is not to say 
that we approached the research without pre-
conceptions or hypotheses – indeed, as will 
become clear, we draw on a wide array of  concep-
tual insights and disciplinary approaches. While 
not abandoning microeconomic analytical 
frameworks and survey data analysis, we have 
made a conscious effort to bring these together 
with relevant literature from the broader social 
sciences including anthropology, sociology, social 
geography, youth studies, gender studies, educa-
tion and policy studies, and with a wider range of  
data and modes of  analysis. In so doing we have 
sought to grapple with the heterogeneity – of  
rural areas, family contexts and young people – 
which is still largely overlooked by the majority 
of  policy-oriented analyses.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next 
section situates the current interest in Africa’s 
rural youth, and the place of  this book, within 
the broader discussion of  policy narratives. It 
then identifies seven narratives about rural 
youth in SSA that channel much contemporary 
policy and development intervention. Following 
this the argument that runs through the book is 
outlined. The key conceptual resources that the 
various chapters draw upon are briefly intro-
duced in the following section. The last section 
provides a brief  summary of  each of  the subse-
quent chapters.
Policy Narratives
What they are and why  
they matter
As with all policy problems, policy and interven-
tions relating to rural youth in SSA are built 
around narratives or stories (Roe, 1991, 1995; 
Jones and McBeth, 2010). Narratives are central 
to policy processes, serving as an important ve-
hicle for organizing and communicating policy 
information (Shanahan et al., 2011). They set 
out the problem, explain why it has arisen and 
propose how it should be addressed. A successful 
policy narrative – one that is memorable, taken up 
and integrated into policy and public discourse – 
cuts through complexity and heterogeneity, and 
sets nuance aside. In this way it provides a com-
pelling and powerful framing, a justification and 
call to arms. It is particularly important to note 
that a successful narrative will foreground cer-
tain solutions or interventions (or development 
pathways), while explicitly or implicitly de-
legitimizing others.
Narratives provide a lens through which to 
view and make sense of  a complex and perhaps 
threatening problem. Successful, compelling nar-
ratives are often constructed around a memor-
able word or phrase: for example, phrases like 
‘youth bulge’, ‘demographic dividend’, ‘farming 
as a business’, ‘digital native’ and ‘waithood’ are at 
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the core of  the key narratives about rural youth in 
SSA. Narratives are about communication and 
persuasion, and they are acutely political. They 
are constructed, disseminated and used with the 
aim of  promoting a particular perspective on a 
problem and a set of  preferred solutions. As such, 
a narrative will serve or advance the interests of  
some individuals, groups and coalitions, while 
seeking to thwart the interests of  other actors.
Policy narratives can be thought of  as 
dominant (hegemonic) or alternative (emer-
gent). However, it is usually not useful to think 
of  them as true or false, right or wrong. Around 
all important development issues – like rural 
youth in SSA – there is just too much hetero-
geneity, too many unknowns and too many 
legitimate differences in perspective, for any 
necessarily simplistic narrative to be true in all 
or most contexts. Ultimately, this does not mat-
ter because the job of  a narrative is not to con-
vey truth, but to be believable, to stimulate and 
facilitate a policy response, and to promote cer-
tain responses over others. It is nevertheless 
important to critically examine policy narra-
tives with the aim of  understanding, for ex-
ample, how they foreground or background 
different groups (e.g. male or female youth) in a 
variety of  rural situations (e.g. high or low 
potential areas), and how they drive policy re-
sponses in particular directions (e.g. toward the 
youth themselves and away from structural 
problems). How narratives are used to advance 
the interests of  some groups over others is a 
particularly important area for research.
Specifically, this book, with its focus on 
youth in the rural economy, is interested in 
(i) how dominant narratives align with the dif-
ferent realities of  young people’s lives in a range 
of  rural contexts; (ii) how they promote certain 
possible responses and close down discussion of  
others; and (iii) the politics around their use. 
This approach to development narratives is dif-
ferent from fact checking, ‘myth busting’ or 
‘telling myth from fact’ (Christiaensen, 2017; 
Christiaensen and Demery, 2018; Mabiso and 
Benfica, 2019). While these exercises are also 
important, they often fail to appreciate the pol-
itical nature of  policy narratives, and that in 
policy processes, ‘a good narrative is worth a 
thousand facts’.
The relationship between narrative and 
evidence is complex and often awkward: an 
evidence-based narrative is not necessarily the 
most desirable or the most powerful tool. Too 
much attention to the detail and nuance of  the 
evidence, the sense that every individual story or 
village is unique, makes it impossible to construct 
a strong narrative. This is why ‘essentialism’ is at 
the core of  the most powerful policy narratives. 
Phillips (2010, p.47) defines essentialism as ‘the 
attribution of  certain characteristics to every-
one subsumed within a particular category’. In 
the narratives addressed in this book, essential-
ism is expressed through statements like ‘African 
youth are…’, ‘rural areas in SSA are…’, ‘agricul-
ture in SSA is…’ and ‘Africa’s youth bulge is…’. 
Essentialism is de rigueur for a compelling policy 
narrative, but it provides a very poor basis for 
evidence generation, policy development or 
investment decisions.
As will become apparent, and despite the re-
cent upsurge in published work, there is little dir-
ect evidence with which to cleanly interrogate some 
of  the most important narratives around youth 
and the rural economy. The challenge is magnified 
by a lack of  clarity around key concepts and cat-
egories (i.e. ‘youth’, ‘migration’ and ‘aspirations’), 
and the considerable heterogeneity both among 
young people and rural spaces. A closely related 
challenge is that because the evidence base is so 
patchy, research findings from a detailed study in a 
particular setting can subsequently be projected 
across an entire region, country or the whole 
subcontinent. While nationally representative 
household survey data address some concerns 
(see Chapter 2, this volume), they also raise 
others (Carletto and Gourlay, 2019).
Key narratives about rural youth  
in sub-Saharan Africa
Debate about, and actions to address, the chal-
lenges associated with youth in rural SSA are 
framed by a number of  powerful and persistent, 
and in some cases, contradictory narratives. 
This section introduces seven of  these narra-
tives that are central to this book and that are 
taken up in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
To a greater or lesser extent, they are linked 
together, and in some cases, they overlap: in 
both public and policy discourse they are often 
combined.
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This is the central narrative that frames every 
aspect of  the current discussion about African 
youth. It is particularly compelling because it 
portrays a potentially dangerous, ‘on-rushing 
future’ (de Wilde, 2000; Jansen and Gupta, 
2009). This view is premised on a conceptual-
ization of  youth, and in particular, unemployed 
male youth, as rebellious and a threat to 
domestic social and political stability, and to 
international relations through uncontrolled 
migration. Female youth are rarely captured in 
this narrative, except if  they are seen to trans-
gress sexual and moral boundaries voluntarily 
or through coercion. The link between the youth 
bulge, youth unemployment and security has 
been part of  the academic narrative for almost 
two decades (cf. Cole, 2011) and was also high-
lighted in a speech by Ghana’s President, John 
Mahama, in 2013:
We need to take the issue of  youth unemployment 
very seriously, so every country should put 
youth unemployment on its national security 
agenda. Because if  plans are not rolled out to 
ensure that you engage the youth then you can 
have a problem in terms of  destabilisation and 
social deviancy.i
However, within the narrative, the threat is 
neatly offset by the potential for a ‘beckoning 
future’ that is prosperous and peaceful. For the 
beckoning future to become a reality, the ‘demo-
graphic dividend’, a one-off  economic windfall 
associated with the youth bulge generation suc-
cessfully entering the labour market or becom-
ing entrepreneurs, must be realized (Drummond 
et al., 2014).
Debates around this narrative address both 
the threat and the promise. There is, for example, 
disagreement about the potential size and 
uniqueness of  Africa’s youth bulge (Bloom and 
Williamson, 1998; Yazbeck et al., 2015; AfDB, 
2016; Baah-Boateng, 2016). There is also con-
siderable contestation regarding the purported 
relationship between youth unemployment, 
civil unrest and radicalization (Brück et al., 
2016), as well as the potential magnitude of  and 
likelihood of  achieving the demographic dividend 
(Eastwood and Lipton, 2011; UNFPA, 2014; 
Yazbeck et al., 2015; Ahmed et al., 2016; Losch, 
2016; Bloom et al., 2017).
Box 1.2. Youth are leaving rural areas en 
masse.
What is the problem? Large numbers of, particu-
larly male, youth are leaving their home rural 
areas and migrating to towns and urban centres. 
This poses a threat to the agricultural sector and 
food security, to rural communities, to the mi-
grants themselves who are vulnerable in their 
new urban surroundings, to urban areas, and to 
political stability.
Why or how has it arisen? Long-term neg-
lect of rural areas (urban bias) has left these 
areas devoid of infrastructure and services (water, 
electricity, health, communications). School cur-
ricula neglect (or worse, denigrate) farming and 
rural life. All things urban are glorified in the 
media. There is a lack of successful rural role 
models.
How should the problem be addressed? 
By making rural areas more attractive through 
investment in infrastructure and services; by 
supporting agricultural modernization and agroin-
dustrial development; by changing young peo-
ple’s perception of rural areas and agriculture 
(i.e. ‘mindset change’ and sensitization); by 
better equipping young people to take advan-
tage of the abundant rural opportunities (i.e. train 
them and build their skills).
Box 1.1. Africa’s ‘youth bulge’ – a defining 
challenge of our time.
What is the problem? SSA is experiencing a 
historically unprecedented ‘youth bulge’ (a very 
high proportion of the total population being 
within a specified age bracket, such as 15–25). 
The subcontinent’s resulting youthfulness is 
associated with both opportunities (the potential 
‘demographic dividend’) and threats (e.g. un- or 
underemployment, increased international migra-
tion, risks of civil unrest and radicalization). 
A large population of disaffected African youth 
could have significant negative domestic and 
international repercussions.
Why or how has it arisen? A slow and late 
demographic transition.
How should the problem be addressed? 
Given that the majority of young people in SSA 
still live in rural areas, agricultural and rural 
policy will be particularly important if policy 
makers are to capture the opportunities and 
avoid the threats associated with the youth 
bulge. Specifically, they must invest in rural 
areas, invest in rural young people and pro-
mote agroindustry.
 African Youth and the Rural Economy: Points of Departure 5
At the heart of  this narrative is dissatisfac-
tion, and the idea that it breeds within the yawn-
ing gap between young people’s rising aspirations, 
and their perception of  the limited opportunities 
available to them in rural areas. Specifically, 
because of  increased educational opportunities 
and digital connectivity, too many rural young 
people have had their eyes diverted toward 
post-secondary education, professional jobs and 
urban life. While migration of  young men is 
sometimes acknowledged as a ‘rite of  passage’ – 
part of  becoming an adult – and remittances can 
be invested in the rural economy, overwhelm-
ingly, it is the negative effects of  migration that 
are emphasized. This is a straightforward crisis 
narrative, with migration portrayed as a threat 
to everything from the agricultural sector to the 
young people themselves. It is also a narrative 
that is manifestly gender blind, referring to 
youth as a gender-neutral category but repre-
senting only the male experience. The female 
experience of  migration or of  leaving rural 
areas, within the framework of  marriage or the 
extended family, is seldom mentioned.
There is much to be considered in this 
narrative. Migration and mobility – in all their 
forms – have been well-established facts of  Afri-
can rural life for many decades. Young people 
leave home for many reasons, including to access 
schooling and a broader range of  educational op-
portunities. In many parts of  rural West Africa, for 
example, short distance, seasonal movement has 
long been central to young people’s efforts to 
build their livelihoods. Historically, these mobili-
ties are gendered; young men often begin their 
migratory trajectories by working on farms and 
in mines, while young women mostly take up do-
mestic work in urban areas, first for a relative 
then moving into other waged work as they gain 
skills (Jacquemin, 2012; Lesclingand and Hertrich, 
2017). Whether their absence affects farming 
depends on the gender division of  labour on the 
farm and on collective and individual inclin-
ations to facilitate a return to work on the family 
farm during the labour-intensive periods (Linares, 
2003). However, their remittances are import-
ant factors in some families’ relocation to rural 
towns and their reliance on hired farm workers 
or sharecroppers.
Equally problematic is the lack of  direct 
evidence that the rate of  youth migration has in-
creased (indirect evidence on changing migration 
rates is provided by: FAO, 2015; Jedwab et al., 
2017; Arslan et al., 2018), or that there has 
been significant change in types or forms of  
migration. Similarly, there is no evidence of  
widespread rural depopulation. In any case, not 
all dissatisfied youth are able to leave, even if  
they want to, because they lack the social net-
works or financial resources. Finally, a signifi-
cant proportion of  rural migrants go to other 
rural areas (Mberu, 2005; Potts, 2013), suggest-
ing that the aversion to agriculture and rural life 
is overstated.
As will become evident in the chapters that 
follow, there are many young people actively 
building livelihoods in rural areas, and they do not 
universally or generally express a wish to leave.
This narrative is closely linked to the previ-
ous one, which suggests that large numbers of  
young people are leaving rural areas. It also high-
lights the gap between rising aspirations and 
the realities of  much smallholder farming: hard, 
dirty, physical work, with poor and uncertain 
returns, and no respect or recognition from the 
broader (read ‘urban’) society. A more nuanced 
version of  the narrative suggests that the problem 
is not with farming per se, but rather that young 
people do not want to farm like their parents.
Box 1.3. Youth do not want to farm.
What is the problem? Young Africans are turning 
their backs on farming. This is a problem for the 
agricultural sector and food security; and for the 
young people themselves, because for some 
decades to come, only agriculture and agrifood 
industries will be able to provide the employment 
opportunities they so badly need.
Why or how has it arisen? Failure of small-
holder agriculture to modernise, to embrace 
technology, mechanization and markets; as a 
result, farming remains hard, dirty and poorly 
paid work. School curricula neglect (or worse, 
denigrate) farming and agriculture. All things 
urban are fetishized in the media. There is a 
lack of successful rural role models.
How should the problem be addressed? 
Use policy to make agriculture economically 
attractive; change mindsets so that farming is 
approached ‘as a business’; promote engagement 
with value chains; promote the use of technol-
ogy (agricultural and digital); reduce drudgery; 
provide training and develop new skills; make 
farming ‘sexy’.
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There are a number of  studies suggesting 
that a significant proportion of  rural youth do not 
aspire to become farmers (Anyidoho et al., 2012; 
Petesch and Rodríguez Caillava, 2012; Tadele 
and Gella, 2012; Leavy and Hossain, 2014; Temudo 
and Abrantes, 2015; BMZ, 2017; OECD, 2017; 
Yeboah et al., 2017; Elias et al., 2018). Debates 
revolve around different understandings of  aspir-
ations, and the degree to which aspirations drive 
(or even inform) choices, decisions and/or out-
comes. However, there is also some literature 
suggesting that in some situations young people 
are actively pursuing or have an interest in agri-
cultural livelihoods (e.g. Berckmoes and White, 
2014; Andersson Djurfeldt et al., 2019; Ruiz 
Salvago et al., 2019; Yeboah et al., 2020).
This narrative runs counter to elements of  
the narratives ‘youth are leaving rural areas’ 
and ‘youth do not want to farm’ outlined above. 
Critically, it stresses ‘push’ factors (limited access 
to productive resources, and thus economic 
opportunity) as opposed to ‘pull’ factors (for 
example, the lure of  professional jobs and urban 
environments). Rooted in historical, evolutionary 
and political economy perspectives, the research 
that underpins this narrative is not preoccupied 
with changing aspirations, but rather with the 
changing agrarian context. The argument is 
that increases in population density, processes of  
commodification (of  crops and land) and associated 
changes in generational relations are making it 
increasingly difficult for young people to access 
land and begin to build an agrarian livelihood 
(Amanor, 2010: Berckmoes and White, 2014: 
Berckmoes and White, 2016: Kosec et al., 2016, 
2018: Scoones et al., 2019).
An extension of  this narrative suggests that 
even if  land is available, an inability to access 
credit, technology and markets inhibits young 
people’s farming. The implication here is that 
young people are being discriminated against 
simply because they are young. However, the ar-
gument can be made that in many rural areas, 
nobody – young or old – has much access to 
formal credit, etc., and thus the fact that young 
people do not have access is not a very compelling 
basis for policy or intervention.
This narrative, which tends toward a new 
‘rural prosperity gospel’ (Sumberg et al., 2020) is 
rooted in a vision of  a modernized, transformed 
agricultural sector. The vision bundles together in-
vestment in infrastructure, with the use of  new 
technology (from seeds and mechanization, to digi-
tally delivered weather and prices), entrepreneur-
ship, engagement with agricultural value chains, 
and perhaps most important of  all, the emergence 
of  a new ethos of  ‘farming as a business’.
However, in many if  not most rural areas 
there is a real gap between this future vision and 
Box 1.4. Youth want to farm but cannot access 
land.
What is the problem? Young people are leaving 
agriculture and rural areas, not because they 
want to, but because they cannot access land. 
In effect, they are ‘land scarcity migrants’.
Why or how has it arisen? Increasing rural 
population density creates pressure on land; trad-
itional inheritance rules result in fragmentation 
of holdings; processes of commodification block 
channels through which young people have 
traditionally accessed land; the older generation 
will not make unused land available to the 
younger generation; and land markets are gen-
erally weak or non-existent.
How should the problem be addressed? 
Provide young people with privileged access to 
land to get them started; support development 
of land markets; change inheritance rules.
Box 1.5. Rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa are 
brimming with opportunity that young people 
just do not see.
What is the problem? Growth in international, 
regional and national demand, linked to urban-
ization and changing patterns of consumption, 
creates significant opportunities for producers 
and processors of agricultural products in Africa. 
However, rural young people are unaware of 
these many and varied opportunities for work and 
livelihood building. This is a problem because it 
fuels dissatisfaction and rural out-migration, and 
robs the rural economy of the ‘best and brightest’.
Why or how has it arisen? Historic neglect of 
rural areas; school curricula that denigrate farm-
ing and rural life.
How should the problem be addressed? 
Develop ‘inclusive’ agricultural value chains; build 
an entrepreneurial culture; revise school curric-
ulum to highlight rural opportunity and role models; 
raise awareness; and invest in training and skill 
development.
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the current reality. This then raises the question: 
‘Even if  the investment and political commitment 
are forthcoming, when will future generations 
of  rural youth actually benefit?’ Acknowledge-
ment of  the gap between vision and reality leads 
to a somewhat less optimistic variant of  the 
narrative: for some years to come young people 
will find work in and around agriculture because 
they will continue to live in rural areas, and 
there is nothing else that can provide employment 
on the scale needed (Filmer and Fox, 2014). In 
this view, engagement with the rural economy is 
about making the best of  a less than optimal 
situation; in many ways, as will become apparent 
in the chapters that follow, this sums up much of  
what is observed across the subcontinent.
This narrative is constructed around the 
essentialist proposition that youth – as a group – 
are different (i.e. from older people), in that they 
are particularly innovative and have a special 
orientation toward the adoption of  technology 
(cf. Sumberg and Hunt, 2019). Given the widely 
held assumption that technological change will 
drive productivity enhancement and rural 
transformation, it is then only logical that young 
people must be at centre stage. Indeed, an argu-
ment that is associated with this narrative is that 
without a special focus on young people and 
their capacity to act as positive ‘agents of  
change’, there will likely be no transformation.
In addition to linking to broader debates 
about the relationship between age and innovative 
or creative behaviour, this narrative suggests that 
it should be possible to observe meaningful differ-
ences in how young people farm in SSA compared 
to older people (see Chapter 6, this volume).
In the book The Time of  Youth: Work, Social 
Change and Politics in Africa (2012), Alcinda 
Honwana used the notion of  ‘waithood’ to cap-
ture a sense of  disrupted and delayed youth tran-
sitions (‘waithood’ had been used earlier by 
Singerman (2007), and Dhillon and Yousef  
(2009)). Based primarily on interviews conducted 
in Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa and 
Tunisia, she described waithood as:
[…] a prolonged and uncertain stage between 
childhood and adulthood that is characterized 
by their inability to enter the labour market and 
attain the social markers of  adulthood [p.19]. 
[…] Waithood is a neither-here-nor-there 
position in which young people are expected to 
be independent from their parents but are not 
yet recognized as social adults. No longer a brief  
transitional stage in the life-course, waithood is 
becoming a permanent condition, as many 
Box 1.6. Youth hold the key to rural transformation.
What is the problem? Rural economies in SSA 
are already going through a transformation that 
includes a shift from production for own con-
sumption to production for the market, increas-
ing productivity, value upgrading and the like. 
However, the pace of transformation is very 
slow, which results in continuing poverty, dissat-
isfaction, pressure to migrate, environmental 
degradation, etc.
Why or how has it arisen? Technology pro-
motion efforts have been focused on older, prin-
cipally male, farmers (the ‘household head’), but 
these individuals are often conservative, have 
little motivation to innovate, and just do not 
understand the opportunities associated with 
‘digital agriculture’.
How should the problem be addressed? 
Target technology promotion efforts at young 
people because they are innovative and quick to 
adopt new technology; also, because they are 
‘digital natives’, young people are particularly 
well placed to turn the promise of digital agricul-
ture into reality.
Box 1.7. Youth are stuck in ‘waithood’.
What is the problem? The majority of young Af-
ricans are living in ‘waithood’, ‘a prolonged and 
uncertain stage between childhood and adult-
hood that is characterized by their inability to 
enter the labour market and attain the social 
markers of adulthood’ (Honwana, 2012, p.19).
Why or how has it arisen? The social con-
tract between the state and its citizens has broken 
down because of unsound economic policies, 
bad governance, corruption and the erosion of 
civil liberties. This breakdown prevents young 
people from transitioning to adulthood and be-
coming active, fully-fledged citizens.
How should the problem be addressed? 
Young people are in waithood but they are not 
passive. Through their involvement in social and 
political movements they are rejecting formal 
politics and the corruption that characterizes it; 
protesting and making revolution; challenging 
the modernity project; and negotiating new 
terms of membership into the global community.
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young people remain stuck in this in-between 
situation. Indeed, waithood is becoming a new 
but socially attenuated form of  adulthood [p.20].
(Honwana, 2012, pp.19–20)
Along similar lines, but based on work in India, 
Jeffrey (2010) talks about young people ‘doing 
timepass’ (‘a means through which young men 
mark their social suffering and begin to negoti-
ate unemployment’ (p.477)). And Sommers 
(2012) suggests that young people in Rwanda 
are ‘stuck’ due to a lack of  jobs and restricted ac-
cess to productive resources that draw out or 
postpone transitions from youth to adulthood.
Honwana made and has repeated a specific 
claim – that ‘the majority of  young Africans 
today live in waithood’ (Honwana, 2012, p.20; 
Honwana, 2019, p.8). This is a very big claim: 
taken at face value it suggests that across Africa 
there are at least 210 million people between the 
ages of  15 and 35 who are living in waithood 
(UNEP, 2019), and unable to move on with their 
lives (although, as Honwana stresses, they are 
not inactive). The claim is important because it 
provides the foundation for her arguments and 
reflections concerning young Africans’ aspir-
ations, economic activities and citizenship, and 
the steps that should be taken to address Africa’s 
youth crisis (see Chapter 8, this volume). It is 
also significant because it has become integrated, 
as fact, into policy discourse.
The Argument
As these narratives are used to justify and pro-
mote particular interventions (and marginalize 
others), they have a profound effect on policy 
processes and the choice and design of  interven-
tions. This book is organized around the most 
prominent of  these narratives.
The argument developed through the chap-
ters that follow is that:
• As should be expected, given the heterogen-
eity in people and place, there is a significant 
disjuncture between the dominant narra-
tives around young people’s engagement 
with the rural economy, and the diversity of  
what is observed across rural SSA.
• Specifically, the central story is not about 
young people leaving rural areas and the 
rural economy, but rather about the many 
millions who are working hard, often in dif-
ficult conditions, to build rural-based and 
rural-inclusive livelihoods. There are few 
signs that these young people are stuck in 
permanent waithood, or generally looking 
to leave rural areas.
• These efforts, and the resulting livelihoods, 
are: gendered in important ways; reflect 
widespread disappointment in and failure 
of  the education system; often combine on-
farm, off-farm and non-farm activities; and 
in many cases the agricultural engagement 
does not appear to be prioritizing ‘farming 
as a business’ and/or engagement with 
agricultural value chains.
• They also reflect the central role of  hazard, 
events or idiosyncratic shocks in the lives of  
rural youth (as distinct from the shared 
shocks that, for example, typify rainfed 
smallholder agriculture). This raises import-
ant questions in relation to thinking about 
aspirations, preferences, choice, decision 
making and the exercise of  agency. It also 
poses significant challenges for develop-
ment policy and practice.
• In contrast to the dominant narratives, most 
rural young people imagine futures for them-
selves in which agriculture and/or the rural 
economy play important roles. However, in 
these imagined futures they are often not 
actually doing the farming, but rather 
managing labour while they themselves 
pursue trading or other activities.
• Finally, we argue that these insights have 
profound implications for youth policy, 
social policy, agricultural and rural policy. 
Specifically, there is an important disjuncture 
between the vision of  the rural economy 
and rural livelihoods that underpin policy, 
and the futures that young people imagine 
and are in the process of  enacting for them-
selves and their communities. Rethinking the 
current tendency for constructing rural 
youth as another ‘target group’ for develop-
ment, to be served by youth-specific inter-
ventions, should be a top priority.
Conceptual Grounding
This section provides a brief  introduction to the 
concepts and frames that underpin the book’s 
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analysis of  young people’s engagement with the 
rural economy. These are further developed and 
nuanced in the individual chapters.
Generational and life course  
perspectives on youthii
A generational perspective offers a way to under-
stand youth as belonging to a distinct social group, 
and in relation to other social groups (Hopkins 
and Pain, 2007; White, 2015; Huijsmans, 2016). 
Generations were established as a subject of  
interest by Karl Mannheim, when he articulated 
the notion that a cohort of  people born around a 
similar time may share certain formative experi-
ences, perspectives, relationships and identities 
that situate them uniquely in relation to other 
generations (Mannheim, 1952). Everyone is 
part of  a generation and is therefore enmeshed 
in intra- and intergenerational relations. Cultural 
norms, as well as negotiations, struggles and 
outright conflict between generations, define the 
mutual rights and obligations of  each gener-
ation in relation to others – an ‘intergeneration-
al contract’ (Huijsmans, 2016). In particular, 
relationships with older generations strongly de-
termine whether, when and under what terms, a 
member of  a younger generation can obtain and 
use resources, express her or himself, exercise 
independent choices and make decisions, and 
build a different kind of  life. The concept of  
‘social navigation’ has been proposed as a way 
to examine how young people attempt to negoti-
ate intergenerational relations, to ‘disentangle 
themselves from confining structures, plot their 
escape and move towards better positions’ (see also 
Christiansen et al., 2006; Vigh, 2006, 2009, p.419).
In addition to being part of  a generation, 
each individual life passes through a succession 
of  phases, each being both distinct (i.e. marked 
by specific experiences and challenges), and a 
time of  evolution and change that connects the 
preceding and following phases. Life phases and 
the transitions between them are socially and 
culturally constructed. Few real lives unfold pre-
cisely in the ways anticipated by bureaucratic, 
medical or legal categories (such as child, adoles-
cent, young adult; above or below the age of  
majority, etc.), which are usually based on age- 
defined norms and assumptions. The youth 
phase is typically framed as a period of  particularly 
rapid and fundamental transition, characterized 
by physical and cognitive growth and transform-
ation, a great deal of  learning, a substantial ex-
pansion of  social networks and the building of  
social capital. In many if  not all societies, mar-
riage and child-rearing are normal expect-
ations of  youth, or key signifiers of  a transition 
between youth and adulthood. For most individ-
uals, the transition from childhood through youth 
to adulthood is marked by increased independ-
ence, autonomy and responsibility. These transi-
tions are usually relative and incremental rather 
than sudden and complete, yet in some contexts, 
such as rural SSA, many young people and espe-
cially young women, ironically, do not experi-
ence this period of  ‘youth’ or only do so to a 
limited extent. Rather, they transition more dir-
ectly from childhood into something more akin 
to adulthood (with childbearing and marriage 
sometimes coming during adolescence, teen-
agers leaving school and becoming economic-
ally active and/or independent, forming inde-
pendent households, etc.).
While there may be important legal, bur-
eaucratic and policy reasons for defining youth 
as sitting between specific lower and upper age 
boundaries,iii this makes little sense from a socio-
logical or cultural perspective (see, e.g. Bourdieu, 
1993). Our focus in this book is on young people 
in the early stages of  livelihood building. Practic-
ally speaking, this means that of  the 416 people 
who participated in individual interviews in the 
main International Fund for Agricultural Devel-
opment (IFAD) Youth Study (see Chapter 2, this 
volume) 86% were less than 30 years old. For 
the analysis of  nationally representative survey 
data, where clear age cut-offs are required, 
youth have been defined as being between 18 
and 24 years old.
In line with the generational perspective, in 
this book we see young people not as isolated, 
autonomous actors, but as deeply enmeshed in 
diverse social and economic relationships. The 
vast majority are first and foremost part of  fam-
ilies, and initially largely dependent on others 
(their parents, carers and kin), and later with 
families of  their own and possible links to the 
family networks of  their partners. The import-
ance of  extended family and clan networks for 
young people in SSA has been widely recognized 
(Langevang, 2008). These networks can enable 
and facilitate, as well as constrain, and as with 
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interhousehold processes more generally, they are 
characterized by both collaboration and conflict 
(Seymour and Peterman, 2018; Acosta et al., 2019).
Family networks, including but not limited 
to parents, enable young people to attend school, 
are primary sites of  skill acquisition beyond for-
mal education (Yeboah et al., 2020), and provide 
access to land and capital (Flynn and Sumberg, 
2017). Existing studies have documented the 
importance of  kin networks in migration, and in 
finding work, securing apprenticeships and in 
accessing educational opportunities away from 
home (Langevang, 2008: Thorsen, 2013). Young 
women and men have expectations placed upon 
them and acquire various responsibilities to-
ward other family members, like contributing to 
the costs of  siblings’ education and taking care 
of  old and sick family members. While living in-
dependently in one’s own home and being able 
to provide for the family is central to many young 
Africans (Sommers, 2012), being able to fulfil such 
family-oriented expectations is also a priority.
In recognizing the importance of  social 
relationships, it is critical to also acknowledge 
the social dynamics that create and maintain 
hierarchies and markers of  social difference, 
both within and outside the household. Gender 
relations and behavioural norms interact and 
create dynamics that strongly shape the liveli-
hood activities considered appropriate for young 
women and men, the distribution of  labour and 
care responsibilities, land access and autonomy 
over earnings. Gender norms also come into play 
in decisions over whether and how to support 
the education or enterprises of  daughters and 
sons, sisters and brothers, and female and male 
partners, as well as decisions about migration 
(Chant and Jones, 2005; Carr, 2008; Doss et al., 
2015; Elias et al., 2018; Van den Broeck and 
Kilic, 2019). In addition to shaping all aspects of  
livelihood building, from aspirations and access 
to education and productive resources, to oppor-
tunities for mobility, these norms play a central 
role in setting out what it means to be a ‘good 
woman’ (Elias et al., 2018) and a ‘good man’.
School and education
A key axis of  our analysis is the role that education 
plays in lives, livelihoods and imagined futures 
of  rural youth in SSA. This is of  particular interest 
because education has been viewed as central to 
ensuring that young people’s potential as 
economic actors and citizens is directed in pro-
ductive ways. In response to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), efforts were made 
across SSA to develop free universal basic educa-
tion. However, the rapid expansion of  the school-
ing system in many contexts proved to be at the 
expense of  education quality: primary enrolment 
in SSA soared by 75% between 1999 and 2012 
(UNESCO, 2015) but this increase was not 
matched by the development of  school infra-
structure or investment in teacher education. In 
addition to exclusions related to the quality of  
provision, location, religion, language of  instruc-
tion and ethnicity, practices of  schooling are 
deeply gendered, and schools are a persistent site 
of  gender violence (Dunne, 2007; Hum-
phreys et al., 2008). Many of  these issues are 
legacies of  the unequal ways that schooling was 
developed in SSA during colonial times (Dunne 
and Adzahlie-Mensah, 2015), which mean that 
education continues to benefit urban more than 
rural populations, the rich rather than the poor, 
and males rather than females (UNESCO, 2018).
Human capital theory (HCT) is the domin-
ant lens through which relationships between 
education and work have been considered. Many 
critiques of  both the evidence base and assump-
tions of  HCT have been voiced (Bennell, 1996; 
Marginson, 2019; McGrath et al., 2019). In edu-
cation (and work), multiple forms of  capital 
come into play, which are valued in ways that 
are context dependent, relational rather than 
universal, and not reducible to individual deficits 
(e.g. The World Bank, 2014). Attempts to isolate 
‘causal’ factors in an overgeneralized way fail to 
attend to their relational intersections, and in-
deed the relational character of  all social life. As 
Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) argue, it is ‘the 
system of  factors, acting as a system’ which re-
quires analysis; for them it is ‘absurd to try to 
isolate the influence of  any one factor’ (p.87).
Alongside the complex intersections of  the 
fields of  education and work, Bourdieu’s theor-
etical frameworks generally offer important 
counter arguments to the individualization of  
deficit in dominant policy narratives about 
youth and education (see Chapter 7, this volume). 
Bourdieu illuminates the power of  schooling to 
produce and arbitrate on what comes to be seen 
as ‘individual merit’, dressed in the language of  
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ability, skills and competences. His theories show 
how education reproduces dominant norms and 
rationalities and gives legitimacy to social strati-
fication. He also helps understand the shifting 
value of  educational qualifications, whereby as 
more young people gain qualifications, their value 
in the job market diminishes, making social cap-
ital and the inherited cultural and economic 
capital of  the family additionally significant in 
the struggle for positioning in the market (Brown 
et al., 2011). Yeboah et al. (2017) and Ansell 
(2018) signal how the imaginaries of  youth in 
different contexts in the Global South often hold 
an idealized notion of  professional work which 
merits further exploration. Overall, however, 
there remains a paucity of  knowledge about 
rural youth’s perspectives on their education 
and how these relate to their imagined futures.
Mobility
The current moral panic in Europe, the US and 
elsewhere around international migration reflects 
a similar, long-standing and equally ambivalent 
stance toward the migration of  rural people in 
SSA. The historical sacrifices and contributions 
of  migration and migrants are celebrated, while 
today’s migrants and would-be migrants are de-
monized. Further, with specific reference to SSA, 
Kleist and Thorsen (2017) describe a ‘mobility 
paradox’ that arises because increased access to 
transportation and communication infrastructure 
exposes young people to seemingly attractive 
livelihood opportunities elsewhere, at the same 
time as global inequality and restrictive migra-
tion policies exclude (or discourage) many from 
participating even in legal circuits of  mobility.
The orthodox view frames rural young people 
as either ‘international’ or ‘internal’ migrants 
based on whether they move within or beyond 
their national borders, or as ‘left behind’ if  they 
remain in their community. Numerous other 
categories are commonly used to describe migra-
tion and migrants in SSA: independent, first- 
or second-generation, permanent, temporary, 
seasonal, rural-to-urban, rural-to-rural, stepwise, 
return, voluntary, forced, and many others. Accord-
ing to Van Geel and Mazzucato (2018), placing 
young people in one of  these categories, as is done 
in many studies, obscures the variation in mobility 
that characterizes young people’s biographies, 
and this variation is central to understanding 
the ways in which mobility is used by, and im-
pacts the lives of, rural youth. As is increasingly 
the case in the academic literature, in order to 
escape the intellectual tyranny of  these categor-
ies and the discourse they help to frame, the 
focus in this book is on mobility as opposed to 
migration. Whether as movement in search of  
land for agricultural production, cyclical liveli-
hood mobility, movement to towns in search of  
employment in the formal or informal sectors or 
entrepreneurial opportunities, or daily journeys 
to work (e.g. fishing), to school, or to meet friends, 
relations and business operators within the rural 
economy, mobility is – and has long been – as 
much a part of  rural life in SSA as farming. It is 
central to the lives of  many rural youth in SSA and 
shapes their experiences and future life chances.
Migration demands mobility, but mobility 
that is part of  livelihood building, or that enables 
beneficial engagement with the rural economy, 
does not necessarily mean migration.iv The 
literature on mobilities speaks of  ‘achieved mo-
bility’ as a source of  excitement, inclusion, thrills, 
temptation and perceived success but also as a 
cause of  fear, danger and exhaustion. On the 
other hand, ‘frustrated mobility’ is regarded as a 
source of  exclusion, despair, anger, and per-
ceived failure (Porter et al., 2010). While the mo-
tivations driving mobility, and the associated 
outcomes, involve complex, multiple and diverse 
realities, the anthropological and social geography 
literatures provide a generally positive view of  
mobility as a means for young people to access 
social and economic opportunities, as a rite of  
passage, a way to strengthen kinship ties, search 
for autonomy, and facilitate the transition to 
adulthood (Hashim, 2005; Hashim and Thors-
en, 2011; Beazley, 2015; Van Blerk, 2016).
The authors of  Youth and the Rural Economy in 
Africa: Hard Work and Hazard do not take a norma-
tive moral stance, explicit or implicit, that rural 
young people are or would be better off  if  they 
stayed in the countryside, or that reduced rural- to-
urban mobility is necessarily good for society, the 
economy, urban areas or rural communities.
Imagined futures, future selves, aspirations
The aspirations of  young rural Africans have re-
ceived some attention in the rural development 
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research literature, motivated by the under-
standing that: (i) increasing levels of  education 
and connectivity fuel rising aspirations; and (ii) 
to a greater or lesser degree, aspirations inform 
decisions about education, employment, marriage, 
migration and so on.
This literature generally leaves unquestioned 
the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of  as-
pirations and their links to behaviour, and the 
associated methodological and interpretive chal-
lenges. In contrast, such dimensions are import-
ant concerns within the sociology and youth 
studies literatures (Zipin et al., 2015). Hardgrove 
et al. (2015), for example, argue that alterna-
tives to aspirations, including ‘imagined futures’, 
‘future selves’ and ‘possible selves’, deserve atten-
tion because they provide ‘a theorization of  the 
link between imagined possibilities in the future 
and motivation to act in the present’ (p.163). 
Specifically, they argue that the notion of  pos-
sible selves provides a pathway to investigate 
how imagined futures become motivational, in-
fluencing the actions of  young people, not only 
in the immediate but also toward the imagined. 
This thus provides a broader theoretical under-
standing of  the agency of  young people as they 
negotiate (navigate) transitions within the pre-
sent and toward the future. The idea of  possible 
selves is that they are underpinned by individual 
and social experiences, and combine a mixture 
of  conceptual explanations that dwell on the 
value of  opportunity structures, motivations, 
socio-cultural based meanings and self-concept 
(Erikson, 2007). Thus, while aspirations as a 
concept may appear ‘vague’ and ‘inflated’, and 
not very well grounded in structured positions 
within society, possible selves are more rooted in 
present circumstances and past experiences. 
They ‘encompass within their scope visions of  
desired and undesired end states’ (Markus and 
Nurius, 1986, p.959), and are rooted in personal 
exposure and experiences, as well as interper-
sonal relationships that could enable the individ-
ual young person to imagine what her or his life 
could become.
Key to the debate about young people’s en-
gagement with the rural economy is the extent 
to which imagined futures or aspirations shape 
the livelihood building process. In contrast to 
much of  the literature on youth in SSA, the ana-
lysis in this book privileges imagined futures over 
aspirations, as a window on young people’s 
thinking about their futures in general, and their 
engagement with the rural economy in particular.
Opportunity structures, agency,  
hazard and performance
Mainstream microeconomic theory is built on 
the notion of  a rational, utility-maximizing in-
dividual who, within some bounds, is free and 
able to exercise choice. Information availability, 
the nature of  the decision making processes, 
and how to avoid ‘bad’ decisions, are key con-
cerns. This rational choice perspective is chal-
lenged by sociological perspectives that empha-
size the embeddedness of  individuals in social 
relationships. Additionally, within applied eco-
nomics and political science work in developing 
country contexts, an increasing prevalence of  
experimental work informed by behavioural 
economics has identified many areas where 
human behaviour deviates systematically from 
that predicted by standard neoclassical eco-
nomic theory (Carter, 2016; Kremer et al., 
2019; Streletskaya et al., 2020).
In relation to the initial phases of  livelihood 
building, a useful starting point is the theory of  
‘occupational allocation’, also referred to as 
opportunity structure theory (Roberts, 1968, 
2009). The central tenet is that the job oppor-
tunities available to school leavers become ‘cu-
mulatively structured’, and Roberts theorized 
that what he called ‘opportunity structures’ act 
to create distinct routes that govern both young 
people’s entry into the labour force and sub-
sequent career progress. These opportunity 
structures emerge from a web of  determinants 
including place, family origins, gender, ethnicity 
and education, and labour market processes. It is 
not so much that opportunity structures leave 
the individual with no room for manoeuvre, but 
rather that for most young people who are poor, 
poorly educated, and/or socially or geographic-
ally marginalized, it is likely that their room for 
manoeuvre will be very tightly constrained. Due 
to this structuring, Roberts (1977) argued that 
it is a mistake to overemphasize the role of  aspir-
ations and choice in determining how young 
people enter the labour market, particularly in 
landscapes of  constrained opportunity. Indeed, he 
put it even more starkly: ‘Neither school leavers 
nor adults typically choose their jobs in any 
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meaningful sense: they simply take what is avail-
able’ (p.3). Some years later he elaborated:
Choice is not irrelevant, but it fails to explain 
enough. It cannot account for the contexts, 
including the labour market contexts, in which 
young people make their choices, and it cannot 
identify the different limits within which 
different groups of  young people choose.
(Roberts, 2009, p.362)
The main implication of  opportunity structure 
theory is that aspirations, choice and individual 
responsibility are simply not very useful foci for 
policy. Change in how young people enter and pro-
gress in the labour market will come about, not as 
a result of  higher aspirations, altered preferences, 
better choices or better skills; rather, it is the op-
portunity structures that need to shift, and this 
implies fundamental social and economic change.
Bourdieu’s concepts of  ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ 
are particularly relevant as they capture the rela-
tionship between individual agency and social 
forces. Field encompasses the structures, stand-
ards and norms in the environment, and habitus is 
the social process through which individuals be-
come socialized (Bourdieu, 1984; Navarro, 2006). 
Habitus is neither a result of  free will, nor overly 
determined by structures, but rather created by 
the interplay between the two, over time (Bourdieu, 
1984, p.170). Habitus is created and reproduced 
unconsciously, ‘without any deliberate pursuit of  
coherence… without any conscious concentra-
tion’ (Bourdieu, 1984, p.170). Moreover, habitus 
is about a ‘full internalization of  social experience’ 
(Pettit, 2016, p.96): past experiences, beliefs and 
norms are embodied, and influence people’s ideas 
and practices. Therefore, while a rational choice 
perspective assumes that individuals will consider, 
even experiment with, all possible actions, through 
habitus the individual gives disproportionate 
weight to (or perhaps only sees) some of  these 
options, influenced by past experience that has 
shaped her or his very rationality (Bourdieu, 1980; 
Pettit, 2016). Habitus thus influences perceptions 
and preferences and here we can link back to the 
point made above: gender norms influence young 
women’s and young men’s aspirations and im-
agined futures.
In addition to ideas around the interplay 
of  structure and agency, we also draw on the 
notion of  ‘hazard’ as developed by Richards (1986). 
Richards conceived of  hazard as including acci-
dents, weather events and mistakes that have (or 
could have) negative impacts, and in some cases, 
these might be cumulative. For example, a fam-
ily illness that then affects farming operations 
represents hazard, as would early rains that dis-
rupt land preparation, or a decision to plant a 
late maturing crop variety in what turns out to 
be a dry year. The notion of  hazard has much in 
common with the idea of  ‘idiosyncratic risks’ (or 
idiosyncratic shocks) in the economics literature 
(Dercon and Krishnan, 2000). While common 
or covariate shocks affect whole communities or 
countries by reducing household income, con-
sumption, and/or the accumulation of  productive 
assets, an idiosyncratic shock affects only one 
individual, household or family. Idiosyncratic 
shocks can arise in the economic sphere (e.g. 
crop failure or loss of  employment), or through 
ill health, family break-up and crime. Dercon 
(2002) notes that ‘even within well-defined rural 
communities, few risks are purely common or 
idiosyncratic’ (p.143). An important difference 
shown by Richards between hazard and idiosyn-
cratic shock is that he included mistakes in the 
former, while they play no part on the latter.
As will become evident, the lives of  many 
rural children, and their subsequent efforts as 
young people to build their livelihoods, are 
affected by hazard. The death of  a parent or 
guardian, parental divorce, frequent relocations 
that disrupt school attendance, a parent’s inabil-
ity or refusal to pay school fees, early pregnancy: 
these everyday yet potentially life-changing events 
figure prominently in the lives and life histories 
of  rural youth. For the vast majority, neither in-
surance nor social assistance programmes, two 
formal mechanisms for risk management, are 
currently available.
Closely linked to the hazards of  everyday life 
is Richard’s notion of  performance (Richards, 
1989; Flachs and Richards, 2018). This entails 
serendipitous discoveries and processes that are 
the outcome of  practices – defined as socially- 
situated actions – with which people respond to 
unpredictable events.
Rural economic geography and  
engagement with the rural economy
Rural economic opportunity exists both on- and 
(increasingly) off-farm, and it has a strong spa-
tial dimension (Chamberlin and Jayne, 2013). A 
simple framework for thinking about the diversity 
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of  rural areas was proposed by Wiggins and 
Proctor (2001) who use differences in quality of  
natural resources and access to markets to char-
acterize current activities and potential future 
agricultural and rural development trajectories 
(Table 1.1). In a similar vein, the ‘development 
domains’ literature uses agricultural potential, ac-
cess to markets and population density to under-
stand ‘opportunities and constraints facing 
alternative rural livelihood options’ (Pender et al., 
2004, 2006; Chamberlin et al., 2006).
Frameworks like these are useful because 
they make explicit the critically important spa-
tial dimensions of  processes of  agrarian change 
including agricultural intensification, commer-
cialization and rural transformation more broadly. 
In so doing, they provide an important window 
on to the different ‘landscapes of  rural oppor-
tunity’ that confront young people and others 
(Sumberg et al., 2019; Abay et al., 2020).
Specifically, Table 1.1 leads to the gener-
ation of  hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between the level of  agricultural commercializa-
tion on the one hand, and the landscape of  rural 
opportunity on the other. For the sake of  argu-
ment, we can consider two ends of  a continuum 
of  rural economic dynamism – ‘hot spots’ 
(darker shading in Table 1.1) and ‘cold spots’ (no 
shading). The stylization shown in Table 1.2 
suggests a more diverse landscape of  opportun-
ity in hot spots, including high value crops, farm 
wage work, non-farm wage work and non-farm 
self-employment. At the same time, it is likely 
that there will be greater pressure on land in hot 
spots, which may restrict access of  some individ-
uals. It is expected that market-based mechan-
isms for land access (like rental markets) will be 
more important in hot spots than in cold spots.
The central concern of  this book is with 
young people’s engagement with the rural econ-
omy, and the focus is on the work or production 
side (as opposed to the consumption side) of  en-
gagement. Building on the previous sections, 
Fig. 1.1 shows how this engagement is concep-
tualized. At the centre of  the figure is a local rural 
economy with some combination of  farm and 
non-farm economic activities. Individuals who farm, 
gain access to land either through non- market 
Table 1.1. Rural diversity: a characterization, with most likely activities. Adapted from Wiggins and Proctor, 
2001. ‘Accessible’ areas include peri-urban and rural areas with good physical access to urban markets.




Accessible areas ‘Middle’ countryside Remote rural areas
Good Market gardening and 
dairying
Daily commuting to the city
Weekend recreation  
activities
Manufacturing industry may 
‘deconcentrate’ from city 
proper into this space
Arable farming and livestock 
production, specialized, with 
capital investment, producing 
surpluses for the market




Employment in off-farm 
economy
Migration (in or out)
Subsistence farming, with 
only the production of 
surpluses of high value 
items that can bear 
transport costs




Poor As above: i.e. Market 
gardening and dairying
NB: Quality of natural  
resources not so  
important since capital can 
be used to augment poor 
land – e.g. by irrigation, 
fertilizer, greenhouses – 
when needed for intensive 
farming







Subsistence farming, low 
productivity, surpluses 
very small or nil
Lightly settled




 African Youth and the Rural Economy: Points of Departure 15
(traditional land, family land, borrowing, etc.) or 
market (purchase, rental, sharecropping) ar-
rangements. Three labour arrangements are en-
visaged in relation to both farm and non-farm 
activities: unpaid labour, self-employment and 
wage labour. Finally, the kinds of  activities under-
taken, means of  accessing land, and labour 
arrangements are mediated by opportunity 
structures, gender, economic vibrancy, agency, 
hazard and an individual’s imagined future.
Chapter Summaries
Youth and the Rural Economy in Africa: Hard Work 
and Hazard proceeds as follows.
Chapter 2 (Oosterom, Chamberlin and Sum-
berg) focuses on the different empirical windows 
that have been used to study young people’s 
economic lives and livelihoods. A selection of  
primarily quantitative, primarily qualitative and 
mixed method studies is analysed in terms of  the 
Table 1.2. Stylized contrast characterization of rural hot spots and cold spots.
Characteristic Hot spots Cold spots
Orientation of farming More commercial Less commercial
Distance to major markets Near Far
Population density Higher Lower
Social services, including schools Better Poor
Internet service Better Poor
Economic dynamism Higher Lower
Opportunities for high value crops More Few
Agric. input / service availability Better Poor
Opportunities for farm wage work More Few
Opportunities for non-farm self-employment More Few
Opportunities for non-farm wage work More Few
















































Fig. 1.1. Conceptualization of young people’s engagement with the rural economy. Courtesy of the authors.
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questions addressed, methods used and the scale 
of  the spatial analysis. Following this, the 
methods used in the research presented in this 
book are described and situated in relation to 
the larger body of  literature touching on youth and 
the rural economy. The final section makes some 
specific recommendations on how these windows 
and methods might be improved to gain greater, 
more policy-relevant insight on young people’s 
lives and livelihoods, in all their diversity.
Chapter 3 (Flynn and Sumberg) is motivated 
by the oft-repeated claim that rural young people 
are turning their backs on agriculture. To put 
this claim into perspective it explores how young 
women and men engage with the rural economy 
across a selection of  countries and contexts. In 
addition to unpaid domestic work, farm work 
and care roles, three broad patterns of  engage-
ment (or segments) emerge. Many young people 
combine some involvement in crop and/or live-
stock production with off-farm or non-farm 
employment, while others are not involved in 
agriculture at all, but engage only in non-farm 
self- employment and/or wage employment. A rela-
tively small number of  others engage only in 
agricultural activities. The chapter provides 
examples of  these patterns and explores the 
influence of  intensity of  agricultural commer-
cialization in shaping them.
Chapter 4 (Chamberlin, Yeboah and Sumberg) 
argues that land issues play a direct or indirect 
role in many if  not most rural ‘youth questions’ 
that are the focus of  policy discussion. This in-
cludes the changing ability of  young people to 
access land for starting out in farming, driven by 
increasing scarcity of  land, but also includes the 
broader transformations that are accompanying 
such scarcity. These transformations include the 
increasing commodification of  land and replace-
ment of  traditional access institutions with mar-
ket mechanisms. They also include expanding 
rural labour markets and rural mobility, chan-
ging farm size and characteristics, and the evo-
lution of  agricultural value chains and the farm 
and non-farm rural economies, all of  which are 
endogenously linked. This chapter lays out what 
we currently know, identifies areas requiring 
further empirical research, and some of  the data 
collection innovations that will enable such 
research.
Chapter 5 (Thorsen and Yeboah) uses the 
‘mobility paradigm’ to shift attention away from 
the deeply entrenched focus on transnational 
and irregular migration, and the relatively few 
rural young people involved in them. Rather, the 
chapter highlights the central role of  movement 
and relocations over shorter spatial and tem-
poral scales in many young people’s livelihoods 
and transitions. Using interview data, examples 
of  forced movement due to civil unrest, and mo-
bilities for education and/or work are explored, 
with a particular emphasis on gender differences 
and the role of  social control.
Chapter 6 (Chamberlin and Sumberg) uses 
household survey data to address three ques-
tions: How might we think about the notion that 
youth bring something new to farming? What 
aspects of  young people’s farming are visible 
with existing empirical windows? Do the young 
in SSA farm differently? The analysis provides 
some support for many of  the stylized assertions 
about youth in African agriculture. Young house-
holds are associated with marginally higher 
propensities for engaging with intensification 
practices and commercial orientations. However, 
the very limited magnitude of  these age effects 
suggests much caution should be exercised in 
making the argument that young people’s 
inherent vim and vigour are important and 
underutilized assets for agricultural growth and 
transformation in SSA.
Chapter 7 (Crossouard, Dunne and Szyp) fo-
cuses on formal education. After laying out the 
intellectual background for the importance of  
education in Africa’s development agenda, the 
chapter draws on qualitative research into youth 
livelihoods in four SSA countries to challenge a 
number of  key assumptions. First, it illuminates 
the extent to which young people value educa-
tion. It then turns to their lived experiences of  
juggling both schooling and work from an early 
age, highlighting the wide disparity between 
idealized notions of  ‘transition’ and the com-
plexities of  youth livelihoods. It then explores the 
gendered dimensions of  this social landscape, and 
how these produce different pressures that force 
young women in particular, out of  education. 
The chapter concludes with implications for 
young people’s current and future engagement 
with the rural economy, and for education policy.
Chapter 8 (Oosterom) interrogates the in-
creasingly popular notion of  waithood, and 
particularly the idea that most young people are 
stuck permanently in waithood because they 
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cannot enter the labour market. Based on empir-
ical data gathered from young rural women and 
men in Uganda, Ethiopia and Nigeria, the mean-
ing of  farming and other economic activities in 
their lives, particularly in relation to social sta-
tus, is presented. Other avenues for claim mak-
ing on social recognition, status and respect are 
then analysed, with a focus on marriage, family 
life, and active citizenship. Throughout the 
chapter the gendered nature of  the process of  
becoming a social adult is emphasized.
Chapter 9 (Yeboah, Crossouard and Flynn) 
explores the futures that rural young people 
imagine for themselves, and how they relate to 
both their current engagement with the rural 
economy, and the narrative that suggests a widely 
held desire to abandon agriculture and rural 
areas. Beyond imagined future economic activities, 
including farm and non-farm work, the chapter 
highlights the place of  education and migration 
in young people’s imagined futures.
Chapter 10 (Sumberg, Szyp, Yeboah, Oost-
erom, Crossouard and Chamberlin) synthesizes 
the main findings of  the seven empirical chap-
ters, and sets out their discursive and practical 
implications for policy, research and practice 
relating to youth, and to agricultural and rural 
development.
Notes
i President John Mahama’s presentation at a youth work session in Cotonou, Benin, on Ghana’s experi-
ence with unemployment and job creation, Friday 13 September 2013, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=yt4IdpWqxGE, accessed on 16 January 2021.
ii This section draws heavily on Glover and Sumberg (2020).
iii The UN mainly uses the 15–24 age range – ‘for statistical purposes’ – as its definition of youth, though 
some UN entities employ other definitions, such as UN Habitat which uses the 15–32 age range (UNDESA, 
n.d.). The UN also recognizes that the definition of youth varies across the world, and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) itself acknowledges the ‘growing momentum’ to extend the definition up to the age 
of 29, given that not all young have completed their education and have thus postponed their entry into the 
labour market (ILO, 2015, p.1). Finally, the African Union, as stated in its ‘Youth Charter’, uses the 15–35 age 
range as its definition of youth (African Union Commission, 2006), though various African governments use 
different definitions (e.g. Kenya uses the 15–30 age range (Republic of Kenya, 2007), while Malawi uses the 
10–35 age range, stating that ‘the definition is quite flexible, bearing in mind the variety of parameters that 
could be used in categorizing the youth’ (Republic of Malawi, 2013, p.v)).
iv For example, Mueller and Lee (2019) use survey data to investigate youth migration, while defining as a 
migrant anyone who moves out of the household in which they were located in the previous survey round. ‘We 
further compare the distances travelled by migration pattern […]. The median distance that young (15–24) ru-
ral-[to-]rural male (female) migrants travel is 1.4 (1.4) kilometres in Malawi, and 0.2 (1.6) kilometres in Tanzania’ 
(p.31). In other words, more than half of the male, rural-to-rural ‘migrants’ in Malawi moved less than 200 m. 
This finding throws into stark relief the importance of distinguishing between migration and mobility.
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Introduction
Over the last two decades young people in rural 
areas of  sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have become a 
clear focus for political rhetoric, policy and invest-
ment at national, regional and international 
levels. Policy processes and public discourse 
addressing rural youth, and the arguments that 
inform them, draw on a wide array of  data and 
information sources. These range from official 
statistics (e.g. unemployment and school enrolment 
rates), through nationally representative surveys 
(e.g. the Living Standards Measurement Study – 
Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS–ISA) 
programme of  The World Bank (Carletto and 
Gourlay, 2019)). special purpose surveys and 
mixed method or qualitative studies at selected 
sites. The field is also rife with ‘common know-
ledge’ claims and narratives about ‘African youth’: 
for instance, that they are abandoning agriculture 
and fleeing rural areas or that they are particu-
larly innovative (for further discussion of  these 
narratives see Mabiso and Benfica, 2019; Sum-
berg and Hunt, 2019). While many of  these styl-
ized claims are not rooted in empirical evidence, 
they nevertheless continue to play important roles 
in public and policy discourse.
In many respects, attempting to say anything 
meaningful and ‘evidence-based’ about ‘young 
people in rural Africa’ or even ‘young people in 
country X’ is a herculean task, if  not altogether 
hopeless. One is immediately confronted with 
the fact of  high levels of  diversity among both 
young people and rural areas. The obvious 
riposte to any finding or statement about young 
people in rural Africa is simply, ‘Which young 
people, and which rural Africa?’
The alternative available sources of  empir-
ical information provide different kinds of  in-
sights and differ in how effectively they deal with 
the challenge of  ‘which young people, and which 
rural Africa?’. For example, large-scale survey 
data have the appeal of  enabling statistical infer-
ence around measurable outcomes (e.g. the 
share of  17-year-olds in school in a country), but 
may be wholly insufficient at representing sub-
jective views of  educational quality, constraints 
to staying in school, plans for the future, or other 
nuanced descriptions of  situations more dis-
coverable through qualitative methods. In sum-
marizing the conclusions drawn from different 
empirical sources, the strengths and weaknesses 
of  alternative methodologies and evidence bases 
are not often explored, or even acknowledged, at 
least in relation to how young people engage 
with the rural economy. Further, there has 
been little discussion of  how these respective 
strengths and weaknesses might affect under-
standings of  young people’s economic activities, 
their efforts to build their livelihoods, and hence 
what policy and intervention strategies would be 
most appropriate.
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In this chapter we review a range of  aca-
demic studies that are centrally focused on or in-
clude findings about young people and the rural 
economy in Africa. We have selected a number 
of  studies that have used quantitative, qualita-
tive and mixed method approaches and employ 
these to reflect on the question: ‘How do we 
know about young people in rural SSA?’ Specif-
ically, the strengths and weaknesses of  the main 
methodological approaches used to generate 
empirical evidence about how young people 
engage with the rural economy are analysed. As 
we will show, the differences across the research 
literature are significant. For example, some 
studies address youth-related questions by ex-
tracting data on the activities of  rural youth 
from general household surveys, while others 
are designed to specifically involve youth as re-
search participants. Studies about rural youth 
have different theoretical, conceptual and discip-
linary underpinnings, which are then reflected in 
coverage (e.g. national, multi-sited or single-sited), 
sample size and sampling strategy. Some large- 
scale studies are cross sectional while others are 
longitudinal; other analyses are highly context-
ualized case studies. There are also differences in 
the primary data collection unit (a household or an 
individual young person), the methods (quanti-
tative, qualitative or mixed) and whether or not 
the study has an ambition to engage with policy.
What we will demonstrate in this chapter, is 
that even multi-sited case studies do not always 
investigate how particularities of  geographic lo-
cations influence young people’s economic activ-
ities. Nor does social diversity among rural youth 
often figure prominently in most analyses, des-
pite the avowed desire to avoid treating African 
‘youth’ as a homogeneous group. Perhaps the 
most common way of  addressing diversity is by 
using a gender lens. However, while undoubtedly 
important, gender remains only one aspect of  so-
cial difference, and gender differences may or 
may not map on to differences in age (even 
among the ‘youth’), ethnicity, religion, disability, 
wealth, level of  education or origin (indigene or 
migrant). Even if  different social categories of  
young people have been purposively included in 
the sample, the implications of  social difference – 
for example, for accessing educational and work 
opportunities – are seldom explored in depth. It is 
here that the ideal of  ‘policy-relevant research’ 
becomes unstuck: while policy makers want sim-
ple facts and narratives covering large numbers 
of  rural youth, these same facts and narratives 
effectively extract young people from their social, 
economic and geographical contexts. Yet it is these 
social and geographical contexts that enable and 
constrain young people’s economic activities, al-
lowing some to move ahead while disadvanta-
ging others. Different research approaches can, in 
principle, deal with context – for example, by ‘con-
trolling for it’ or building it into the design of  em-
pirical work. To date, however, the role of  context 
remains a major lacuna in the evidence base on 
the economic activities of  rural youth.
The remainder of  the chapter is organized in 
three sections. The next section focuses on the dif-
ferent empirical windows that have been used to 
study young people’s economic lives and liveli-
hoods. A selection of  studies is analysed in terms 
of  the questions addressed, methods used and the 
scale of  the spatial analysis. Following this, the 
methods employed in the research presented in 
this book are described and situated in relation to 
the larger body of  literature touching on youth 
and the rural economy. The final section makes 
some specific recommendations on how these 
windows and methods might be improved to gain 
greater, more policy-relevant insight on young 
people’s lives and livelihoods, in all their diversity.
Empirical Windows: How Do We Know 
About Rural Youth in Africa?
To frame this exercise, we generated a list of  em-
pirical studies that directly or indirectly address 
youth engagement with the rural economy in 
SSA. This collection of  39 studies (Appendix 
Table 2A) reflects our own knowledge of  the lit-
erature and suggestions received from several 
other researchers in the field. It is not meant to 
be exhaustive (Francophone and Lusophone lit-
erature is absent), but rather to reflect both the 
essence and the diversity of  the empirical literature. 
Included in Appendix Table 2A are the ‘cited by’ 
figures given by Google Scholar, which, with all 
the usual caveats (i.e. difference in publication 
date and type of  publication), provide a crude in-
dicator of  the relative influence of  the different 
studies to date.i
Each study was then broadly classified in re-
lation to the methods used (primarily quantita-
tive, primarily qualitative or mixed) and the scale 
at which the analysis is focused (Fig. 2.1). The 
boundaries between quantitative and qualitative 
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are not absolute, and some quantitative studies 
have a qualitative element and vice versa. The two 
largest clusters of  studies are first, those that use 
primarily quantitative methods and representa-
tive samples to present analyses at the level of  a 
whole country; and second, those that use quali-
tative methods to present analyses at the level of  
individuals, villages or districts (although most 
often these are not based on representative sam-
ples). Most studies in the former group have a 
cross-country comparative element, while fewer 
studies in the latter group are concerned with coun-
try comparisons. It is also important to note that 
relatively highly cited studies appear in four of  the 
six boxes, suggesting there is no clear methodo-
logical monopoly on the knowledge about young 
people’s engagement with the rural economy.
In the sections that follow we review many 
of  these studies in more detail, with a focus on 
the topics they address, the methods used, and 
briefly, whether they support or challenge com-
mon narratives about rural youth.
Studies with a primarily quantitative 
orientation
The quantitative studies overwhelmingly address 
three major topics: employment (Blattman et al., 
2014; Filmer and Fox, 2014; Elder et al., 2015; 
Maiga et al., 2015; Baah-Boateng, 2016; Fox 
and Thomas, 2016; Losch, 2016; Yeboah and 
Jayne, 2018; Mueller and Thurlow, 2019, Chapters 
2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9); land access (Kristensen 
and Birch-Thomsen, 2013; Bezu and Holden, 
2014; Kosec et al., 2018; Andersson Djurfeldt 
et al., 2019); and migration and labour mobility 
(Bezu and Holden, 2014; Kosec et al., 2018; Mu-
eller and Thurlow, 2019, Chapters 2 and 9).
These topics are linked in ways that largely 
align with two major themes. The first is that 
farming opportunities are increasingly limited 
for young people in SSA – chiefly, but not exclu-
sively, because their access to land is limited. The 
second theme is that non-farm income-generat-
ing opportunities available to young people are 
also limited in rural (and urban) areas. The up-
shot is that the lack of  economic opportunity 
will drive a number of  processes with either 
negative or ambiguous valence, including rural 
out-migration, political unrest, and fraying of  
traditional social norms and institutions.ii
Many of  the studies in our selection focus 
on descriptive documentation of  youth employ-
ment patterns. A central question is the relative 
importance of  agriculture as an employer of  
rural youth. Given the limited absorption cap-
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Fig. 2.1. Distribution of selected empirical studies by method and scale. Courtesy of the authors.
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sector in many rural areas, agriculture is widely 
seen as having a central role in the provision of  
productive employment for Africa’s rural youth 
(Filmer and Fox, 2014; AGRA, 2015; Maiga 
et al., 2015; Losch, 2016; IFAD, 2019). Maiga et al. 
(2015) estimate agricultural labour participa-
tion rates for youth (defined as individuals aged 
16–35) in Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Tan-
zania and Uganda, finding about half  of  all youth, 
on average, worked in agriculture (although 
with high cross-country variation – rates ranged 
from 27.1% in Nigeria to 63.4% in Niger – combined 
with high internal variation). Yeboah and Jayne 
(2018), using nationally representative data 
from nine countries, find that the number of  
young people engaged in farming is increasing 
in absolute terms but the share of  farming in 
total employment is declining over time in most 
countries. Employment in off-farm segments 
of  agrifood systems is expanding rapidly in per-
centage terms, with non-farm activities consti-
tuting the major source of  new employment. This 
movement of  labour from farming is associated 
with agriculture-driven changes: the performance 
of  farming is found to significantly influence the 
rate of  job growth in the rest of  the economy, 
with a 5-year lagged moving average rate of  
agricultural productivity growth found to be 
positively and significantly associated with 
growth in the off-farm share of  labour.
Other country-level studies have produced 
results which suggest that these patterns vary 
considerably across settings. Schmidt and Bekele 
Woldeyes (2019) find that young Ethiopians 
have a greater probability of  working in non-
farm enterprises than older individuals, but that 
outcomes are also affected by other (‘push’) fac-
tors: those in areas with less favourable agricul-
tural potential, who possess fewer assets, and 
have less access to agricultural credit are more 
likely to seek off-farm work. Diao et al. (2019) 
find continuous movement of  young people in 
Ghana from agriculture. Adesugba and Mavro-
tas (2016) find very large internal migration 
rates in Nigeria, much of  which is associated 
with non-farm employment, particularly for 
those with higher educational attainments. On 
the other hand, Benson et al. (2019) find that 
the process of  rural labour diversification into 
non-farm sectors in Malawi is not youth driven, 
but rather characterized by older men (in their 
30s and 40s) responding to climate stresses and 
other push factors. They furthermore find little 
evidence of  structural transformation processes 
alluded to in many of  the large-scale assess-
ments of  SSA. These latter two studies find a 
strong association between non-farm work and 
remoteness, as does some of  the background 
work for IFAD (2019).
In one of  the few quantitative studies to 
examine farm decisions made by youth, Diao 
et al. (2019) find that compared with older farm-
ers, younger farmers in Ghana are not more 
likely to intensify or use modern inputs; con-
straints to adoption seem to be non-age specific 
(e.g. market access is important for technology 
adoption) (see Chapter 6, this volume). They also 
find that labour productivity is growing faster 
than land productivity – highlighting the increas-
ing importance of  labour-saving technologies 
for agricultural intensification. How this will 
play out for successive generations of  new en-
trants to farming is unclear, given the land and 
migration patterns mentioned above.
Andersson Djurfeldt et al.’s (2019) mixed 
methods study in Zambia also found no age- 
related intensification or productivity relation-
ships, which they attribute in part to the limited 
resources of  younger household heads – a find-
ing which recurs repeatedly in both quantitative 
and qualitative assessments. Land was found to 
be a major constraint to young people’s farming 
prospects, as elsewhere – e.g. Andriamanalina 
et al. (2014) in Madagascar, Ahaibwe et al. (2013) 
in Uganda, Benson et al. (2019) in Malawi.
A recurring finding is that, because of  
limited rural opportunities (again linked with 
underdeveloped land and labour markets), the 
movement of  young people from rural areas is 
increasing and likely to increase further over 
time. Bezu and Holden (2014) and Kosec et al. 
(2018) both use microeconomic data from sub-
national samples in highland Ethiopia and find 
that youth out-migration is in part a response to 
limited agricultural land availability. Mueller 
and Lee’s (2019) Ethiopian study finds that 
rural-to-urban migration facilitates movement 
out of  agriculture, with associated gains in eco-
nomic returns, but it is a pathway for relatively 
few young people. Youth are more likely to pur-
sue rural-to-rural migration.
The political and developmental valence of  
this movement is less clear: on the one hand, given 
limited absorption capacities of  the non-farm 
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sectors in both urban and rural areas, such 
flows will not address the youth employment 
challenge (Filmer and Fox, 2014; Losch, 2016). 
On the other hand, economic welfare returns to 
investment in movement are generally perceived 
to be high, particularly for those able to move to 
urban areas (Mueller and Lee, 2019).
The analytical emphasis of  many quantita-
tive studies is on identifying the determinants of  
observable outcomes, where the determinants 
of  interest are often structural features of  the 
economic setting which may be amenable to pol-
icy leverage (e.g. functioning of  land markets). 
Emphasis is on formal conceptualization of  rela-
tionships, identification of  average effects at a 
population level, and credibility of  claims for 
internal validity (i.e. claims of  causal identifica-
tion). Most of  the studies in the set of  papers that 
use quantitative methods feature individual- or 
household-level observational data and econo-
metric analyses (e.g. Bezu and Holden, 2014; 
Maiga et al., 2015; Baah-Boateng, 2016; Kosec 
et al., 2018; Yeboah and Jayne, 2018; Anders-
son Djurfeldt et al., 2019; Mueller and Thurlow, 
2019, most chapters). Others feature macroeco-
nomic analyses to make statements about struc-
tural relationships at the level of  the national 
economy (Filmer and Fox, 2014; Baah-Boateng, 
2016; Fox and Thomas, 2016; Losch, 2016).iii 
Most of  these studies seek to identify average 
treatment effects or marginal effects of  changes 
in variables that can be altered (in theory) 
through policy.
A key feature of  many of  these studies is 
their large sample sizes and sampling strategies 
that make then nationally representative.iv In-
ternal diversity in such large, random samples is 
almost guaranteed, by construction. However, 
policy-oriented analysis typically seeks to un-
cover average effects after controlling for such 
diversity, rather than to explicitly examine its 
implications for policy, e.g. through interaction 
effects of  key characteristics, such as age and 
gender, or particular contexts, such as remote 
rural settings. Relatedly, comparative analyses 
of  different geographical contexts are only pre-
sented in a few of  the studies, as in many cases 
the extent of  potential disaggregation is limited 
by sample design. Surprisingly, educational at-
tainment of  young people – a key component of  
policy debates – is not the central focus of  any of  
the studies in our selected set, although limited 
education is cited as a broad constraint on the 
non-farm opportunities available to rural young 
people (e.g. Yeboah and Jayne, 2018) and for 
those who migrate to urban areas (Mueller and 
Thurlow, 2019, Chapter 2). While sex disaggre-
gated analysis features in many of  these studies 
(e.g. Bezu and Holden, 2014; Kosec et al., 2018; 
Yeboah and Jayne, 2018; Andersson Djurfeldt 
et al., 2019), further interactions (e.g. between 
sex and educational attainment) are generally 
not addressed and gender-specific policy recom-
mendations are not made. Policy prescriptions 
tend to be very normative and fail to articulate 
ways in which youth as a heterogenous group 
may require differentiated support; this may en-
courage essentialist thinking and overly stand-
ardized policy actions (Sumberg et al., 2012).
The scale of  analysis is a function of  the 
sampling frames, with studies that use nation-
ally representative data generally making infer-
ential claims about all rural youth in a country 
(e.g. the studies in Mueller and Thurlow, 2019). 
Claims for external validity elsewhere in the re-
gion are not usually made explicitly, except in 
the case of  cross-country analyses (Maiga et al., 
2015; Yeboah and Jayne, 2018). However, the 
fact of  national representativeness confers a 
strong inherent advantage of  such studies over 
stocktaking claims arising from qualitative case 
studies which are typically much reduced in 
scope. Some subnational surveys typically offer 
large samples (many hundreds of  observations) 
which are either representative of  key subpopu-
lations of  interest or indicative of  broadly shared 
conditions (e.g. woredas within the Blue Nile 
Basin in Amhara and Oromia, Ethiopia, see Ko-
sec et al., 2018).
Unlike qualitative studies, most quantita-
tive analyses make statements about young 
people using data sets collected via multi-purpose 
household-level instruments (although typically 
with detailed information on individual mem-
bers, reported by a single respondent, usually 
the head). Youth-specific instruments are rare 
(exceptions include Bezu and Holden, 2014; 
Kosec et al., 2018; Andersson Djurfeldt et al., 
2019). Thus, data are generally collected on – 
but not from – young people via the information 
gathered for members of  sampled households 
(e.g. Maiga et al., 2015; Yeboah and Jayne, 2018; 
Mueller and Thurlow, 2019, Chapters 2, 3, 5, 6, 
7, 8 and 9). The fact that data underpinning 
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these analyses are generally not reported by the 
individuals concerned is potentially problematic, 
as the head (the typical respondent in household 
surveys) may not be aware of  or adequately rep-
resent the activities and experiences of  young 
household members (see Chapter 6, this vol-
ume). There is a large empirical literature docu-
menting divergence of  responses to the same 
questions from self-reporting versus proxy re-
spondents, and gendered differences in estimates 
of  asset values, control and decision making, 
and time spent under different activities (Bardasi 
et al., 2011; Kilic and Moylan, 2016; Doss et al., 
2017, 2018; Janzen, 2018; Ambler et al., 2019).
As noted above, the emphasis of  many of  
these studies is to gain insights about the out-
comes that might be expected if  conditions are 
changed through policy or through specific 
interventions. This orientation can generate valu-
able inputs for policy guidance. However, such 
studies generally do not directly address pro-
cesses, path dependencies or dynamics, other 
than through the interpretive discussion of  de-
scriptive statistics and estimated relationships. 
For the most part, transitions to adulthood are 
not directly addressed, except in some interpretive 
discussions of  results (e.g. Andersson Djurfeldt 
et al., 2019). Although many studies use panel 
data (in which the same individuals and/or 
households are observed over time), these data 
are used to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
in order to make better appeals for internal valid-
ity. To date, panel data have not been used to de-
scribe the trajectories of  young women’s and 
men’s engagement with the rural economy. It 
may be useful to pursue analysis along these 
lines in the future.
Studies with a primarily qualitative 
orientation
The studies discussed in this section can be div-
ided into two groups. The first, including Petesch 
and Rodríguez Caillava (2012), Leavy and Hos-
sain (2014) and Yeboah et al. (2020) are rela-
tively large scale, including many respondents 
and multiple locations and/or countries. Petesch 
and Rodríguez Caillava (2012) report on work 
designed to provide background to the 2012 
World Development Report on Gender Equality 
and Development (The World Bank, 2012). The 
study focuses on people’s perceptions of  eco-
nomic opportunities, how they approached 
these opportunities, and the social institutions 
that shaped their perceptions. It integrates a 
gender perspective in the choice of  topics and 
questions, addressing issues such as caring re-
sponsibilities and marriage traditions. Data were 
collected through nearly 150 focus groups and 
key informant interviews, in a total of  30 rural 
communities across six countries in SSA (Bur-
kina Faso, Liberia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanza-
nia and Togo). Focus groups were conducted 
separately with young women and men from 
ages 18 to 24, as well as with adult women and 
men (ages 25 to 60). In Burkina Faso, Sudan 
and Togo, additional focus groups were held 
with adolescent boys and girls (ages 10 to 16).
The study by Leavy and Hossain (2014) is 
extracted from a larger research programme on 
food price volatility in the wake of  the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis. Using the concept of  ‘opportunity 
space’ (Sumberg et al., 2012), it aims to provide 
insights into the opportunities for youth to en-
gage with farming. The study explores the as-
sumption that higher food prices make farming 
relatively more attractive. Using a sociological 
approach, it examines the factors influencing 
choices with respect to farming and how aspir-
ations are formed. In total, 13 rural sites and ten 
peri-urban and urban sites in ten countries were 
covered (Vietnam, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Paki-
stan, Ethiopia, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Kenya, 
Guatemala and Bolivia). Focus group discus-
sions (FDGs) were held in all sites with individ-
uals in the low-income category or in precarious 
livelihoods, while individual interviews were 
conducted with youth, parents and older key in-
formants. In total 1500 participants took part in 
the study (the number of  FGDs and interviews is 
not specified). Yeboah et al. (2020) is a medi-
um-scale, multi-country study focused on young 
people’s engagement in farming and other eco-
nomic activities in ‘hot spots’ of  agricultural 
commercialization. Data were collected via 117 
interviews conducted in single sites in Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe and Ghana with young women and 
men aged between 16 and 35. The strategy for 
capturing diversity was to have a gender-balanced 
sample, and including individuals of  different 
ages, origin (local or migrant) and years of  
formal education.
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The second group of  qualitative studies in-
cludes smaller-scale studies involving one or a 
few locations (Ansell, 2004; Locke and te Linte-
lo, 2012; Kristensen and Birch-Thomsen, 2013; 
Berckmoes and White, 2014; Reynolds-Whyte 
and Acio, 2017). These seek mainly to contrib-
ute to conceptual development, and although 
there may be some engagement with policy nar-
ratives and discourses, the primary objective is 
not to provide policy or programme recom-
mendations. The studies explore processes and 
dynamics and seek to explain outcomes such as 
young people’s educational attainment, eco-
nomic activity and transitions to adulthood.
Ansell (2004) investigates the gendered im-
pact of  schooling on young people’s transitions, 
and the multiple factors that influence their sec-
ondary school experiences and hopes for the fu-
ture. In terms of  scale this was the smallest study 
in our set: case study research was conducted at 
two rural secondary schools, one in Lesotho and 
one in Zimbabwe, which included participant 
observation, group discussions with older pupils, 
and inviting younger pupils to write ‘compositions’ 
on a range of  topics. Interviews were conducted 
with teachers, school governors and other adults 
in the community. Locke and te Lintelo (2012) 
explore how young Zambians make sense of  de-
layed or partial transitions to adulthood, with 
the objective of  contributing to conceptualiza-
tions of  youth transitions. Sixty interviews 
focused on life trajectories from birth and par-
ticularly the social dynamics behind education, 
aspirations and employment. Using purposive 
sampling, a selection of  young women and men, 
who were formally and informally employed, 
self-employed (including some ‘subsistence’ farm-
ers) and unemployed, was made. Sixteen key in-
formant interviews were also conducted with 
representatives of  youth organizations and donors, 
and with researchers.
Kristensen and Birch-Thomsen (2013) 
study the economic activities of  rural youth at 
two locations in the northern province of  Zam-
bia and two in eastern Uganda, including the 
barriers to, and opportunities for, successful busi-
ness creation. They analyse mobility patterns 
and what motivates young people to migrate or 
stay put, and the assistance that is ‘visible’ to 
rural youth and whether it matches their needs. 
The methodology combined a household ques-
tionnaire survey (N=164 households, including 
387 young people between 15–36 years), FDGs 
with young people and key informant inter-
views. Berckmoes and White (2014) study the 
perceptions of  rural youth in Burundi, focusing 
on livelihoods challenges and transitions, and 
strategies in relation to education, marriage and 
migration. The gendering of  youth transitions is 
a principle concern. Interviews and group dis-
cussions were conducted with female and male 
youth, community leaders and non-governmen-
tal organization (NGO) facilitators, and a survey 
was conducted in three villages (N=161). Reyn-
olds-Whyte and Acio (2017) focus on the chal-
lenges that rural youth face in accessing land in 
the Acholi region in northern Uganda, a region 
affected by over 20 years of  armed conflict. 
A gendered analysis of  how social institutions 
and gerontocracy complicate young people’s ac-
cess to land is developed from 46 individual 
interviews conducted in one sub-county.
All of  the primarily qualitative studies, apart 
from Levy and Hossain (2014), are designed 
with an explicit focus on youth. They directly in-
volve young people through interviews and 
other qualitative methods. Often, the inter-
actions with youth are complemented by inter-
views with parents, community leaders, local 
officials or NGO representatives, and sometimes 
with surveys. However, it is also striking that both 
the large- and small-scale studies rely mostly on 
conventional qualitative methods including in-
dividual interviews and FDGs. This is despite the 
recognition that participatory research methods 
are particularly appropriate with young people 
(Johnson et al., 2017) as they can provide greater 
scope for self-expression. One rare example is 
Daum’s (2019) recent study on the aspirations 
of  young people in Zambia’s eastern province: 
he asked 53 young people to draw ‘the farm they 
want’ and then complemented this exercise with 
in-depth interviews. While some studies include 
both qualitative and survey methods (Ahaibwe 
et al., 2013; Kristensen and Birch-Thomsen, 
2013; Andriamanalina et al., 2014; Berckmoes 
and White, 2014; Yeboah et al., 2017; Anders-
son Djurfeldt et al., 2019), survey data are used 
only to provide simple descriptive statistics.
Most of  the studies recognize that while 
youth constitute a diverse social category, they 
are often treated as if  they are homogenous. 
However, while an acknowledgement of  the 
importance of  diversity informs most sampling 
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strategies, and gender-balanced samples are the 
norm, the depth of  any gender analysis varies 
and consideration of  other aspects of  social dif-
ference is limited. Few of  these studies analyse 
gendered experiences in as much depth as Ansell 
(2004), Berckmoes and White (2014), and 
Reynolds-Whyte and Acio (2017). In terms of  
other aspects of  social diversity, Yeboah et al. 
(2020) is an exception in that migrant and local 
youth, including youth with different educa-
tional backgrounds, were sampled. While the 
majority of  young people in rural areas are likely 
to belong to a low-income category, none of  the 
studies samples both relatively better-off  and 
poorer youth. Only Leavy and Hossain (2014) 
present some findings for better-off  youth, while 
Locke and te Lintelo (2012) discuss the life tra-
jectories of  relatively poorer youth separately. 
Andersson Djurfeldt et al. (2019) discuss youth 
access to land and agricultural opportunities 
vis-à-vis their positionality within households.
Across both large- and small-scale studies 
there is considerable variation in how much 
contextual detail is provided and how it is inte-
grated into the analysis. Single location studies 
including Reynolds-Whyte and Acio (2017) in 
northern Uganda, and Berckmoes and White 
(2014) in Burundi, are more likely to discuss 
context in greater depth. Multi-country studies 
by Leavy and Hossain (2014), and Petesch and 
Rodríguez Caillava (2012), give little attention 
to the specifics of  context and, for example, how 
these might matter for outcome variables such 
as work, education or migration. The study by 
Kristensen and Birch-Thomsen (2013) is an 
exception in interpreting strategies of  young 
people in Zambia and Uganda as a function of  
their location (primarily in terms of  access to 
farmland). It is interesting to note that most 
multi-sited studies highlight the shared ex-
periences of  young people across very differ-
ent sites and contexts, rather than analysing 
how variation in economic opportunities re-
sult in different attitudes and strategies. For 
example, despite working in rural, industrial 
and urban locations, Locke and te Lintelo 
(2012) provide no analysis of  the differential 
influence of  context on youth transitions. The 
emphasis is rather on commonalities across 
the three sites, with one exception being the 
observation that while rural youth face more 
structural difficulties in attaining an education 
and finding work, at least they are farming while 
‘waiting’ for a complete transition (p.788).
Mixed methods studies
Several of  the studies in our selection explicitly 
feature a mix of  qualitative and quantitative 
analyses (Ahaibwe et al., 2013; Kristensen and 
Birch-Thomsen, 2013; Andriamanalina et al., 
2014; Yeboah et al., 2017; Andersson Djurfeldt 
et al., 2019). In practice, however, these studies 
tend to emphasize one or the other in their ana-
lysis. For example, some primarily offer a quali-
tative study with a small survey for descriptive 
statistics added on (Kristensen and Birch-Thom-
sen, 2013). Conversely, Ahaibwe et al. (2013) 
and Andriamanalina et al. (2014) offer descrip-
tive analyses of  large quantitative data sets, 
which are bolstered with FGDs to help inform 
interpretation of  results. Yeboah et al. (2017) is 
different in that the primary study methodology – 
Q Methodology – is inherently mixed: it organ-
izes data collection on subjective views in such a 
way that quantitative analyses are facilitated. 
However, it shares many of  the other character-
istics of  qualitative studies, including small sam-
ple size, emphasis on description and elicitation 
of  subjective viewpoints. Andersson Djurfeldt 
et al.’s (2019) study of  youth farming in Mkushi, 
Zambia, comes closest to methods integration. It 
uses survey data (albeit on a relatively small 
sample of  268 households) to document trends 
in agricultural intensification for farm man-
agers of  different ages, along with qualitative 
interviews to describe more detailed patterns, 
subjective constraints and aspirations for agricul-
tural participation by young people occupying 
different household positions.
While not included in our list of  39 studies, 
the work of  the Young Lives programme in Ethi-
opia deserves mention (Chuta and Morrow, 
2015; Favara, 2017; Favara et al., 2018; Pank-
hurst et al., 2018). Young Lives was a longitu-
dinal comparative research programme, that in 
Ethiopia undertook a 15-year study, following 
two cohorts of  children in 20 sites selected from 
five regions. The research followed one cohort 
from infancy to adolescence (aged 1–15), and 
the second from early childhood to early adult-
hood (aged 8–22). Combining both quantitative 
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and qualitative data, the studies provide a unique 
perspective on the effects of  poverty on chil-
dren’s lives and transitions. We do not include 
these studies in our review for two reasons: first, 
they did not arise through our literature selec-
tion process, as described earlier in this chapter; 
second, with specific respect to the Young Lives 
programme outputs, the emphasis has been 
largely on children, rather than on young adults.
The dearth of  mixed methods studies de-
serves comment. On the one hand, mixed methods 
studies are on the rise in the applied social sci-
ences (Timans et al., 2019). On the other hand, 
fully integrated mixed methods studies continue 
to prove challenging (Roelen and Camfield, 
2015; Palinkas et al., 2019). Although some big 
picture assessments are sometimes referred to in 
framing qualitative studies (e.g. Filmer and Fox, 
2014; Losch, 2016), the reverse is seldom true. 
Furthermore, the qualitative and quantitative 
studies generally have very little overlap in terms 
of  cited literature (this is particularly evident 
with migration studies).
Approaches and Methods That 
Underpin This Book
General approach
The research that is at the heart of  this book was 
conceived with an ambition to use a combin-
ation of  methods that would allow us to address 
some of  the limitations of  the existing empirical 
studies noted above. In particular, we wanted to 
design multi-case study research that investi-
gates contextual differences and how these im-
pact on young people’s choices, and thus how 
different economic structures and opportunities 
shape their actions and aspirations. We also 
wanted to overcome the limitation of  some sur-
vey research that is not targeting young people 
themselves, by designing qualitative methods 
that directly involve young women and men. 
Thus, we proposed a mixed methods approach 
that would integrate analysis of  existing coun-
try-level LSMS–ISA survey data, and particu-
larly the underexploited panel data available for 
some countries, with qualitative research in four 
countries, two in East Africa and two in West 
Africa. For the qualitative field work we were 
particularly interested in methods that would 
privilege the histories, experiences and perspec-
tives of  a diverse selection of  young people, liv-
ing in a variety of  rural contexts. By including a 
diversity of  young people, as we will explain 
below, the study aims to overcome shortcomings 
in existing studies that tend to disaggregate for 
gender but do not analyse other forms of  social 
difference.
We planned to use a sequential mixed 
methods design (Creswell et al., 2003), in which 
quantitative analysis is used to help orient the 
qualitative research. One particular aim was to 
use the LSMS–ISA data to help identify ‘hot 
spots’ and ‘cold spots’ of  agricultural commer-
cialization (Yeboah et al., 2020), which could 
then be sampled through field work. Here, the 
interest was in whether different commercializa-
tion contexts affect young people’s economic ac-
tivities and imagined futures. Another aim was 
to use the field work to explore key relationships 
identified through the quantitative analysis. Our 
hope was that this would allow the research to 
be ‘mixed methods’ by design, as opposed to sim-
ply combining the quantitative and qualitative 
results at the write-up stage.
In the end we fell short of  this ambition. 
Logistical issues meant that for some countries 
the quantitative analysis was not sufficiently 
progressed by the time field sites needed to be 
identified. These issues also limited our ability to 
explore in the field, relationships that had been 
previously identified. In a further complication, 
political unrest in Burkina Faso meant that we 
were unable to do field work there; while a deci-
sion was eventually made to work in Côte d’Ivo-
ire instead, this country is not involved in the 
LSMS–ISA data collection initiative.
Quantitative data
The quantitative data used in this book come 
from a core set of  nationally representative 
household surveys from Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 
With the exception of  Zambia, these data come 
from the LSMS–ISA project (Carletto and Gour-
lay, 2019); data for Zambia are from the Rural 
Agricultural Livelihood Survey (RALS) con-
ducted by Indaba Agricultural Policy Research 
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Institute (IAPRI), Michigan State University 
(MSU) and the Zambian Central Statistical Office 
(CSO, 2012).
The stated objective of  all of  these nation-
ally representative panel surveys is to improve 
the understanding of  the links between agricul-
ture, socio-economic status, and non-farm in-
come-generating activities. Such surveys have 
historically focused on the collection of  house-
hold-level as well as individual-disaggregated 
data in the areas of  demographics, education, 
agriculture, health and wage employment. One 
of  the features of  such surveys is that they col-
lect data on a wide range of  activities of  rele-
vance to the rural economy, including agricul-
tural production, land ownership, management 
and control, input use, non-farm employment, 
and other income and durable asset ownership. 
Unlike earlier generations of  household surveys 
based on small samples, the large coverage of  
these data sets allows some disaggregation by 
geography, household type and other factors.
LSMS–ISA data in particular have provided 
the basis for much recent analysis of  rural liveli-
hoods and associated welfare outcomes (Jones 
et al., 2014; Aguilar et al., 2015; Coromaldi et al., 
2015; Doss et al., 2015; Karamba and Winters, 
2015; Kidoido and Korir, 2015; McCarthy and 
Kilic, 2015; Oseni et al., 2015; Slavchevska, 2015). 
For example, Sheahan and Barrett (2017) em-
ploy LSMS–ISA data to update the understand-
ing of  agricultural input use in SSA. In a similar 
spirit, Palacios-Lopez et al. (2017) use LSMS data 
for six SSA countries to quantify the share of  
agricultural labour supplied by women.
Depending on the variable, the household 
surveys used in our analyses collect information 
at either the household or individual level. Thus, 
our analysis includes a combination of  some in-
formation about the activities of  the young 
people in the samples (e.g. labour allocation, mi-
gration decisions), and some information about 
the households with which they are associated 
(e.g. income portfolios and land rental market 
participation). This is less than ideal, but reflects 
the fact that the surveys were not designed with 
specific analyses of  young people’s economic ac-
tivities in mind. Another related limitation is 
that for at least some households, all responses 
were provided by the household head, even if  the 
questions related to the activities of  a young per-
son (who may or may not have been present).
Given our focus on youth and the rural 
economy, we exclude households in major urban 
areas (e.g. Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, Kampala 
in Uganda, Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, Niamey in 
Niger, Lagos in Nigeria) and those in areas with 
estimated population densities of  1000 or more 
persons/km2. For those countries with more 
than one production season, we focus on the 
main farming season. To produce nationally rep-
resentative statistics, we use sampling probabil-
ity weights.
We are particularly interested in the early 
stages of  livelihood building, and as analysis of  
these data demand an age-delimited definition 
of  youth, we classify individuals in the age 
range of  15–24 as ‘youth’.v We deviate from 
this definition at various points, however. For 
example, in constructing household-level sum-
mary statistics, we find that the sample of  
household heads in this age range is very small 
and unlikely to generate reliable statistics (let 
alone enable further subdivision by geograph-
ical or other variables).
Our analysis of  these survey data focused 
on how youth labour allocations could be com-
pared to those of  older people (Abay et al., 2020), 
whether young people farm differently (see 
Chapter 6, this volume), young people’s mobility 
and migration, and their subjective well-being 
(Chamberlin and Sumberg, 2020).
Qualitative data
The qualitative component of  the research was 
conducted in Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Côte 
d’Ivoire. With the exception of  Côte d’Ivoire, 
these countries were originally selected because 
they had completed multiple rounds of  LSMS–
ISA data collection and we wanted both East and 
West African countries represented. We also 
wanted to include countries with both economic-
ally vibrant and disadvantaged regions that are 
clearly distinguishable. The design sought to 
balance country-level representation and youth 
diversity with the collection of  rich, in-depth 
data. This was done by selecting four different 
geographical locations per country, devising a 
sampling strategy to identify participants from 
different backgrounds, and employing a combin-
ation of  different qualitative research methods.
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Selection of  the four sites in each country 
involved consideration of  levels of  agricultural 
commercialization and economic vibrancy. In 
commercialization hot spots, local economies are 
dynamic and while farming remains important, 
there are opportunities for farming commercial 
crops and for non-farm employment and 
self-employment (Yeboah et al., 2020, p.143). In 
cold spots, on the other hand, the local economy 
is dominated by small farm production based pri-
marily on family labour, while the farm-service 
economy and the non-farm economy are limited. 
In each country, two sites were located in hot 
spot areas with relatively better access to urban 
markets and road networks, and two were in 
cold spots, which were relatively more remote 
with limited infrastructure and low levels of  
agricultural commercialization and economic 
vibrancy. Higher levels of  commercialization 
were assumed to influence both actual oppor-
tunities available to young people, and how they 
imagined their futures. In Uganda, for instance, 
two sites were located in Central region, only 60 
km away from the capital and where cash crops 
are an important part of  the agricultural econ-
omy. The other sites were located in the Acholi 
region, the overall economic development of  
which has been hampered by a conflict that 
ended in 2006. All 16 study sites are shown in 
Table 2.1. The analysis for Korhogo, Côte d’Ivo-
ire, was incomplete at the time of  publication, so 
is included only where data are available.
Within each site, participants were identi-
fied using purposive sampling to reflect diversity. 
Table 2.2 presents an overview of  the research 
instruments and sampling strategy. Apart from 
seeking to achieve gender balance in the selec-
tion of  participants, all research exercises were 
designed to enable gender analysis, with ques-
tions related to how family dynamics, work and 
educational opportunities are gendered.
The qualitative research was designed to 
capture data on key themes in the lives of  rural 
youth: education, economic activity, family and 
peers, migration, and imagined futures. The idea 
was that this would allow us to explore connec-
tions between issues that are usually dealt with 
separately in qualitative studies. The design al-
lowed for a sample size that would help mitigate 
issues of  validity and generalizability, which are 
associated with small qualitative studies. Overall, 
the qualitative work included 64 FGDs, 416 
interviews with young people and 92 interviews 
with adults. In order to be able to analyse diversity, 
Table 2.1. Identification of sites where qualitative research was undertaken, indicating stylized contrast 
characterization of rural hot spots and cold spots (see Chapter 1, Table 1.2, this volume).
Site Uganda Ethiopia Nigeria Côte d’Ivoire
1 Awach
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Notes: LGA = local government area.
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we purposively selected young people with dif-
ferent educational backgrounds and those in-
volved in different economic activities, while 
we explicitly designed questions that enabled 
us to analyse the implications of  these different 
social markers. The methods emphasized indi-
vidual histories, which helped to avoid seeing 
young people’s lives as static (i.e. a young tailor 
will not have always been a tailor) and helped 
us to analyse how they respond to landscapes 
with more or less opportunity. Finally, using 
a range of  qualitative methodologies enabled 
triangulation.
Qualitative research in each site started 
with a number of  FGDs for young women and 
men, aimed at obtaining an overview of  young 
Table 2.2. Data collection instruments and sampling used for qualitative research.
Research 
exercise Objective
Sampling frame in each  




General overview of economic 
activities common for the  
area – specifically those 
undertaken by youth – and 
migration patterns.
Two FGDs involving young 
women and two involving 
young men from across the 
site, with participants 
identified to include the range 








Focus on the trajectory that led 
the interviewee to the 
economic activities and 
domestic arrangements s/he 
is currently involved in. 
Particular interest in roles of 
social norms and institutions, 
migration and imagined 
futures.
Twelve individuals from across 
the site (6 females, 6 males), 
covering the range of 
engagement with formal 








Focus on the current economic 
activities and domestic 
arrangements. Particular 
interest in roles of social 
norms and institutions, 
migration and imagined 
futures.
Four individuals from across 
the site (2 females, 2 males) 
covering the range of 
engagement in economic 
activities, from farming and 
livestock to non-farm 








Focus on the futures that 
interviewees imagine for 
themselves, including 
education, work, domestic 
arrangements and migration, 
and factors that may hinder 
movement toward these 
imagined futures.
Six individuals, gender 
balanced from diverse 
educational backgrounds:  
a few years of primary 
school; some years in 
secondary school; and one 
who had completed 






Adult interview Provide context and a historical 
perspective on the site and 
change in young people’s 
economic activities, and  
adult perspectives on  
barriers and opportunities for 
young people, and their 
motivations.
Six individuals (3 females, 3 
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people’s economic activities in the area, and mi-
gration patterns. Issues raised during the FGDs 
partly informed the selection of  participants for 
the different interviews.
Life history interviews covered early child-
hood to the present and focused specifically on 
events such as changing residence; parents’ di-
vorce or death; starting, stopping or resuming 
school attendance; marriage and children; and 
shifts in economic activities. For each ‘critical 
junction’ reasons for the change were explored, 
as were the role of  family dynamics and gender 
relations. Purposeful sampling was used to in-
clude young women and men of  different ages 
and levels of  educational attainment.
Livelihood interviews focused on the factors 
and trajectories that resulted in the respondents’ 
involvement in their current work. They also ex-
plored efforts to expand or diversify their activ-
ities and the challenges faced, including the role 
of  education, family and other social networks 
in addressing these challenges. Purposeful sam-
pling was used to be sure that young people with 
different levels of  access to land and other assets 
were included, and to select young people in-
volved in common non-farm activities.
Photo–voice interviews involved each par-
ticipant being given a small digital camera and 
being asked to take photos that reflected how s/
he imagined the future, and what might enable 
or hinder progress in this direction. The pictures 
were then printed and used as prompts during a 
semi-structured interview. As only a relatively 
small number of  these interviews could be com-
pleted per site, individuals were purposively se-
lected to achieve a gender balance and a range 
of  education levels.
Adult interviews primarily sought to add 
historical context and to obtain adult perspec-
tives on the opportunities and barriers for young 
people, and the role and value of  education.
All interviews, with the exception of  those 
from Côte d’Ivoire, were transcribed into Eng-
lish. Each transcript was then read, and the 
information reorganized and synthesized to 
follow a common sequence. The resulting ‘syn-
thesis profiles’ from each site were brought 
together in site summaries. The synthesis pro-
files, transcripts and site summaries were then 
analysed for insights in relation to questions 
around, e.g. economic activities, education, 
waithood, land, etc.
Conclusions: Toward a Stronger 
Empirical Base
This review of  the empirical windows on youth 
engagement in the rural economy highlights the 
fact that considerable research has been under-
taken, from a variety of  disciplinary perspectives, 
motivated by different concerns and questions, 
and using a range of  methodological approaches. 
That having been said, two points deserve attention.
The first is that little progress has been 
made in breaking down the barrier between 
qualitative and quantitative approaches, and as 
a result, their respective insights are not being 
integrated into a more nuanced understanding. 
This significantly diminishes the potential to 
influence policy and programming (and young 
people’s life chances). One important reason for 
the persistence of  these barriers is how academia 
is organized (Bryman, 2007). Many journals are 
rooted in a single discipline and encourage the 
articulation of  contributions in ways that offer 
few incentives to bring diverse bodies of  litera-
ture and methodological approaches together. 
Peer reviewed publications are often limited in 
size and scope, making it difficult to fully draw 
out the qualitative and quantitative sides of  even 
a single research question. Qualitative work re-
lies on narrative exposition that requires space; 
quantitative methods require set-up (conceptual 
framework, estimation strategy) and interpret-
ation that similarly are not always easily con-
densed. In effect, constraints imposed by journals 
make the publication of  good integrative studies 
difficult, even where mixed methods have been 
employed at the project level.
Nonetheless, lip service is often paid to the 
need for more integration. For example, the 
recent flagship report of  the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 
Creating Opportunities for Rural Youth (IFAD, 2019), 
notes that:
Qualitative research is also needed in order to 
complement quantitative methodologies as a 
basis for the attainment of  a better 
understanding of  the contextual factors that 
shape youth livelihood outcomes.
(IFAD, 2019, p.272)
Yet, this same report itself  draws on background 
papers that almost exclusively provide analysis 
of  survey data. Of  its 21 background papers, 
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only two offer literature reviews that focus on in-
sights from qualitative studies (Trivelli and Morel, 
2019; White, 2019), and the only paper that 
purports to offer a mix of  qualitative and quanti-
tative analysis is a political economy study of  na-
tional policies (Philips and Pereznieto, 2019). 
While some of  the reviews cite some qualitative 
studies in passing (Doss et al., 2019; Mabiso and 
Benfica, 2019), their emphasis is on summariz-
ing the results of  primarily quantitative ana-
lyses. Hence, the research presented in this book 
was designed to be a mixed methods study in 
which the qualitative component represented a 
sizeable part of  the programme.
The second observation is that it would 
appear – although this deserves further analysis – 
that the primarily qualitative studies do not have 
much impact on policy formulation. Ironically, it 
is likely that the richness of  these studies, and 
the sense they may give of  ‘endless individual 
cases’, hinders their integration into policy pro-
cesses. On the other hand, is also important to 
better understand why quantitative analyses are 
more easily integrated into policy discussions. It 
is likely that organizational factors play a role: if  
the analysts and policy makers responsible for 
promoting (youth) employment are mainly 
economists and political scientists, they may be 
primed by their professional training to be more 
receptive to quantitative analysis and less open 
to in-depth qualitative data. Such priming also 
intersects with more practical considerations 
and other reasons for why quantitative analysis 
is attractive. Numbers, to begin with, enable 
measurable comparisons to be made across re-
gions, countries and social groups, in ways that 
are not straightforward for qualitative summa-
ries. Moreover, well-defined survey sampling 
frames enable inferential statistics. Thus, esti-
mates of  population values of  interest (such as 
mean and variance of  household size in a 
country) are well defined. Second, nationally 
representative data appeal to external validity 
concerns, i.e. characteristics and relationships 
of  interest are representative of  the broad 
population of  interest, not just particular villages 
or particular socio-economic contexts. Third, 
assiduously assembled claims about causal 
identification – increasingly enabled by randomized 
control trials and other experimental approaches 
to impact evaluation – feed into aspirations for 
evidence-based policy. This means that formal 
claims about cause-and-effect relationships may 
be generated and evaluated against formal and 
well-defined criteria for assessing internal valid-
ity. Such claims are generally not credibly made 
with qualitative approaches.
Such virtues of  quantitative analyses can be 
used to underpin concrete policy recommenda-
tions. The fact that much policy making aims at 
national-level analysis and solutions, only rein-
forces the drive to decontextualized policy making 
based on readily digested statistical facts. On the 
other hand, it is also clear that some, albeit few, 
primarily qualitative studies have likely influenced 
dominant narratives about young people, includ-
ing that they are not able to access sufficient land 
(e.g. Amanor, 2010; Berckmoes and White, 2014).
Our view is that more nuanced and integra-
tive analyses should be the objective of  policy- 
oriented youth studies in the coming years. The 
reliance of  so much influential analysis on gen-
eral household surveys should be re-evaluated 
in the context of  our increasing understanding 
of  the limitations of  these instruments. In rela-
tion to the economic activities of  young people, 
these include: respondent bias (data on individ-
uals from survey responses provided by others); 
imperfect correspondence between the high 
variability over time and space in individual eco-
nomic activities, and the shorthand measures of  
such in standard instruments; the organization 
of  data collection around the household as the 
primary unit of  analysis; and multi-year gaps in 
panel observations. For these reasons, the data 
collected on some kinds of  young people’s eco-
nomic activities may be highly attenuated and 
biased, even opaque.
On the qualitative side, more explicit en-
gagement with internal and, especially, external 
validity would strengthen the policy relevance 
of  results produced by qualitative approaches. 
As explained, the qualitative component of  our 
research programme sought to do this by involving 
a sizeable sample of  participants, and by triangu-
lation through using various methods. Clearly, 
not all qualitative studies seek to influence policy, 
but for those that do, new approaches to the syn-
thesis and presentation of  findings may be 
needed. Qualitative work that generates expli-
citly testable hypotheses will stand a much bet-
ter chance of  informing quantitative work that 
explores causal mechanisms, and thereby influen-
cing policy. There is scope for better comparative 
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research design and analysis that demonstrates 
the different experiences of  youth, presented in 
such a way that findings can inform policies that 
aim to target different groups. Qualitative work 
ought to bring out the importance and implica-
tions of  diversity and context, without being 
overwhelmed by them. It can help to uncover 
where there are important exceptions, conditional-
ities or nuances to the trends, correlations and 
causal relationships demonstrated by quantita-
tive research.
Thus, there is certainly some room for in-
cremental improvement on both sides, while in-
vestment in specialized and more integrated 
data collection exercises that better capture the 
individual, collective and intergenerational di-
mensions of  young people’s lives, may well be 
warranted. Specifically, approaches that better 
integrate the best of  the quantitative and quali-
tative repertoires are required to more adequately 
address questions around:
• Critical youth transitions, including house-
hold formation, mobility and relocation, 
moments of  going in and out of  schooling 
and/or training, and labour market entry 
and participation.
• The role of  local and national opportunity 
structures, embeddedness and path de-
pendence in youth transitions, decisions 
and trajectories, and how these are 
gendered and influenced by other social 
identities.
• Young people’s perspectives on the kind of  
work they hope to do, what market oppor-
tunities they want and where, and the 
meaning of  ‘decent work’. How engage-
ment in economic activities helps achieve 
other personal and family objectives.
• The role of  youth in driving economic, 
social and political change, and potential 
linkages between their economic status and 
political engagement.
Notes
i We recognize that a number of review articles have been highly cited (e.g. Leavy and Smith, 2010; Proctor 
and Lucchesi, 2012), but the focus here is on empirical studies presenting primary data for all or some of 
their analysis.
ii As noted by Blattman et al. (2014), ‘a large literature assumes that poor, unemployed young men weaken 
social bonds, reduce civic engagement, and heighten the risk of unrest’, although they also note that empirical 
evidence for these claims is limited. Limited rural opportunities, particularly with respect to land access, 
have been more clearly linked to rural out-migration, as we discuss in the text.
iii Not all papers fit this mould. Blattman et al. (2014) use experimental data, collected through a randomized 
control trial. Elder et al. (2015) use a large individual-level survey data set encompassing many countries 
but rely largely on descriptive statistics.
iv Many studies are not nationally representative (e.g. Bezu and Holden, 2014; Blattman et al., 2014; 
Kosec et al., 2018; Andersson Djurfeldt et al., 2019).
v We acknowledge that by most definitions, individuals under 18 years old are considered children. Never-
theless, given their involvement in economic activity, it seemed reasonable to include 15–17-year-olds. See 
Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) for a discussion of the use of LSMS–ISA data to investigate child 
labour; see also Roelen et al. (2020).
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Appendix
Table 2A. Selected empirical studies touching on youth engagement in the rural economy in 
sub-Saharan Africa (referenced in Fig. 2.1).
Empirical study Number code in Fig. 2.1 Times cited(Google Scholar)a
Blattman et al. (2014) 1 399
Honwana (2012) 2 371
Filmer and Fox (2014) 3 370
Richards (2005) 4 318
Bezu and Holden (2014) 5 257
Leavy and Hossain (2014) 6 87
Porter et al. (2011) 7 62
Tadele and Gella (2012) 8 52
Locke and te Lintelo (2012) 9 52
Shehu and Nilsson (2014) 10 47
Yeboah and Jayne (2018) 11 46
Ahaibwe et al. (2013) 12 44
Losch (2016) 13 44
Kosec et al. (2018) 14 43
Baah-Boateng (2016) 15 36
Okali and Sumberg (2012) 16 35
Kristensen and Birch-Thomsen (2013) 17 34
Fox and Thomas (2016) 18 30
Thorsen (2013) 19 25
Elder et al. (2015) 20 23
Berckmoes and White (2014) 21 20
Hino and Ranis (2014) 22 20
Adesugba and Mavrotas (2016) 23 15
Continued
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aAs of 26 June 2020.
Empirical study Number code in Fig. 2.1 Times cited(Google Scholar)a
Schmidt and Bekele (2016) 24 15
Maiga et al. (2015) 25 14
Elias et al. (2018) 26 12
Yeboah et al. (2017) 27 12
Allen et al. (2016) 28 8
Petesch and Rodríguez Caillava (2012) 29 8
Reynolds-Whyte and Acio (2017) 30 5
Andriamanalina et al. (2014) 31 2
Andersson Djurfeldt et al. (2019) 32 1
Williams and Pompa (2017) 33 1
Daum (2019) 34 0
Mueller and Thurlow (2019) 35 0
Yeboah et al. (2020) 36 0
IFAD (2019) 37 N/A
AfDB (2016) 38 N/A
BMZ (2017) 39 N/A
Table 2A. Continued.
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3 Are Africa’s Rural Youth Abandoning 
Agriculture?
Justin Flynn and James Sumberg
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Introduction
The idea that young people in rural Africa are 
leaving agriculture is pervasive in both the re-
search and policy literature (White, 2012; AGRA, 
2015; Maiga et al., 2015; UN, 2016; Mabiso and 
Benfica, 2019). Two explanations are commonly 
offered. The first is that agriculture is seen as ‘hard 
work’, ‘dirty’, ‘backward’ and ‘low status’, making it 
an option of ‘last resort’ (Juma, 2007; Langevang and 
Gough, 2012; Tadele and Gella, 2012; Leavy and 
Hossain, 2014). The second is that even if  they want 
to farm, young people cannot access land (Aman-
or, 2010; Ahaibwe et al., 2013; Bezu and Holden, 
2014; Filmer et  al., 2014; Andersson Djurfeldt 
et al., 2019; Scoones et al., 2019). Nevertheless, 
recent research on young people’s livelihoods reveals 
that many are involved in agriculture (Beauchemin, 
2011; Potts, 2012; de Brauw et  al., 2014; Elder 
et al., 2015; Fox and Thomas, 2016; Betcherman 
and Khan, 2018; Yeboah and Jayne, 2018; IFAD, 
2019; Abay et  al., 2020; Yeboah et  al., 2020). 
While some are farming because they have no other 
options (Tadele and Gella, 2012), others are actively 
pursuing agricultural work, and through it es-
tablishing independent lives for themselves and 
their families (Yeboah et al., 2020). Some young 
people are able to use agriculture to accumulate 
assets like land, housing and means of  motorized 
transportation (Bouzidi et al., 2015a,b; Anders-
son Djurfeldt et al., 2019; Yeboah et al., 2020).
This chapter presents new evidence concern-
ing young people’s engagement with the rural 
economy, and uses this evidence to ask whether 
young people are indeed leaving agriculture en 
masse, and if  so, what they are doing instead. 
The focus is on broad patterns of  engagement, 
and how these are affected by gender, age and 
other markers of  social difference. The discus-
sion is framed by established debates around the 
emergence and importance of  the rural non-farm 
economy (RNFE), linkages between farm and 
non-farm activities, and the changing nature of  
rural livelihoods – all set against a backdrop of  
structural transformation. While rural-to-urban 
migration is an important strategy for some 
young rural Africans, and is to be expected dur-
ing structural transformation (de Brauw et  al., 
2014), we do not focus on this, as our interest 
lies in their engagement with the rural economy 
(see Chapter 5, this volume).
The chapter is structured as follows. The next 
section reviews the terminology, concepts and 
theories that underpin the literature on the rural 
economy, and identifies key debates  addressed by 
this literature. Following this, we review insights 
on youth engagement with the rural economy 
that emerge from recent analyses of  nationally 
representative household surveys. Findings from 
qualitative work are then presented. The final 
section discusses these findings and concludes 
with a discussion of  implications for policy.
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Changing Rural Economies
The what and the where  
of rural economic activity
Africa’s rural economies, and the livelihoods that 
both shape and are shaped by them, are described 
and analysed using a variety of  categories and 
terms. For example, it is common to divide the 
rural economy into the farm economy, the non-
farm economy, and transfers (e.g. remittances 
and social protection programmes). Individual 
economic activities are usually analysed using 
some combination of  the location where the work 
takes place, the sector, and/or the type of  labour 
market engagement, that together yield categories 
such as: farm, on-farm, off-farm, non-farm, domes-
tic labour, unpaid labour, self-employment, wage 
labour, and more recently, entrepreneurship.
Reardon et  al. (2007) suggest that agricul-
tural employment refers only to work undertaken 
in the primary production of  agricultural prod-
ucts (this includes self-employment and farm 
wage labour). Thus, farm wage labour is not con-
sidered to be part of  the RNFE, and should not be 
treated as equivalent to non-farm wage labour. 
Further, they use the term ‘off-farm agricultural 
wage labour’ to denote that work is undertaken 
outside the bounds of  one’s own (or one’s family’s) 
farm. Downstream agriculture-related activities, 
such as food processing are within the RNFE. 
Along similar lines, Davis et  al. (2017) include 
crop and livestock production as two distinct on-
farm activities, while agricultural wage labour (i.e. 
labour undertaken on someone else’s farm) is con-
sidered an off-farm activity. They then distinguish 
between these agriculturally oriented activities, 
and non-farm self-employment and wage employ-
ment. In this scheme, transfers and other types of  
income (e.g. rental income) are also considered as 
off-farm. It is important to note that in much of  
the literature, there is little clarity around the op-
erational definitions associated with these terms.
Linkages
The growth of  the agricultural sector in a given 
rural area can contribute to the expansion of  the 
economy beyond agriculture. This is largely at-
tributed to a rise in demand for non-farm goods 
and services, the provision of  raw goods for trade 
and processing, and to a higher demand for la-
bour leading to rising wages (Reardon et  al., 
2007; Djoumessi et al., 2020). Linkages between 
the farm and non-farm economies also work in 
the other direction, with the RNFE generating 
growth and employment through its linkages 
with the agricultural economy (Haggblade and 
Hazell, 1989; Haggblade et al., 2007; Haggblade 
et al., 2010).
Haggblade et al. (2007) provide a typology 
of  five different kinds of  farm–non-farm growth 
linkages: production, consumption, factor mar-
ket, productivity and reverse linkages. The ter-
minology of  forward and backward linkages is 
also commonly used:
• Production linkages include forward linkages, 
where the non-farm sector uses agricultural 
raw materials (e.g. in food processing), and 
backward linkages, where agriculture uses 
non-farm sector inputs (e.g. agrochemicals, 
pumps, etc.).
• Consumption linkages come about through 
expenditure by agricultural households on 
locally produced goods and services, and 
expenditure by non-agricultural households 
on locally produced agricultural products.
• Factor market linkages refer to positive ef-
fects on the farm sector brought about by 
investment in the non-farm sector (and vice 
versa).
• Productivity linkages between sectors come 
about when growth in one sector boosts 
productivity in the other. For example, 
lower food costs from increased farm prod-
uctivity might fuel increases in the product-
ivity of  the non-farm sector.
• Reverse linkages refer to the benefit that the 
agricultural sector gains through growth in 
the non-farm sector. For example, the con-
struction of  a local food processing plant 
(e.g. a juice factory or cannery) can stimulate 
growth (through increased demand) in the 
production of  local agricultural products.
According to Davis et al. (2017, p.154), linkages 
between agriculture and non-farm activities 
tend to be weak in rural areas with low levels of  
economic activity (i.e. there is little activity or 
growth that can be ‘linked’). In these areas, agri-
culture is generally the main, if  not the only en-
gine for rural economic growth (McCullough, 
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2017). This is particularly the case in much of  
rural sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where rural 
population densities are generally low (particu-
larly compared to many parts of  rural Asia) and 
where agriculture is still the main economic ac-
tivity (Haggblade et al., 2007). The relative im-
portance of  different kinds of  linkages will 
depend on the context and the characteristics of  
the rural economy. One study of  an irrigation 
scheme in Malaysia found that 80% of  non-farm 
income gains stemmed from consumption link-
ages, and the remaining 20% from production 
linkages to agriculture (Haggblade et al., 2007, 
p.158). This result highlights the potential im-
portance of  consumption linkages.
Changing livelihoods
The linkages discussed above help to contextual-
ize the economic conditions under which rural 
people build and pursue their livelihoods. The 
majority of  young rural Africans are involved in 
agriculture to some degree (over 90% of  those 
aged 15–16 and around 80% for those 24 and 
older) (Elder et al., 2015; Fox and Thomas, 2016; 
Yeboah and Jayne, 2018). IFAD (2019) also 
finds that young people (aged 15–24) in rural 
SSA spend close to 70% of  their working time in 
farming (p.238), while those aged 15–34 living 
in rural and semi-rural areas spend more than 
60% of  their working time in the agrifood system 
(i.e. through independent agricultural production 
and working on farms of  others as wage labour, 
and/or other wage work and self-employment). 
Finally, Davis et al. (2017) suggest that ‘regard-
less of  the level of  GDP [gross domestic product], 
agriculture continues to be the distinctive fea-
ture of  rural livelihoods’ (p.155). Nevertheless, 
there are many rural young people who also 
work in the RNFE. The process of  combining 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities is 
commonly referred to as ‘livelihood diversifica-
tion’, while a variety of  other terms including 
‘mixed livelihoods’, ‘portfolio livelihoods’ and 
‘pluri-activity’ are also used. Even if  SSA’s non-
farm economy has traditionally been seen as 
relatively underdeveloped, it is important to re-
member that the subcontinent’s rural residents 
have combined activities across sectors for dec-
ades. Unfortunately, rural people are still often 
labelled as ‘farmers’, with the accompanying 
assumption that they are only engaged in, and 
totally dependent on, agriculture. The non-farm 
sector in SSA is now generally seen as undergo-
ing rapid expansion, as an integral part of  broader 
processes of  rural transformation (Barrett et al., 
2017; Jayne et al., 2018).
The livelihoods diversification literature dis-
tinguishes between ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors, with 
the former including the higher returns individ-
uals and/or households expect to derive from 
non-farm activities (Reardon et al., 2007). Push 
factors arise from negative aspects of  the agri-
cultural economy that constrain the livelihoods 
and well-being of  agriculture-dependent house-
holds. Examples include seasonality and reduced 
capacity to farm due to short-term shocks (e.g. 
drought or physical incapacitation), and long-term 
trends like loss of  soil fertility and subdivision of  
inherited land into increasingly smaller plots. 
Decisions to diversify taken with no crisis in view 
(ex ante) are sometimes framed as ‘risk manage-
ment strategies’, and if  successful may lead to an 
accumulation of  assets and additional invest-
ment in non-farm and/or on-farm activities 
(Reardon et al., 2007; Bezu and Holden, 2014; 
Davis et al., 2017). In contrast, steps to diversify 
taken in the midst of  or following a crisis (ex post) 
are usually classed as ‘coping strategies’ (Ellis, 
1998, 2000; Reardon et al., 2007). Thus, depend-
ing on context and household situation, diversifi-
cation may be driven by either an expanding or a 
contracting opportunity landscape (Haggblade 
et al., 2007).
Indeed, among the determinants of  diversi-
fication, Reardon et al. (2007) cite financial and 
other capitals as allowing a differentiated ability 
to undertake rural non-farm activities:
Skill-based and financial barriers to entry do not 
deter wealthy households, whose members 
systematically cream off  the most lucrative 
opportunities in the RNFE [. . .] Conversely, 
asset-poor households remain confined to the 
low-return segment of  the RNFE.
(Reardon et al., 2007, p.134)
Along these lines, the work of  Bezu et al. (2012) 
in Ethiopia illustrates how households with a 
greater capacity to accumulate capital, with 
more adult labour or better access to credit and 
savings, are better able to take advantage of  high 
return non-farm activities. In contrast, households 
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which are in low productivity activities, such as 
subsistence farming, engage in these types of  
activities as they serve as ‘a refuge for the poor’. 
High barriers to entry keep poor households 
from undertaking higher return non-farm activ-
ities (see also Alobo Loison, 2015; Davis et  al., 
2017).
Reardon et  al. (2007) use similar argu-
ments to account for women’s more constrained 
livelihood choices and more limited ability to 
diversify relative to men. Both of  these expect-
ations are borne out in a study of  labour by 
McCullough (2017): across Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Tanzania and Uganda, women – who tended to 
have lower levels of  education than men – were 
more involved in agriculture, while men were 
more involved in the service and industrial sec-
tors. These factors represent a ‘dual-burden’ for 
women, limiting both their opportunity space 
(IFAD, 2019) and their ability to exploit it through 
diversification.
More broadly, Bryceson and Jamal (1997) 
and Bryceson (2002) argue that the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of  the 1980s 
and 1990s, which removed input subsidies (e.g. 
for fertilizers, seeds, pesticides), and led to lower 
yields and reduced agricultural incomes, were 
significant push factors. In their view the result-
ing undermining of  agrarian livelihoods can be 
directly linked to ongoing processes of  ‘depeas-
antization’ and ‘deagrarianization’.
It would be expected that processes of  liveli-
hood diversification and deagrarianization, if  
widespread, could be observed through the in-
comes of  rural households. Yet, empirical ana-
lyses do not provide a clear picture, with average 
non-farm income estimated to range from 30% 
to 80% (Bryceson, 2002; Reardon et al., 2007; 
Davis et  al., 2017). Davis et  al. (2017) used a 
nine-country SSA data set to show that the 
share of  agricultural income decreases with 
every income quintile. In most countries, for the 
poorest quintile, around 50% of  household in-
come comes from on-farm activities (i.e. crop 
and livestock production only), while this drops 
to less than 20% for the richest quintile. This 
supports the suggestion mentioned above that it 
is the better off  who are able to take advantage 
of  more remunerative opportunities in the non-
farm economy. Income from agricultural wage 
employment also decreases with increasing 
levels of  household expenditure. Overall, as total 
income rises, agricultural income shares de-
cline while non-farm income shares increase, 
particularly from non-agricultural wages and 
self-employment.
Structural transformation
Structural transformation refers to the shift in 
labour from less productive to more productive 
sectors, thereby generating economic growth 
(Kilby and Johnston, 1975; Timmer, 1988; 
McCullough, 2017). Structural transformation 
is considered by most development economists 
to be a fundamental feature of  economic growth 
and, in theory, proceeds until productivity levels 
between the farm and non-farm sectors con-
verge (Diao et  al., 2017, p.415). Davis et  al. 
(2017) suggest that income diversification is a 
key characteristic of  the transformation process.
For Diao et  al. (2017, p.426–427), struc-
tural transformation is well under way in SSA 
as evidenced by a 9.3% point fall in labour allo-
cated to the agricultural sector in Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanza-
nia and Zambia, between 2000 and 2010. How-
ever, there are clear signs that this transformation 
is following a different path than that observed 
in other developing countries and regions. Rod-
rik (2016a) finds that instead of  moving into the 
manufacturing sector, as in Asia and Europe, la-
bour in SSA is shifting into a service sector that 
is not particularly productive and that remains 
largely informal. The growth of  cities and rural 
towns based on services rather than industry 
has been referred to as ‘urbanization without in-
dustrialization’ (Gollin et al., 2016). For the ser-
vice sector to be productive, it typically requires 
high levels of  skill (e.g. the information technol-
ogy (IT) sector), which usually takes an extended 
period of  time to develop, and demands sus-
tained support. As for the industrial sector, Rod-
rik (2016b) suggests it is peaking much sooner 
in terms of  employment share (at comparable 
income levels) than seen in the Asian Tiger econ-
omies, a phenomenon he terms ‘premature 
deindustralization’.
These limitations notwithstanding, structural 
transformation is widely seen as a key frame-
work for understanding the evolving opportun-
ities for rural youth employment and livelihoods 
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in rural and urban spaces (Barrett et al., 2017; 
Diao et  al., 2018; Jayne et  al., 2018; Mueller 
et al., 2019).
Method
To gain additional insight into young people’s 
engagement with the rural economy – and 
particularly the role of  agriculture – we draw 
primarily on the transcripts of  416 individual 
interviews undertaken in Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire (see Chapter 2, this vol-
ume). The basic approach was to use information 
on economic activity to divide the research par-
ticipants in each site into segments representing 
broadly different patterns of  engagement with 
the rural economy. We approached this not as a 
statistical clustering exercise, but more in the 
spirit of  broad market segmentation (Yankelovich 
and Meer, 2006). Nevertheless, the objective was 
to minimize variation in engagement within the 
segments, and maximize variation between the 
segments.
In establishing the segments, the fact of  
growing maize rather than cowpea, or engaging 
in petty trade rather than catering was of  little 
importance. Rather, the segments were con-
structed using a scheme that classifies all paid 
and unpaid rural work by sector (agriculture, not 
agriculture); by location (on own farm, not on own 
farm); and by labour arrangement (unpaid/ 
domestic, self-employment, wage) (Table 3.1). 
Ultimately, these were reduced to three main 
patterns of  economic activity: agricultural work 
(including own production, unpaid family farm 
labour and farm wage work); combined agricul-
tural and non-farm work; and non-farm work 
(including self-employment and wage work).
Each segment was described by a short nar-
rative (Box 3.1). Segments were compared within 
sites and across sites within each country. We 
had a specific interest in comparing segments in 
sites with different degrees of  agricultural 
commercialization.
Youth in the Rural Economy
Insights from existing quantitative work
Recent analyses based on large-scale household 
surveys provide some insight into young peo-
ple’s engagement with the rural economy. Abay 
et al. (2020) use national representative house-
hold survey data from Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanza-
nia, Zambia, Nigeria and Niger to examine how 
rural young people allocate their labour. Among 
Table 3.1. Simple classification of rural work based on sector and location.
Location
Sector Labour arrangement On own farma Not on own farm
Agriculture Unpaid/domestic Crop and livestock production
Primary processing of agric. 
commodities
Self-employment Crop and livestock production
Primary processing of agric. 
commodities
Agric. input supply, processing 
of agric. commodities, 
produce trade, etc.
Wage employment Farm labour
Employment with agric. input 
supplier, produce trader, etc.
Not agriculture Unpaid/domestic Caring, cooking,  
childminding, etc.
Help in household business
Self-employment Brick making, mat weaving, etc. Catering, petty trading, 
hairdressing, seamstressing, 
carpentry, transportation, etc.
Wage employment Employment in shop, bar/
restaurant, teaching, etc.
aOwn or household’s farm.
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the economic activities, farming is the most 
common, with the percentage of  15–24-year-
olds that devote some time to farming ranging 
from 23% in Nigeria to 78% in Uganda. A much 
smaller share of  this age group is involved in ei-
ther wage employment (from 3% in Nigeria and 
Niger, to 19% in Tanzania) or non-farm business 
activities (from 3% in Zambia, to 11% in Tanza-
nia and Ethiopia). In all six countries, a margin-
ally higher share of  25–34-year-olds devote 
some time to farming compared to the 
15–24-year-olds. The percentage of  young 
people involved in wage employment and non-
farm business activities increases with proximity 
to markets, and in both Ethiopia and Zambia, 
the relative importance of  these non-farm activ-
ities decreases with remoteness and more slowly 
in high potential areas.
Yeboah and Jayne (2018) analyse labour 
market engagement of  individual household 
members across urban and rural areas of  
Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zambia using data from the Living Standards 
Measurement Study – Integrated Surveys on 
Box 3.1. Example segment narratives.
Wondo Genet, Ethiopia, Segment A – Combined agricultural and non-farm work
The individuals associated with this segment are all engaged in agriculture. Cultivation of khata is com-
mon and is the most important source of revenue; it is sometimes grown on irrigated land. Other crops 
include coffee, ensete [false banana], potato and maize, and these are consumed and/or sold. All indi-
viduals in this segment also engage in one or more other economic activities such as owning a small 
shop, helping out in the family shop, working as a barber or a guard. Money from khat cultivation was 
used to start some of these enterprises.
Individuals within this segment live under various household arrangements. Those who are not 
married, including a few students, mostly live with their parents (a small number live in rented accom-
modation), while those who are married typically live with their spouse in an independent household. 
Married individuals mostly live on land belonging to the male spouse, which was given upon marriage. 
They farm on land made available by the husband’s father.
This segment includes women and men aged between 20 and 29. Some are still students; others 
have only a few years of formal education; still others have completed Grade 10; and a few are pursu-
ing post-secondary education.
This segment narrative is informed by six key interviews, two women and four men.
Soubré, Côte d’Ivoire, Segment B – Non-farm work (only)
Individuals associated with this segment engage with the rural economy through a wide variety of non-
farm work, including both self-employment (preparing and selling local food including placalib and at-
tiékéc; working as a barber, a beautician, a photographer, a mason and a house painter; operating an 
Orange Money stall) and working for wages (in a bistro; for an insurance broker; doing casual work). 
The skills needed for jobs like photographer, barber and beautician were mainly gained informally from 
friends or family.
They do not engage in agricultural activities, either because they do not have access to land, or 
because they simply do not want to farm (despite having access to land).
Many individuals within this segment take advantage of varying opportunities that arise to build a 
portfolio of activities. To increase income (e.g. to be able to meet increased parenting obligations) 
seems to be the primary motivation.
This segment includes women and men, aged between 20 and 30. They are single, married or 
separated, and live with parents, friends, relatives or spouses.
Most have some secondary-level education, but only one is still in secondary school. The main 
reasons for leaving school early include a lack of financial support, and for multiple women, early pregnancy.
This segment narrative is informed by eight key interviews: five women and three men.
aKhat is a shrub native to Ethiopia. Its leaves are chewed as a stimulant.
bPlacali is a staple food made from fermented cassava dough.
cAttiéké is the Ivorian name for gari (i.e. a flour of varying texture made from cassava roots that are grated, squeezed, 
left to ferment and then dried. It is a major staple food in West Africa).
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Agriculture (LSMS–ISA) programme of  The 
World Bank and similar households surveys. Us-
ing data from 2010–2011 and 2012–2013, and 
disaggregating ‘youth’ (aged 15–24) from ‘young 
adults’ (aged 25–34), they find that a significant 
share of  youth is economically inactive (ranging 
from 22.5% in Tanzania to 62.7% in Nigeria). 
Education is the most commonly cited reason for 
economic inactivity. Among young adults, eco-
nomic inactivity is lower (ranging from 1.7% in 
Rwanda to 25.7% in Nigeria), while females in 
this age group are more likely to be economically 
inactive than males. In all six countries, farming 
provides the largest share of  jobs for youth (aged 
15–24), ranging from 54.5% in Ghana to 75.5% 
in Uganda, with the share of  non-farm jobs ran-
ging from 18.8% in Uganda to 30.9% in Ghana. 
The importance of  farming is generally less for 
young adults (aged 25–34), with the share of  
jobs in farming ranging from 31.8% in Ghana to 
64.1% in Rwanda, and non-farm jobs ranging 
from 28% in Rwanda to 51.7% in Ghana. Males 
are generally more likely to be employed in the 
non-farm sector than females.
While useful, these kinds of  analyses pro-
vide little sense of  what young people’s economic 
engagements actually look like on the ground. 
Using a unique, relatively high frequency data 
set, Carreras et al. (2020) investigate the micro-
dynamics of  rural young people’s work in nor-
thern Ghana and eastern Uganda over a 
12-month period. The focus is on four dimen-
sions of  the work undertaken: its nature, fre-
quency, steadiness and amount. The analysis 
suggests that the non-domestic work activities of  
young people are multi-faceted, context and sea-
son specific, and highly gendered. The study sup-
ports the observation made by others, drawing 
on different types of  data, that the non-domestic 
work of  a significant share of  African rural youth 
is part-time and intermittent, and closely linked 
to agriculture. Farming, for consumption and 
sale, is central to the work of  many young women 
and men in both study sites. Many combine 
farming with other self-employment or wage em-
ployment, and those who do tend to work more 
often. There is little sign of  specialization within 
either their farming or non-farm work. Some 
young people, particularly women in northern 
Ghana, work infrequently and for relatively few 
hours, suggesting that unemployment and 
underemployment, or a lack of  opportunity to 
work, may well be important. However, these au-
thors caution against assuming that all young 
people want or are able to work full-time, or all 
year around, as paid work is only one means of  
attaining social adulthood (also see Chapter 8, 
this volume).
Engagement with the rural economy: 
three segments
Within each of  the 16 sites in Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, the present study iden-
tified three broad patterns (or segments) of  en-
gagement with the rural economy. The first, and 
generally larger segment, includes those who com-
bine own or family farming with some other type(s) 
of  non-farm self-employment and/or wage labour. 
The second includes those who do not farm, but 
only engage in non-farm self-employment and/or 
wage labour. The third segment includes those 
who only farm: this is a relatively small segment 
in all sites, ranging from 0% of  interviewees in 
Daloa, Côte d’Ivoire to 35% in Jabi Tehnan, Ethi-
opia. Across both segments that contain farm-
ing, some of  this engagement is in the form of  
unpaid family labour. Across all three segments, 
many young people are also involved in domestic 
labour and caring for parents or elderly relatives, 
siblings’ offspring, or their own young families 
(see also Chapter 9, this volume). In what fol-
lows, we provide two examples of  individuals 
associated with each segment.
The first example from the segment that 
combines agricultural and non-farm work is a 
28-year-old single man living with his mother 
and two younger sisters in Awach, northern 
Uganda. His father died a few years ago, and his 
two older sisters are married and living else-
where. Between 1999 and 2005 he lived in vari-
ous refugee camps due to the war in northern 
Uganda. He started school in the camps and con-
tinued after returning home, where he com-
bined schooling with farming during weekends 
and holidays. His formal education ended at Pri-
mary 5 due to a lack of  money for school fees. 
After this he concentrated on farming. He now 
pursues a portfolio of  economic activities with a 
distinct seasonal rhythm.
Farming is very important because it’s the 
source of  food and income for our family, 
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whereas things like running a business can stop 
at any time, but farming is constant. [. . .] We 
have over 8 ha of  land that we farm. [. . .] 
Sometimes we sell the farm produce and we also 
use it for food. [. . .] We all do farming together 
with our mother. [. . .] I work on the farm more 
than my sisters, even grazing animals like goats 
and feeding the pigs. I am the one who does this 
work more than anybody else at home. Both my 
older and younger sisters do the same work: 
farming and domestic work. [. . .] There are 
activities that I do only during rainy season like 
farming and burning charcoal. As for brick 
making, I do this only during the dry season. 
Other activities like rearing animals continue 
throughout the year.
The second example from this segment is a 
21-year-old married woman living in Kuyu, 
Oromia, Ethiopia. She lives on her own with her 
two children; her husband is in prison. A few 
years ago, he went to do field work with mem-
bers of  the police force, during which a conflict 
broke out and a policeman was killed. He was 
suspected of  killing the policeman and in 2014 
was sentenced to prison. Her formal education 
went to Grade 10 (she is one of  the best educated 
interviewees at this site). She wanted to con-
tinue at a private vocational college in Kuyu, but 
was unable to pay the fees.
I decide which activities I should do by myself.  
I was just starting to sell food when my husband 
was arrested. [. . .] My family are also of  low 
economic status and we do not have many cattle. 
So, I turned my attention to food selling. [. . .] I 
support my family by preparing shiroo [a stew] and 
drinks like farsoo [local beer]. I do not have land; I 
own nothing and I do not have any support. I just 
work and depend on my own labour to make a 
livelihood for my family. [. . .] I have rented land 
and cultivated crops as additional work. I rented 
on contract one gamsi for 300 birr for a year. It is 
very small. What can we do? We just do as our 
capacity allows. [. . .] From one gamsi it is possible 
to get about four quintals [400 kg] [of  wheat]. [. . .] 
I also engage in hojii hodhaa [embroidery]. [. . .] The 
work I do depends on the season. For example, 
there is a good market for araqee [or areki, an 
alcoholic drink] during the dry season, during the 
Easter holiday and for wedding ceremonies. I even 
take it to market to sell. During summer [the rainy 
season] we engage in farming activities like 
preparing land, sowing and weeding, and during 
winter [the dry season] we harvest, collect, store 
and thresh the crops. I sell food beginning in 
September when schools start.
A first example from the segment that only does 
non-farm work is a 22-year-old single man who 
lives with his three younger brothers and two 
sisters in Igbariam, Anambra State, Nigeria. His 
father is deceased and his mother lives in an-
other community. Being the eldest, he was able 
to obtain a National Diploma from a federal poly-
technic, but was unable to finish his Higher Dip-
loma due to a lack of  money when his father 
died. His brothers all stopped their education 
and did not progress higher than secondary 
school. He wishes he could have finished school-
ing, so that he ‘may get a job any day’, but after 
his father died, ‘things changed’.
I learnt how to do the business [of  textile 
trading] as I was an apprentice for some time. 
[. . .] I [also] work as a labourer, helping  
bricklayers. [. . .] Usually I am paid four naira 
per block. If  I deliver 400 blocks to a builder at 
that rate for a day, I will get about 2000 naira, 
but not always. [. . .] I work as a driver for people 
in their private vehicles and I earn 1000 or 
1200 naira daily. [. . .] Firewood does not sell for 
very much and we get 500 to 1000 [naira]. [. . .] 
These jobs are usually available. There is 
nothing else available to me. No one advised me 
about these jobs. I got into doing them in order 
to earn a living to be able to support myself  and 
my younger brothers. [. . .] I always look out for 
more opportunities. I am never idle; [. . .] I have 
one paid job or the other.
[Land situation] Well, we have a piece of  land 
but our foster father farms on it and he would 
not let us use it. We returned to the village  
2 years ago and after a family meeting in 
December he promised to allot some  
portions to us.
A second example is a 28-year-old married 
woman living in Luénoufla, a village about 
30 km away from Daloa, in south-western Côte 
d’Ivoire. She lives with her husband (she is his 
second wife) and their two children, a niece, the 
first wife and her children, and other relatives of  
the husband. She attended a Quranic school for 
3 years, but stopped when her parents died. She 
then went to live with her aunt, who would not 
pay for her schooling. She engages in a mix of  
activities, but domestic work also takes a lot of  
her time. She and her co-wife help each other 
out, including in their business activities.
At the moment, I am selling shoes, along with 
wrap skirts, earrings and children’s clothes and 
accessories. [. . .] I was selling ox feet and heads 
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[when I met my husband]; I was preparing them 
and selling them. [Have you stopped this 
activity?] No, I continue, but not that much. 
[. . .] I do the household chores first. I sweep and 
when it’s my day to cook, I cook. I also do 
laundry, get the kids ready for school, and when 
I finish, I cook. The days when I am not cooking, 
I am at the market selling my wares. [. . .] It is 
the domestic chores that take most of  my time. 
These chores are the first thing I do when I get 
up. [. . .] I get up at 4:00 in the morning. [. . .] If  I 
am washing my wares, my co-wife and my niece 
help me, and when we prepare food, we help 
each other out as well.
[. . .] Here, apart from cocoa-related activities, 
nothing else produces money. During the cocoa 
harvest period there are all sorts of  activities 
here, and thus the young people who are not 
afraid of  work may have money. But after that, it 
is misery. [When the cocoa activities stop, does it 
affect your business?] Yes, that’s it! The business 
doesn’t work well then.
[Why do you not farm?] Because my parents 
don’t have land. They don’t have land, which is 
why I don’t farm.
A first example from the segment that only farms 
(or works on farms) is a 30-year-old married 
man in Ziévasso, a village about 10 km south of  
Odienné, in northern Côte d’Ivoire. He lives in a 
large household with more than 15 members, 
including his wife and three children, his par-
ents and his four younger brothers. His father 
farms and makes tools for local gold miners. His 
mother also farms. He did some farming while 
going to school, in part to contribute to his 
school fees, though this made him feel ‘overbur-
dened’ with work. His formal education ended at 
lower secondary school (‘troisième’), because he 
failed the Brevet d’Etudes du Premier Cycle (BEPC) 
national exam.
I am a farmer; [. . .] I go to the field daily. [. . .] 
Today I farm 4 ha. If  I have the money, I can do 
more. [. . .] He [my father] subdivided the land 
into sections and designated a section for me, as 
well as sections for each of  my brothers. [. . .] 
I’ve planted cashew [in my field] and, as the 
trees grow, little by little, I add food crops 
underneath. [. . .] I often grow rice, maize, 
beans. [. . .] This past year I also grew ground-
nuts [for sauce] [. . .] and potatoes. [. . .] If  you 
have a field of  cashew, you can take the money 
you have made and invest it in another project. 
Regarding the cereals, you can use them as food. 
[. . .] I [also] plant small gardens with tomatoes, 
peppers and okra. When I sell my produce, it 
helps me [financially].
He describes the importance of  his religious and 
cultural upbringing, which has placed a strong 
emphasis on duty towards one’s parents, and 
how his sense of  duty influences his economic 
activities.
According to the customs of  our religion, which 
is Islam, when you reach adulthood [majorité] 
[. . .] you have to take care of  your parents. [. . .] 
[As] my brothers have distanced themselves 
from the affairs of  the household [they are all 
mining for gold], I have decided to do nothing 
else but farm work. [. . .] I recognize my 
responsibility to my parents; they no longer have 
the strength to work. My duty as a child is to go 
to the field and do my best to feed them. [. . .] I 
would have liked to have been a doctor. [. . .] To 
be honest, I don’t regret [not having continued 
my studies] [. . .] because had I continued, I 
would not have received the benedictions from 
my parents for staying close. [. . .] Yes, for me, 
the benedictions are very important.
A second example is a 20-year-old single woman 
who lives in Mucwini, northern Uganda, with 
her parents and four siblings. She went to school 
up to Primary 5, but stopped due to problems in 
paying school fees. While at school she farmed in 
the early morning, and during weekends and 
holidays. Due to the farming she sometimes 
arrived late to school.
My family has 3 acres of  land and we have 
cattle, goats, pigs and chickens. [. . .] The land is 
owned by my father. He shows me which part of  
the land to farm and I farm on it for free. I do not 
own any land. [. . .] I cannot access enough 
land, so I end up renting land. [. . .] My father 
helps me farm – he has the oxen for ploughing, 
and if  I ask him to help plough my garden, he 
does it willingly and for free. I am also in a 
farming group, where the members help each 
other in turns. [. . .] I sell my crops at Mucwini 
trading centre and Kitgum town. [. . .] In 
addition to farming, I am also rearing chickens, 
goats, pigs, and I look after the cattle.
One key takeaway from all these respondents is 
that the majority of  young people, with some 
variation across sites and countries, have some 
involvement in agriculture. In some sites (i.e. in 
northern Uganda, Jabi Tehnan woreda in Ethi-
opia and Odienné region in northern Côte d’Ivo-
ire) farming and/or livestock production is part 
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of  the work of  nearly all the young people inter-
viewed. Some of  their farming is for their own 
consumption, with any surplus being marketed; 
some is primarily or solely for sale. While agri-
cultural commercialization is clearly very im-
portant, overall, there is little sign of  engagement 
with value chains or quality standards, and the 
value-added activities that are observed are long 
standing, such as gari production (see Box 3.1). 
Also, there is little indication that the farming 
activities of  young people are very different from 
those of  their parents, or older people more gen-
erally (see Chapter 6, this volume) – indeed, 
much of  the farming of  these informants (par-
ticularly for those who are younger, single and/
or not living independently), is done under, for, 
or with the support of  their elders.
Aside from farming, the self-employment 
activities in which young people are involved re-
volve around the common suite of  rural eco-
nomic activities, including petty trade, catering, 
sewing, hairdressing, artisanal work and the 
like. Some is seasonal or otherwise ephemeral, 
and much of  this activity can be characterized 
as generally small scale, requiring little skill, low 
investment and minimal technology, and pre-
sumably, providing low returns. There are few 
examples of  innovative work or ‘doing some-
thing different’, and little sign of  any meaning-
ful specialization within the segments. Mobile 
phones are ubiquitous, and commonly used to 
contact suppliers and customers, and for mobile 
banking, but there is little sign of  the often- 
forecast digital agricultural revolution. With 
the exception of  the few young people working 
in more formal positions, e.g. as teachers, in 
construction or for non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), the wage work is also relatively 
low skill (such as working as a farm labourer or 
bar and restaurant work).
The vast majority of  young people fall into 
one of  these three segments – farming plus non-
farm, non-farm only or farming only – and inde-
pendent of  these segments, many are also 
involved in domestic and care work. It is also 
clear that within each segment there are young 
people who are in very different positions. For 
example, a low level of  education is not always 
closely linked to engagement in farming, while 
more education neither guarantees a life with-
out farming, nor a desire not to farm. Similarly, 
while some interviewees said that compared to 
young men, it was more difficult for young 
women to access land, there are a number of  ex-
amples of  young women pursuing their own 
farming, including the use of  land rental mar-
kets. In all sites some jobs or activities are seen as 
more appropriate for women or for men. Never-
theless, the diversity within the segments chal-
lenged our own initial assumption that social 
differences among young people would be crit-
ical in influencing broader patterns of  engage-
ment with the rural economy.
Depending on the circumstances, parents 
and other family members might assist the young 
women and men with their economic activities, 
but equally, they might not. At the same time, 
young people must assist with domestic duties 
and fulfil their moral obligations (i.e. to parents). 
The broad patterns of  economic engagement 
characterized by the segments do not appear to be 
particularly sensitive to local economic dyna-
mism, at least as captured by our classification of  
agricultural commercialization hot and cold 
spots. Indeed, a stronger driver of  engagement in 
the rural economy looks to be the nature of  the 
region in which a site is situated, rather than the 
relative dynamism of  individual sites.
One distinction that emerges from the seg-
mentation exercise is between young people who 
are living within a natal household (headed by a 
parent or older relative), and those who are 
within an independent household with a spouse 
or partner (Fig. 3.1). Those who are part of  a 
natal household fall into two subgroups. The 
first are young, single women and men who are 
still in school or have recently left school. They 
may farm some plots for themselves and/or con-
duct some other independent economic activ-
ities, but they also do domestic work, help on the 
family farm and may contribute to other family 
enterprises. The second subgroup includes 
young women who previously left their natal 
home to live with a spouse or partner, but have 
returned following divorce or separation (often 
with one or more children). Again, they may 
farm some plots for themselves and/or carry out 
some other independent economic activities, but 
most often they also help on the family farm or in 
another family enterprise. We are not suggesting 
that there are no single people living on their 
own or with friends, or separated/divorced 
women and men who live independently. How-
ever, among the young people interviewed in the 
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course of  this research, these were very distinct 
minorities.
Even if  they are pursuing essentially the 
same economic activities, the key difference be-
tween those living in natal and independent 
households is the degree to which they can exer-
cise autonomy. Young people in natal house-
holds are subordinate to the larger unit: they 
remain, at least in part, under the direct supervi-
sion or guidance of  elders, and may be wholly or 
partially dependent on them for land. The work 
they do on the family farm is likely to be unpaid. 
In contrast, young people living in their own, in-
dependent households farm (and engage in 
other activities) individually and/or collabora-
tively, but with considerably more autonomy. 
Nevertheless, even these households are likely to 
depend, at least to some degree, on parents or re-
latives for access to land, and some also benefit 
from capital and other resources from parents 
and others.
As developed in greater detail in Chapter 8 
(this volume), this latter finding challenges the 
direct link between engagement in the labour 
market and the attainment of  markers of  social 
adulthood as proposed by Honwana (2012). Ra-
ther than the work itself, which is essentially the 
same regardless of  whether they live within their 
natal home or independently, it is marriage and 
the platform of  an independent household from 
which the work is undertaken, and the associated 
autonomy and responsibility, that would appear 
to drive the transition to social adulthood.
Discussion
Recent quantitative analyses, as well as the ana-
lysis of  qualitative data from the 16 sites across 
four countries presented above, strongly suggest 
that with some variation across sites and con-
texts, the majority of  economically active young 
people in rural areas continue to maintain some 
engagement with agriculture. The idea that 
rural young people have turned their backs on 
agriculture en masse is clearly not supported by 
the evidence presented here.
However, three important caveats must be 
stated. First, few young people are engaged only 
in farming: the majority of  those who farm are 
also engaging in some other self-employment or 
wage labour activity. Thus, while there is wide-
spread involvement in farming, in most of  the sites 
it may be quite wrong to conceive of  or label these 
young people simply as ‘farmers’ (or even ‘primar-
ily farmers’). Second, in most cases the engagement 
of  young people with the rural economy does 






















Fig. 3.1. Patterns of engagement with the rural economy. Courtesy of the authors.
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not align at all well with the imaginary of  young, 
highly entrepreneurial, innovative, business and 
value-chain oriented ‘agripreneurs’. A key dis-
tinction here is between commercialization on 
the one hand, and engagement in value chains on 
the other: the latter includes the former, but agri-
cultural commercialization, in which many young 
people are involved, does not necessarily mean en-
gagement in value chains. Indeed, much of  the 
farming that young people undertake – on their 
own or on family plots – is both for own con-
sumption and sale. Even where there are higher 
levels of  commercialization (e.g. in ‘hot spots’ or 
where commercial vegetable production is 
prevalent), there is little direct mention of  en-
gagement with value chains, agribusiness firms 
or certification bodies. This, combined with the 
fact that farming is one of  a number of  farm and 
non-farm economic activities, likely has import-
ant implications for if  and how young people 
search out and/or invest in new agricultural 
technology (Sumberg et al., 2004; see also Chap-
ter 6, this volume). Third, while there is little evi-
dence that rural young people are turning their 
backs on agriculture, as discussed in Chapter 9 
(this volume), few imagine a future of  ‘digging’. 
Rather, those who do want to farm envisage 
more mechanized forms of  farming and taking 
on a managerial role, with increased reliance on 
hired labour.
Involvement in the non-farm sector is wide-
spread, but most of  these activities are small 
scale, demanding low investment and requiring 
little skill or technology (see also Flynn and 
Sumberg, 2017, 2018). They are presumably 
also low-return activities, suggesting a low-level 
equilibrium, parallel to the poverty traps de-
scribed by Barrett and Swallow (2006), and the 
low-input, low-output farming traps described 
by Barrett (2008). While this might not be unex-
pected for young people in the early stages of  
livelihood building, it is not clear that many of  
these activities offer viable pathways to secure 
and/or increased remuneration through upscaling, 
skill upgrading, innovation or technology in-
vestment. The case studies make it clear that 
many of  the young people interviewed were well 
aware of  the limitations of  their activities.
The picture that emerges of  young people’s 
engagement with the rural economy begs the 
question as to whether the young people are 
misreading the rural opportunity landscape, or 
whether the misreading has been on the part of  
those promoting the ‘rural prosperity’ gospel. 
Rather than a lack of  ambition or hard work on 
the part of  young people, it would appear that as 
far as secure, remunerative or ‘decent’ work is 
concerned, the landscape of  opportunity in 
many rural areas remains monochromatic. 
While the density of  opportunities may be 
greater in commercialization hot spots, it is not 
immediately obvious that the quality of  the op-
portunities is significantly better.
This analysis calls into question the em-
phasis on young people’s decisions and choices 
in relation to the economic activities they pur-
sue. For the most part, the initial stages of  liveli-
hood building are less about ‘career’ in some 
abstract sense, and more about the practicalities 
of  getting established on a path to adulthood. 
The possible array of  economic activity in most 
rural areas is highly constrained, and this, to-
gether with other social and cultural opportun-
ity structures (Roberts, 1968) shapes their 
engagement with the rural economy. To para-
phrase Roberts (1977), by and large, young 
people simply take what work is available.
Finally, much of  the engagement with the 
rural economy described in this chapter goes be-
yond the work of  individual young people. Ra-
ther, whether living in a parental or independent 
household, their work involves both inter- and 
intragenerational joint effort, cooperation, ex-
change and mutual support. To focus solely on 
the individual and her/his aspirations, choices, 
decisions and career is to make a fundamental 
error in conceptualizing both the problem, and 
its potential solutions.
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Introduction
Land is at the centre of  much of  the discussion 
of  rural young people’s economic activities. If  
starting out in life is the canonical process that 
defines youth, then many of  the decisions and 
outcomes related to this process will, in one way 
or another, revolve around land. By starting out 
in life, we mean transitioning from being a largely 
dependent member of  a household to becoming a 
more autonomous economic and social agent – 
although, as is now widely recognized, reality is 
invariably messier than this simplified transition 
suggests. In rural areas, the household formation 
process, an important part of  this transition, is 
most often conditioned by securing land for farm-
ing and accommodation. Even though young 
people are increasingly engaged in non-farm work 
(Yeboah and Jayne, 2018), and an increasing 
number may not be doing any ‘digging’ them-
selves, few are members of  households which 
are not at least partially dependent on farm pro-
duction. Considering that sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) is the only region of  the world where the 
rural population, and the number of  rural youth 
in particular, is projected to grow beyond 2050 
(Fig. 4.1), access to land will likely remain a critical 
issue for decades to come.
While the stylized contours of  this story 
have been recognized for some time, its empirical 
basis has developed rapidly in recent years, driven 
in large part by the expansion of  nationally 
representative household survey data. Given this 
volume’s inquiry into the patterns of  youth 
engagement in the rural economy, the opportunity 
to take stock of  the empirical knowledge base on 
youth and land is timely. The purpose of  this chapter 
is threefold: (i) to review available evidence on how 
young people access and use land; (ii) to clarify 
linkages between land access and other livelihood 
decisions and outcomes of  interest; and (iii) to 
identify remaining knowledge gaps and discuss 
strategies for filling them. The following sections 
address each of  these objectives in turn, after 
which we summarize the main conclusions.
Young People’s Access to Land
Access is increasingly difficult
Land in SSA has traditionally been seen as abun-
dant. In aggregate, the region is sparsely popu-
lated, with about 30 persons per km2 estimated 
for 2020 (United Nations, 2019a). However, this 
population is highly spatially concentrated, with 
63% of  the total rural population found in just 
10% of  the land area (Jayne et al., 2014). Many 
parts of  rural Africa are experiencing rising popu-
lation densities, with corresponding increases in 
land scarcity and shrinking farm sizes (Jayne 
et al., 2003, 2014, 2016; Knapman et al., 2017; 
 Young People and Land 59
Wineman and Jayne, 2018), and increasing per-
ceptions of  tenure insecurity (Lawry et al., 2014; 
Ghebru, 2019). Rising interest in arable land from 
both local and international investors appears 
to be exacerbating these pressures in some areas 
(Jayne et al., 2019). Increasing ‘commodification’ 
of  land – i.e. when land takes on a monetary value 
and is exchangeable through market mechanisms – 
which accompanies rising demand for land by 
outsiders, is often cited as a major contributor to the 
difficulties that youth experience in accessing 
land (Chinsinga and Chasukwa, 2012; White, 
2012; Kidido et al., 2017; Asaaga and Hirons, 
2019; Kumeh and Omulo, 2019). In systems 
where land access is increasingly facilitated 
through market mechanisms (e.g. rental and 
sales markets), young people may be especially 
constrained by limited social and capital assets.
Nationally representative surveys indicate 
clear systematic differences in farm size by age of  
household head (Fig. 4.2). Although average 
farm sizes differ widely across countries, reflect-
ing spatial variation in land abundance, within 
each country, households headed by individuals 
under 30 years old are associated with smaller 
farm sizes on average (with the exception of  
Nigeria, where there is little difference across 
age groups). Households with heads aged 45 
and older generally have the largest farm sizes, 
often considerably larger than the farm sizes of  
the youngest heads, although this pattern does 
not hold in either Ethiopia or Nigeria. Care must 
be exercised in interpreting this relationship as 
evidence of  young people’s increasingly constrained 
access to land, however. Other factors, such as 
constrained access to capital, labour, machinery 
and/or experience in farming, may at least par-
tially explain the observed smaller farm sizes among 
youth-headed households. Even if  access to land 
were unconstrained, these other factors of  pro-
duction might still limit the farm size of  younger 
households. Thus, while it is likely that young 
people’s access to land is becoming more difficult, 
the link with farm size is neither direct nor universal.
Changing patterns of  access have been docu-
mented, with households in densely populated 
areas having little potential to access additional 
land through customary land institutions or 
through inheritance (e.g. Bezu and Holden, 
2014; Kosec et al., 2018; Ghebru, 2019). Precise 
analysis of  trends over time is difficult, given 
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Fig. 4.1. Projected annual rural population (in millions) at mid-year, 1950–2050. From United Nations, 2019b.
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results may be assembled from survey data. Us-
ing recent data from Tanzania, Fig. 4.3 shows 
the likelihood of  a plot being reported as having 
been acquired through inheritance, as a 
non-parametric function of  years since the plot 
was acquired. More recently acquired plots are 
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Fig. 4.2. Average farm size (ha) by age of household head. From Living Standards Measurement Study 
– Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS–ISA) data for Burkina Faso (2014–2015), Ethiopia (2015–
2016), Niger (2014–2015), Nigeria (2015–2016), Tanzania (2012–2013) and Uganda (2011–2012); Rural 
Agricultural Livelihood Survey (RALS) (CSO, 2012) data for Zambia (2014–2015). Urban households not 




























Fig. 4.3. Likelihood of plot being acquired via inheritance, by years since plot acquisition. From Living 
Standards Measurement Study – Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS–ISA) data for Tanzania 
(2014–2015). Courtesy of the authors.
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Moreover, buoyed by improvements in health 
systems and general well-being of  the populace, 
life expectancy in a number of  African countries 
has risen. Indeed, mean lifespan in SSA has in-
creased from 48 years in 1980 to 61 years in 
2018, with an estimated growth of  20–42% since 
2000 in some countries (The World Bank, 2020). 
Longer adult lifespans likely mean offspring 
waiting longer to formally inherit land: while 
this may not necessarily affect their use of  the 
land in the interim, it might limit their decision 
making power.
Customary tenure systems seem to be wan-
ing in many areas. Sitko and Chamberlin (2016) 
report that the share of  Zambia’s land under 
customary tenure has declined from 94% at 
independence to at most 54% in 2015. Malawi 
has experienced similar declines, from 87% at 
independence to an estimated 60% in 2016 (An-
seeuw et al., 2016). Given dwindling stocks of  
unallocated customary land and the trends in 
title formalization – which may increase with 
outsider land acquisitions and the continued de-
velopment of  rural land markets – it seems clear 
that the ability of  young people to access land via 
customary mechanisms will continue to diminish.
As a consequence of  these changes, it is per-
haps unsurprising that increasing numbers of  
rural Africans indicate that surplus land is no 
longer available in their communities. Even in 
relatively land abundant Zambia, where the aver-
age population density is less than half  that of  the 
region as a whole (United Nations, 2019b), fewer 
than half  of  rural household heads indicate that 
unallocated land is available in their area, and 
that it is possible for them to obtain some of  this 
land for farming (Table 4.1). The trend in percep-
tion over time indicates that constraints are 
intensifying rapidly, and most rapidly among 
heads younger than 30 years old as well as heads 
over 45 years. It is possible that pressures on older 
heads to bequeath land to their children make 
them more sensitive to local land availability than 
household heads in the middle age range.
Commodification of land is particularly 
relevant for young people
The general consensus is that land-related 
changes are taking place relatively rapidly in 
many rural areas (Jayne et al., 2019). Rental mar-
ket participation is increasing (Chamberlin and 
Ricker- Gilbert, 2016; Muraoka et al., 2018), farm 
structure is changing, with medium-scale farms 
showing rapid expansion in many areas (Sitko and 
Chamberlin, 2015; Jayne et al., 2016), and title 
conversions are rapidly taking place (Sitko and 
Chamberlin, 2016). The relative decline in im-
portance of  customary institutions as a means of  
allocating land has been both decried and wel-
comed as part of  a general process of  change 
which has agriculture on a trajectory toward 
larger-scale, more capital-intensive and commercially 
oriented production. The commodification of  land 
is an important part of  this process. Increasing 
land scarcity is associated with commodification, 
and the monetary value of  land in rural SSA is in-
creasing in real terms over time (Holden and Bezu, 
2016; Wineman and Jayne, 2018; Tione and 
Holden, 2020), particularly but not only in rela-
tively accessible areas (Tione and Holden, 2020).
Some observers have suggested that the 
commodification of  African farm land will inevitably 
lead to extractive forms of  commercialization that 
generate few decent employment opportunities, 
weaken multiplier effects with local rural econ-
omies, and exacerbate social differentiation with 
corrosive effects on community cohesion, welfare 
and resilience (Cousins, 2007; Amanor, 2012; 
Table 4.1. Household heads indicating that unallocated land was available in their area, and that it was 
possible to obtain some of this unallocated land for farming, Zambia. From Rural Agricultural Livelihood 




2012 47.2% 40.9% 40.3% 41.7%
2015 38.6% 37.1% 35.1% 36.2%
2019 37.1% 36.7% 28.5% 31.7%
Change: 2012–2019 –10.1% –4.2% –11.8% –10.0%
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Chitonge et al., 2017a,b, Hall et al., 2017; Yaro 
et al., 2017; Amanor, 2018). The argument of  
many of  these observers is that commodification 
will inevitably turn smallholders into landless 
or nearly landless informal wage workers, with 
reduced levels of  welfare and livelihood security. 
However, it is important to note that this literature 
has principally focused on larger-scale commer-
cial investments, and has largely ignored rental and 
sales transactions between local farmers, which 
are likely to be the more prevalent modes of  
commodification in rural Africa. Some of  these 
negative critiques of  land commercialization and 
commodification writ large make claims which 
are out of  sync with their empirical foundations, 
being frequently very limited in geographic scope, 
sample size, methodological reproducibility and the 
types of  commodification that are being examined.
The development of  rental markets for land 
is part of  the process of  commodification, and 
these markets have increased in importance in 
recent years. Although still at nascent stages, 
rural rental market participation rates are rising 
(e.g. Jin and Jayne, 2013; Chamberlin and Rick-
er-Gilbert, 2016; Deininger et al., 2017; Ghebru 
et al., 2018; Ricker-Gilbert and Chamberlin, 
2018; Tione and Holden, 2019). This is particu-
larly true for densely populated regions in coun-
tries such as Ethiopia, Malawi and Kenya, but it 
is also evident in more sparsely populated coun-
tries such as Zambia (Chamberlin and Ricker- 
Gilbert, 2016). In land constrained areas, rural 
land rental markets may be particularly import-
ant as a conduit for younger people who want to 
start farming (Ghebru et al., 2018; Holden and 
Tilahun, 2018; Kosec et al., 2018; Ricker-Gilbert 
and Chamberlin, 2018; Yeboah and Jayne, 
2018; Yeboah et al., 2019). An important body 
of  evidence suggests that rural land rental mar-
kets have important positive effects on equity (by 
transferring land from land-rich to land-poor 
households), and overall efficiency (by transfer-
ring land to more productive users), and thus 
contribute to broader positive trends in rural 
transformation (Holden et al., 2008, 2013; Jin 
and Jayne, 2013; Chamberlin and Ricker-Gilbert, 
2016; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2019). Offsetting 
these positive effects, however, there is some evi-
dence that rental rates and other transaction 
costs are higher for young tenants (Ricker- 
Gilbert and Chamberlin, 2018), and that rental 
rates decrease with plot size, making the costs of  
smaller transactions higher in proportional 
terms (Abay et al., 2020). Furthermore, in some 
cases rental markets may be exacerbating access 
constraints faced by youth in customary areas: 
White (2012) cites case studies in which com-
munity elders were documented as preferring to 
allocate land to external parties via rental or 
other arrangements, rather than allowing culti-
vation rights to local youth. In some cases, this 
not only constrained youth participation in agri-
culture, but also fomented social conflict. Thus, 
while there is good reason to view land markets 
(particularly rental markets) as representing posi-
tive institutional change for increasingly land 
constrained youth, there is a need for more com-
prehensive research on the distribution of  costs 
and benefits of  these markets, and their poten-
tial trade-offs.
Figs 4.4–4.6 summarize land rental market 
participation patterns at the household level for 
seven countries in SSA. Several observations 
stand out. First, there is substantial variation in 
rental market participation rates across coun-
tries: more than a quarter of  households in 
Uganda rent in one or more plots, compared to 
less than 5% in relatively low-density countries 
like Niger, Zambia and Burkina Faso. Second, in 
countries where rental markets are more 
developed – i.e. Tanzania, Ethiopia and Uganda – 
relatively younger household heads are signifi-
cantly more likely to rent in land than older 
heads. Furthermore, in these same countries, 
younger households (defined by age of  house-
hold head) are engaging more intensively 
with rental markets: they rent in a higher pro-
portion of  their farmland and a larger share are 
renting in 90% or more of  their land. This latter 
statistic implies that many young households 
would effectively be landless if  they did not have 
access to a rental market.
This inverse relationship between land 
market participation and age of  household head 
is more visible in Figs 4.7 and 4.8, which use 
non-parametric regressions to illustrate the rela-
tionship and intensity of  renting in, measured as 
the rented in share of  farmed land. It is worth 
noting that it is not the very youngest household 
heads who are most active in the rental market.
Given that households which are just start-
ing out are likely to have resource constraints 
which affect their ability to farm, we next exam-
ine the likelihood of  renting after controlling for 
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such factors. Table 4.2 shows the estimated par-
tial effects from Probit models of  renting-in land 
by households in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda, 
Niger and Nigeria. While there are some dif-
ferences across the specifications, and in the 
estimation results, the basic results are very 
consistent across countries: younger heads are 
more likely to rent in land, even after controlling 
for prerental farm size and other observable 
characteristics.
Using survey data from the Living Stand-
ards Measurement Study – Integrated Surveys 
on Agriculture (LSMS–ISA) programme of  The 
World Bank for Tanzania, from 2008–2009 
and 2014–2015 (in which the sample was re-
freshed), we can compare nationally represen-
tative statistics over a relatively short period of  
time. Surprisingly, these changes are very pro-
nounced and seem particularly so for house-
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Fig. 4.4. Household participation in land rental market, by age of household head. Analysis of LSMS-ISA 



























<30 years 30–44 years 45+ years
Fig. 4.5. Percentage of land rented in by renting households, by age of household head. Analysis of 
LSMS-ISA and RALS (CSO, 2012) data, courtesy of the authors.
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While overall farm size grew slightly on average 
over this period, it actually dropped for the 
youngest households. Median farm size de-
clined over the same period, indicating that the 
growth in average farm size was driven by rela-
tively few farms at the larger end of  the spec-
trum. Median farm size for the youngest house-
holds dropped even more than the median for 
all households.
Table 4.3 also shows that the general in-
crease in land rental market participation re-
flects a concentrated use of  rental markets by 
households with the youngest heads. At the 
same time, the share of  total farmland acquired 
via rental is growing fastest for the youngest 
households. Growth in the number of  plots 
with title certificationi is largest for heads aged 
30–44, indicating potential age-related con-
straints (but also likely related to the increased 
rental share of  land in younger hands). Inter-
estingly, while land values are increasing rap-
idly, this growth has distinct age-related pat-
terns.ii Heads under 30 years report faster 
increases in rental rates than older heads, while 
the changes in estimated land sales values 
show the reverse pattern: younger heads report 
much lower rates of  growth. This is consistent 
with the idea that younger households are 
more likely to farm marginal lands, in response 
to relatively higher land access constraints 
relative to older households.
Paradoxically, given the relatively greater 
importance of  rental markets for young people, 
there may also be higher costs for them to access 
such markets. Rural land rental markets are 
generally still in incipient phases of  development, 
rather thin (i.e. little land on offer and few trans-
actions), and characterized by relatively high 
transaction costs (Tione and Holden, 2019). In 
some areas where these markets are more devel-
oped, the demand exceeds the willingness of  
individuals to rent out land, partly because of  
risk associated with insecure land tenure. Con-
sequently, land prices and rental rates are rising 
rapidly, particularly in areas of  high agroecolog-
ical potential with favourable access to market 
(Wineman and Jayne, 2018). In Tanzania, for 
instance, real land rental rates rose by 5.7% per 
year between 2009 and 2013, driven largely by 
improved incentives for farming, urbanization 
and rising population density, as well as improved 
tenure security (Wineman and Jayne, 2018). 
These developments may adversely impact younger 
renters disproportionately (Holden and Tilahun, 
2018; Ricker-Gilbert and Chamberlin, 2018). 
Tione and Holden (2019) find evidence of  large 
non-linear transaction costs in Malawi; such 
costs may be particularly hard to negotiate for 
young potential tenants, suggesting a role for 
policy action. Ricker-Gilbert and Chamberlin 
(2018) find evidence in Tanzania that unit ren-
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Fig. 4.6. Land renting households that rent in at least 90% of their farmland, by age of household head. 
Analysis of LSMS-ISA and RALS (CSO, 2012) data, courtesy of the authors.
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than those paid by older tenants, suggesting age- 
related barriers (possibly related to social capital 
in contexts of  weak contractual enforcement).
In counterpoint to these large-scale pat-
terns, qualitative interviews with young people 
indicate how variable and complex their rela-
tionships with evolving land institutions are in 
different contexts. From among all the 317 
interviews conducted across 15 sites in Uganda, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire (see Chapter 2, 
this volume), 221 young people (70%) reported 
some own-account farming activity. As shown 
in Table 4.4, in all sites except Bora and Jabi 
Tehnan in Ethiopia, family/customary channels 
or borrowing were the most important ways 
that young people accessed land. There is con-
siderable variation in the prevalence of  ‘owner-
ship’iii (0% in four sites, rising to 42% in Daloa) 
and rental (0% in three sites, rising to 38% in 
Jabi Tehnan in Ethiopia and Oba Oke in Nigeria). 
Sharecropping was only reported in Ethiopia, 
where it accounted for between 7% and 31% of  
cases of  reported land use.iv Table 4.4 also shows 













































































95% CI Predicted probability
Fig. 4.7. Probability of household renting-in land, by age of household head. Analysis of LSMS-ISA and 
RALS (CSO, 2012) data, courtesy of the authors.
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sites – refering to the level of  agricultural com-
mercialization – within countries. Ownership is 
more important and rental less important in hot 
spots in both Uganda and Ethiopia (including 
Wodo Genet where khat production is import-
ant), but the opposite trend is seen in Nigeria.
The interviews also picked up a number of  
cases of  young people or their relatives renting 
out excess land. For some, it was clear that the 
income derived from renting out land made an 
important contribution to household welfare.
Both the interviews conducted for this re-
search, and the nationally representative survey 
data referred to earlier, show that in at least 
some sites, rental markets play an important 
role in allowing young people to gain access to 
land (or to additional land). To date there has 
been an assumption that young people and 
others would benefit if  landholders brought 
more of  their land into the market. As a general 
proposition this may be correct, but the magni-
tude and distribution of  these benefits will 
depend on how rental markets in particular 
locations actually function. In the remainder of  
this section, we highlight a number of  potential 
issues identified in the interviews with individ-
ual young people: we make no claims about their 
absolute or relative importance, but they are 

















































































Fig. 4.8. Share of household’s land rented-in, by age of household head. Analysis of LSMS-ISA and 
RALS (CSO, 2012) data, courtesy of the authors.
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One important question is whether rental 
markets are open to all on equal terms. For one 
21-year-old woman from Igbariam Eziafor, 
Nigeria, gender is not a barrier. According to 
her: ‘The plots of  land are owned by different 
people, so you meet a landowner, and settle the 
price for a plot with him [the landowner] and 
then he gives it to you’. She seems confident of  
being able to hire a piece of  land to farm: ‘If  we 
have the money, we can.’ A 19-year-old woman 
Table 4.2. Determinants of renting-in land (average partial effects from Probit model).
Dependent variable  
(1 = rents in land) Tanzania Ethiopia Uganda Niger Nigeria
Age of household head –0.0134 –0.0056 –0.0026 –0.0017 –0.001
(0.000)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0007)** (0.000)**
Prerental farm size (ha) –0.4356 0.0111 –0.1430*** –0.0160 –0.052
(0.000)*** (0.007) (0.0338) (0.0066)** (0.019)***
Household size 0.0051 0.0034 0.0111 0.0035 0.0037
(0.854) (0.0058) (0.041)*** (0.0021) (0.003)
Maximum educational attainment 0.0057 0.0008 0.0036 –0.0009 –0.0004
(0.721) (0.0008) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.001)
Female head = 1 0.0219 –0.1803 –0.0029 –0.0524 0.1644
(0.929) (0.0277)*** (0.0268) (0.0283)* (0.019)
Number of plots 0.7075 0.0077 0.0081 0.0031
(0.000)*** (0.0061) (0.0029)*** (0.002)*
log (Assets) 0.0495
(0.005)***
log (Income per capita) 0.0122 0.0142 0.0056
(0.0129) (0.0064)** (0.065)
Household has ox plough = 1 0.1121 0.084 0.0390 0.0449
(0.342) (0.026)** (0.0477) (0.0285)
Household has tractor = 1 0.0574 0.1806
(0.734) (0.2389)
Located in rural area = 1 0.0619 0.1085 –0.095
(0.753) (0.0386)** (0.033)***
Kilometres to road –0.0017 0.0008 –0.0005 0.0010 0.0022
(0.820) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.001)
Kilometres to market 0.0004 –0.0008 –0.0015 –0.0004 0.0004
(0.943) (0.0004)** (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.000)*
Elevation 0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 –0.0003 –0.000
(0.175) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)** (0.000)
Slope –0.0315 –0.0004 –0.003
(0.237) (0.0019) (0.004)
log (Population density) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0018
(0.974) (0.0000) (0.007)
log (Kilometres to night lights) –0.0091 0.0022
(0.0054)* (0.0035)
Bimodal rainfall = 1 –0.4316
(0.451)
Mean annual rainfall 0.0015 0.0001 0.0001 –0.0005*** 0.000
(0.262) (0.0000)** (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.000)***
N 8741 1887 1723 2208
Notes: Tanzania model uses 2008–2009, 2010–2011 and 2012–2013 waves of the Tanzanian Living Standards 
Measurement Study – Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS–ISA) data. For Tanzania, Mundlak-Chamberlain controls 
(time-averages of time-varying regressors) and year dummies are included, but coefficients not reported. Uganda model 
uses the 2011–2012 wave of the Uganda LSMS–ISA data. Niger model uses the 2014 wave of the Niger LSMS–ISA 
data. P-values are cluster robust, with significance levels denoted as follows: * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01.
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from Mucwini, Uganda, has a slightly different 
perspective:
I don’t think it matters if  you are a man or woman, 
as long as you have the money to pay the landowner 
in time. But it is better if  a man goes ahead to make 
the arrangement as men are more respected than 
the women when it comes to land matters.
Perhaps to circumvent this apparent lack of  
respect, but also to reduce the need for women to 
travel away from home, a 26-year-old woman in 
Awach, Uganda, spoke of  how land access is 
managed among her siblings:
We use customary land, which is in Latwong, 
but the land is not enough for all of  us. 
However, my three brothers combined resources 
and bought some three acres in Latwong, and 
any female family member is free to use it as 
long as it is not in use by another person. 
Meanwhile, the boys rent land from elsewhere 
while we, the girls, use the [land] at home.
In addition to gender, one’s origins may come 
into play in land rental transactions. For example, 
according to a 27-year-old woman in Oba Oke, 
Nigeria, and contrary to what might be assumed, 
it is the indigenes who are discriminated against, 
although any positive discrimination seems to 
come at a cost to the immigrants:
Most immigrants have access to large size of  
lands because they have money to pay 
landowners. Most people love to rent farmland 
to the migrants, so they have more opportunities 
than us indigenes. Also at harvest, compared to 
the indigenes, the immigrants give more crops 
as a ‘bonus’ to landowners.
Table 4.3. Farm size and land market characteristics, by age of household head (HH), Tanzania.
Survey year
Age of household head
Total15–29 30–44 45+
Mean landholding size (ha)
2009 1.39 2.29 2.61 2.34
2015 1.23 2.32 3.09 2.49
Change: 2009–2015 –12% 1% 18% 7%
Median landholding size (ha)
2009 0.81 1.21 1.42 1.30
2015 0.61 1.10 1.46 1.17
Change: 2009–2015 –25% –9% 3% –9%
% of HHs renting-in land
2009 12.7% 14.6% 7.4% 10.7%
2015 18.1% 19.0% 9.9% 14.6%
Change: 2009–2015 42% 30% 33% 36%
Rented % of land
2009 8.1% 8.8% 4.5% 6.5%
2015 13.1% 12.8% 6.3% 9.8%
Change: 2009–2015 63% 46% 40% 50%
% HHs with certified land
2009 6.6% 8.1% 10.2% 9.0%
2015 9.3% 15.9% 13.4% 13.8%
Change: 2009–2015 41% 97% 31% 54%
Rental rates (real 2015 TSh)
2009 75 75 90 80
2015 126 102 110 108
Change: 2009–2015 68% 36% 22% 36%
Estimated land values (real 2015 TSh)
2009 1217 1343 1426 1369
2015 1688 2486 2569 2421
Change: 2009–2015 39% 85% 80% 77%
Notes: Calculations are for the rural households in 2008–2009 and 2014–2015 survey rounds of the Tanzanian Living 
Standards Measurement Study – Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS–ISA) (www.worldbank.org/en/programs/lsms/
initiatives/lsms-ISA, accessed 26 November 2020) data. The sample was refreshed in 2014–2015.
 Young People and Land 69
The importance of  social relations within these 
markets was highlighted in two interviews. A 
25-year-old man in Bora, Ethiopia, noted the 
importance of  family relations:
Before my marriage my family gave me only one 
qert [0.25 ha] but later they then gave me an 
additional qert. I also rent in two qert of  land 
from my mother-in-law at very low price.
In another example, a 22-year-old immigrant 
woman from Oba Oke, Nigeria, told us how her 
brother’s good connections and high standing 
helped her in finding land to rent: ‘People have a 
lot of  confidence in him so when he introduces a 
new person there is no problem.’
A number of  interviewees drew attention 
to the limitations and insecurities associated 
with land rental. For example, limitations on 
the crops that can be grown, and underhand 
behaviour on the part of  the landowners are 
highlighted by a 35-year-old woman from 
 Butuntumula, Uganda:
When I got married, I found no land to cultivate 
at my husband’s place. I was not used to hiring 
land, but we needed food for the family. We had 
to hire land where we could grow maize, beans, 
cassava and sweet potatoes. […] I wanted to 
plant bananas but could not. Where I rent, you 
are allowed to only cultivate annual crops. 
Bananas go deeper and the plantation lives for 
over 5 years. Once you grow bananas, you are 
perceived to be interested in taking the 
landlord’s land. My fields are now a quarter of  
an acre. The landlord kept giving different 
portions to different interested tenants so that 
he makes a lot of  money on the same land. 
I used to have a big area rented for 30,000 
shillings per season but the size has kept 
reducing every season. The landlord reduces the 
size but does not reduce on the rent. Many 
people lack a place to cultivate so the demand 
for land is high now.
A 25-year-old woman from Luweero, Uganda, 
who cultivates cassava, maize and beans on two 
acres of  rented land, told of  a very different 
Table 4.4. Means of access to farmland by interviewees.
Country Site Statusa Cases
% Family, 
customary  
or borrowed % Rented % Owned % Sharecropped
Uganda Awach Rel. hot 27 88 11 0 0
Luweero Rel. hot 36 58 25 17 0
Mucwini Rel. cold 42 69 26 5 0
Butuntumula Rel. cold 23 52 30 17 0
Ethiopia Wodo Genet Rel. hot 14 86 7 0 7
Bora Rel. hot 20 15 35 35 15
Jabi Tehnan Rel. cold 29 24 38 17 21
Kuyu Rel. cold 13 46 23 0 31
Nigeria Oba Oke Rel. hot 16 63 38 0 0
Igbariam Eziafor Rel. hot – – – – –
Idi Amu Rel. cold 10 80 10 10 0
Umumbo Rel. cold 13 62 0 38 0
Côte d’Ivoire Soubré Rel. hot 7 86 0 14 0
Odienné Rel. hot 11 64 4 36 0
Daloa Rel. cold 12 58 0 42 0
Uganda Rel. hot 63 73 18 9 0
Rel. cold 65 61 28 11 0
Ethiopia Rel. hot 34 51 21 18 11
Rel. cold 42 35 31 9 26
Nigeria Rel. hot 16 63 38 0 0
Rel. cold 23 71 5 24 0
Côte d’Ivoire Rel. hot 18 75 2 25 0
Rel. cold 12 58 0 42 0
a‘Relatively hot’ and ‘Relatively cold’ refer to the level of agricultural commercialization (see Chapter 1, this 
volume).
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experience with her landlord, but faces similar 
restrictions on the crops that she can grow:
The landlord is a kind man and very patient 
with us. There are not so many restrictions on 
his land, except that we cannot grow crops that 
take long in the garden, those crops that take 
years to mature.
A 22-year-old male immigrant from Benin, who 
is farming in Oba Oke, Nigeria, spoke of  how 
through renting one can become entangled in 
local land disputes:
[…] a person has three or maybe five children, 
grows old and then dies. So, the land that ‘le vieux’ 
[‘the old man’] possessed now goes to those 
children, and some of  them might not be living 
in or even visiting the village. It is the children 
who are in the village that ‘attack’ the land and 
who might rent out some of  it to you. It can now 
happen that the children not living in the village 
return, and insist that the land is for all the 
children, so you can become involved in a dispute. 
Then you will have to beg them to allow you to 
finish with the crops you have started. They 
might accept, but if  not, you might have to give 
the person something to calm him. And if  this 
does not help, they might send you off  the land.
Finally, the experience of  a 26-year-old married 
woman from Jabi Tehnan, Ethiopia, shows that 
even with the protection provided by a written 
contract, functional institutions for dispute reso-
lution are essential:
We contracted farmland for 8400 birr for 2 
years. We used it for 1 year, half  the time of  the 
contract. The landholder then said he wanted to 
increase the rent to 10,000 birr for the second 
year, and we should sign a new 2-year contract. 
There are people who work as brokers and they 
encouraged him to increase the rent. We became 
angry and asked him why he was asking us for 
another contract with more money before the 
original contract had finished. We said that he 
should remember how we are helping him, but 
he insisted. We took the money on credit from 
the Amhara Saving and Credit Institute, and we 
asked him to pay the interest if  he is going to 
break the contract. He should also have paid the 
giyyid [penalty in cash if  she/he breaks the 
contract] but he refused even when he was 
asked by the elders. The good thing is that we 
made a written agreement at the beginning. He 
started intimidating us. […] He went to my 
husband’s parents and told them that he would 
kill their son, my husband, that very night. My 
husband is a religious person and keeps control of  
himself; I am rather quick to take offence and tried 
to confront the landlord. […] He then took the case 
to a court and I was called to the court to reply to 
the charge. […] We took the eyewitnesses [to the 
original contract] to testify, but by the time we 
reached the court, he had already been inside with 
people as eyewitnesses who were not even present 
during the contract process. We complained and 
asked the court to consider the contractual 
agreement and the eyewitnesses indicated on the 
paper. The landlord started begging the eyewit-
nesses not to give testimony against him. He also 
continued intimidating me and my husband. I 
complained to the court about the harassment. 
Finally, he returned our 4400 birr […].
In synthesizing the available evidence on young 
people and land markets in Africa, while it is 
clear that markets are increasingly important, 
there is a wide range of  engagement strategies 
and outcomes. There is significant spatial het-
erogeneity in these patterns, and markets are 
not equally important everywhere. Where they 
are important, they are particularly so for young 
people. Paradoxically, given the relatively greater 
importance, there seem also to be higher costs 
for them to access such markets. In some situ-
ations, for example where young people may 
seek to grow vegetables for the market, these 
higher costs might be related to the quality of  
the land being rented (e.g. relatively fertile land 
in lowland areas where water is available for irri-
gation). Qualitative accounts of  evolving land 
institutions indicate how difficult it is to cleanly 
describe the nature of  youth participation or 
assert the impacts of  land commodification on 
young people’s livelihoods. The lack of  well- 
defined sampling frames and small sample sizes 
mean that it is difficult to know how prevalent 
the different stories and situations are in the 
broader national, regional or subcontinental 
contexts. More comprehensive mixed methods 
studies of  the costs and benefits of  land markets 
would be extremely valuable, as would more 
comprehensive assessments of  other dimensions 
of  land commodification and its implications for 
the livelihoods of  rural women and men.
Changes in farm structure are associated 
with evolving rural economic opportunities
Closely linked to the discussion of  commodification 
and rental markets is the growth in medium- scale 
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farms that, in recent years, has received consid-
erable research attention (Jayne et al., 2016, 
2019). How this trend will impact young people 
will depend on the contribution these larger 
farms make to the rate of  agricultural product-
ivity growth and the strength of  their forward 
and backward linkages with the rest of  the 
economy (see Chapter 3, this volume). To the 
extent that agricultural productivity growth 
and new linkages support the creation of  off-
farm jobs, the increased difficulty of  acquiring 
land for farming, although problematic, may not 
depress rural livelihoods as would otherwise 
be expected.
Emerging evidence points to potential posi-
tive spillover effects from medium-scale farms on 
neighbouring small farms (Deininger and Xia, 
2016; Lay et al., 2018; Chamberlin and Jayne, 
2020), although whether or not such changes 
in farm structure imply greater employment op-
tions for rural youth is not yet clear. Chamberlin 
and Jayne (2020) enumerate several potential 
pathways that could generate positive spillovers. 
First, larger farms which are more highly capit-
alized and linked with input markets, may help 
to attract input suppliers to an area and improve 
upstream linkages for neighbouring small-
holders. Second, larger farms are more likely to 
have a commercial orientation (i.e. sell a larger 
share of  their production) and to market in lar-
ger volumes. These characteristics may attract 
more competition in downstream marketing 
channels (e.g. buyers, transporters), including 
larger buyers who may also offer neighbouring 
smallholders more favourable and well-defined 
prices. There is some evidence that this is oc-
curring in Zambia (Sitko et al., 2018). Third, if  
larger farms are owned and managed locally, 
then there may be relatively high expenditures 
on local goods and services, i.e. the classical 
multiplier effects of  Johnston and Mellor (1961). 
Fourth, there may be direct economic engage-
ments between larger and smaller farms, such 
as larger farms hiring labour from small farm 
households, or providing tractor services or 
equipment rentals to neighbouring smallholders. 
A fifth possible mechanism is via the local 
stock of  political capital: if  larger farms are 
politically important to incumbent administra-
tions, then resource allocation (e.g. for infra-
structure and public services) may favour 
areas in which they are concentrated. Further 
inquiry into the employment effects arising 
from the increasingly capitalized and larger- 
scale farming systems is now warranted.
Land Access is a Key Conditioner  
of Other Processes
In addition to directly facilitating agriculture, 
access to land shapes other options available to, 
and decisions made by, young people. Constrained 
access to farmland (whether perceived or actual) 
is associated with the greater likelihood of  rural 
out-migration by young people (Bezu and Holden, 
2014; Muyanga and Jayne, 2014; Kosec et al., 
2016; Ghebru et al., 2018). Evidence from Kenya 
also indicates that the amount of  land controlled 
by youth is more important than family land ac-
cess in influencing their migration decisions 
(Muyanga et al., 2020).
Similarly, constrained access to land is asso-
ciated with movement into non-farm activities. 
Table 4.5 presents the estimated results from a 
fractional Probit model examining the effect of  
land access on the proportion of  total work time 
devoted to agriculture. The results show that 
access to land, as proxied by a household’s land-
holdings, significantly influence how young 
people allocate their labour between farming 
and non-farm employment activities, even after 
controlling for individual-, household- and 
community-observable characteristics. Specific-
ally, for both youth and young adults, increasing 
household landholdings are associated with 
greater engagement in farming. This finding is 
consistent with other studies showing that in at 
least some locations, the availability of  land 
through inheritance, as well as the productivity 
of  that land, significantly influence the intention 
of  youth to remain in agriculture (Kosec et al., 
2018; Mdoe et al., 2020).
The results also provide some insights into 
how land concentration may be influencing 
youth engagement in agriculture. Generally, 
communities with increased concentration of  
medium-scale farms (5–10 ha) were associated 
with an increased level of  engagement in farm-
ing activities among young people. This could 
signal the role played by medium-scale farms in 
providing employment to youth, whether directly 
in agricultural wage work, or indirectly through 
positive spillover effects on neighbouring small 
farms such as improved access to market and farm 
72 J. Chamberlin et al. 
inputs, which increases profitability of  farming 
and creates new incentives.
Lack of  available land has been implicated 
in delayed household formation and associated 
with so-called ‘waithood’ (Honwana, 2014). As 
discussed in Chapter 8 (this volume), however, it 
would be a mistake to draw too narrow a con-
nection between limited access to land, low 
labour market participation and waithood. Young 
people work to sustain themselves and their 
Notes: Results from first stage regression controlling for factors influencing household landholding sizes are not 
reported here. Standard errors and significance levels in parentheses; significance levels denoted as follows: * = p<0.10, 
** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01.
Table 4.5. Effect of household landholdings on young people’s engagement in farming. From Yeboah et al., 
2019, based on estimates from a fractional Probit CRE model using data from Tanzania National Panel 
Survey (2008–2009, 2010–2011, 2012–2013).
Youth  
(age 15–24)





Age of member (years) 0.2053 0.00 0.0835
(0.02)*** (0.02) (0.007)***
Gender of member (1=male) –0.0152 –0.20 –0.1646
(–0.11) (0.10)** (0.07)**
Member’s education attainment  
(base: no education)
Primary education completed –0.8966 –0.28 –0.5825
(0.15)*** (0.12)** (0.10)***
Secondary education completed –2.7340 –1.24 –2.0832
(0.19)*** (0.19)*** (0.13)***
Post–secondary education completed –39.8565 –14.49 –74.5801
(0.31)*** (0.36)*** (0.23)***
Household level
Age of household head –0.0136 0.00 –0.0095
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.003)***
Sex of household head (1=male) 0.2293 –0.24 –0.0241
(0.19) (0.20) (0.13)
Marital status (base: monogamous)
Polygamous –0.2445 –0.07 –0.1556
(0.16) (0.15) (0.10)
Single 0.2583 –0.43 –0.0540
(–0.20) (0.22)** (0.14)
Other 0.3806 –0.05 0.1165
(0.18)** (0.14) (0.11)
Landholding (ha) 0.2099 0.13 0.1594
(0.05)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Number of livestock ‘000 –0.005 0.00 –0.0043
(0.002)** (0.003) (0.001)***
Own plough (1=yes) 0.1266 0.17 0.2013
(0.17) (0.20) (0.12)
Community level
% of households with 5–10 ha of land 0.0273 0.03 0.0240
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)***
% of households with over 10 ha of land 0.0000 0.00 0.0021
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Residuals from first stage regression –0.1797 0.04 –0.0204
(0.07)** (0.04) (0.04)
Constant –3.8413 0.72 –1.4963
(0.51)*** (0.58) (0.27)
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families, and to attain the markers of  social 
adulthood through avenues other than autono-
mous farming, wage work and/or self-employment.
Given the important theoretical linkage be-
tween long-term tenure security and incentives 
for productive investments which are not fully 
realizable within a season, the increased shift to 
production on rented or borrowed land may be 
associated with greater nutrient mining or 
short-term investments, over longer-term main-
tenance of  soil fertility. While some research 
suggests that this may be the case (Ricker-Gil-
bert et al., 2020), evidence is still limited. Still the 
orientation of  agricultural investments by 
young farmers may be especially sensitive to in-
centives of  production under short-term usu-
fruct rights (e.g. Okali and Sumberg, 2012).
Given the cash needs for upfront rental con-
tracts (the most prevalent rental arrangement in 
SSA), the role of  non-farm occupations in enab-
ling farming activities must be considered. The 
cash needs of  commercially oriented farming 
may further underscore the importance of  cap-
ital resources. This diverges from the age-old 
pathway of  ‘pulling oneself  up by one’s boot-
straps’ (with help from family and friends), with-
out recourse to resources outside of  one’s own 
labour and capital. Little empirical work to date 
has explored this relationship, but an interview 
with a 25-year-old man from Jabi Tehnan, Ethi-
opia, provided an intriguing example:
I also started to rent in land from the land-rich 
people to do farming. I used to rent in one gazim 
[0.25 ha] of  land for 1 year paying 3000–4000 
birr to cultivate green pepper. The main activity 
that is important for my livelihood is obviously 
green pepper production. Regardless of  the high 
cost of  production, including buying chemical 
fertilizers, and limited profit, my daily subsistence 
depends on the income from producing and selling 
pepper. I produce it on the land that I rent in from 
other people. […] It [money for renting farmland] is 
obtained from the teahouse. I work in the teahouse 
and generate the money to rent in land for farming.
Opening New Empirical Windows  
on Remaining Knowledge Gaps
The foregoing discussion indicates that nationally 
representative household survey data are invaluable 
for monitoring changes in Africa’s rural land 
access and use – in terms of  the distribution of  
farm sizes, evolving land institutions and the 
patterns of  farming. However, the empirical win-
dows they offer have important limitations for de-
veloping a youth-specific lens on land dynamics.
To begin with, standard survey data offer 
constrained windows into processes of  house-
hold formation. It is difficult to determine where 
any given surveyed household falls within this 
process. Even survey questions such as, ‘when 
did the household head first come to this area?’, 
do not indicate whether the currently observed 
household formed at that time, prior to the 
head’s arrival, or at some point after arrival. 
Moreover, traditional household survey instru-
ments are subject to the tyranny of  the concep-
tion of  the household as an organizational unit, 
and the household head as the locus of  farm and 
household management. As a result it is entirely 
possible that the activities of  young dependents 
(farming, labour allocations, business activities, 
etc.) do not show up at all in survey responses. 
Young people may occupy liminal or interstitial 
places that may be opaque to surveys focused on 
the household strongly framed relative to the 
head. For example, given the low reported rates 
of  plot decision making and control by house-
hold members other than the head and spouse 
(see Chapter 6, this volume), it seems plausible 
that we may not fully observe young people’s 
land management activities. The divergence 
between the nominal patterns of  intrahouse-
hold control as recorded in survey data, and 
the self-expressed narrative accounts of  
youth farming engagement (e.g. Andersson 
Djurfeldt et al., 2019, as well as the qualitative 
findings reported above) suggest that closer at-
tention to this is warranted. Such patterns may 
stem from systematic survey omissions (i.e. fail-
ing to record data on plots which are not con-
trolled by the head or spouse) and/or divergent 
subjective interpretations of  control. Either way, 
digging deeper into the ways in which depend-
ents farm (and whether or not such activities 
show up in household survey plot rosters) is 
clearly warranted.
Finally, given the dynamism around both land 
and youth in at least some parts of  rural SSA, 
there may be a rationale for surveys to oversam-
ple relatively dynamic contexts. Examples of  
such areas may include: commercialization hot 
spots, farm blocks (which hire in labour), areas 
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undergoing rapid changes in urbanization or 
accessibility, or areas where farming is changing 
significantly (e.g. via expansion of  medium- and 
larger-scale farms) and value chains are rapidly 
modernizing.
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have attempted to articulate 
why an understanding of  rural youth livelihoods 
in SSA requires an appreciation of  what is hap-
pening with land. While land-related research 
questions are not necessarily always youth ques-
tions, youth-related questions almost invariably 
invoke consideration of  land, either directly or 
indirectly. In our discussion, we have endeavoured 
to do three things. First, we summarize recent 
empirical evidence from primary and secondary 
sources to sketch out what we know about youth 
and land in rural Africa. While many aspects of  
the stylized story are clearly borne out in their 
broad contours from existing empirical data – e.g. 
the increasing importance of  land rental, shrinking 
farm sizes – other aspects require more nuance, 
such as the supposed disinterest in rural farming 
(and non-farming) futures on the part of  young 
people. Second, we review how land questions spill 
over into other youth options, decisions and out-
comes, through a review of  recent analyses. 
Building on these discussions, a third contribu-
tion of  this chapter is to articulate remaining 
knowledge gaps and to discuss the ways that 
new modes of  data collection could help address 
these gaps.
Africa is undergoing rapid transformation 
with respect to many of  the land-related questions 
and characteristics outlined above (Jayne et al., 
2018). Rural population growth is expected to 
continue for several more decades, even as 
urbanization increases (United Nations, 2019b). 
This means that new generations of  rural young 
people coming into the rural workforce will feed 
into greater absolute numbers of  rural households 
and individuals. Land constraints will inevitably 
be more acute for these successive generations. 
Livelihood prospects for these young people will 
be dependent upon, on the one hand, how they are 
able to negotiate the increasing commodification 
of  land and evolving land institutions (markets, 
tenure formalization) and, on the other, the 
kinds of  opportunities that are opened up off- farm 
in increasingly capitalized and market- oriented 
farming systems and rural economies.
As we have discussed, an improved and more 
nuanced understanding of  these issues as ‘youth 
issues’ will require new approaches to data col-
lection and analysis. In particular, ways need to 
be found to better monitor the interstitial spaces 
occupied by youth that may not show up in survey 
sampling frames (or in conventional modes of  
household-based data collection). We envisage 
much more scope for exploratory qualitative work 
to guide better and novel sampling frames, better 
questions and modes of  survey data collection, as 
well as greater scope for intentional mixed methods.
Notes
i In Tanzania, this includes two main types of certificates – a Granted Right of Occupancy (GRO) issued by the 
government, or a Customary Right of Occupancy (CRO) issued by a village council – as well as derivative rights 
of a GRO, such as leases and other private contractual arrangements which may be legally formalized.
ii Data on two types of land values are available from LSMS–ISA surveys in Tanzania: data on actual rental 
rates paid by tenants (for plots which were rented-in); and estimated sales values for land, elicited as re-
sponses to the question, ‘What would the value of this plot be if it were sold today?’
iii The interviews relied on people’s own understanding of ownership. We assume that this can mean either 
the land was purchased (with or without formal title) or held through long-term customary usufruct rights 
which may or may not extend to its sale.
iv See Yeboah et al. (2020) for an example of youth sharecropping in Ghana involving the establishment of 
a cashew plantation.
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Introduction
Migration features prominently in policy discourse 
relating to rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) and has done for many decades. The fram-
ing of  rural out-migration as a policy problem 
usually highlights the threat to the agricultural 
sector and national food security from the loss of  
young labour; the threat to urban areas from 
additional pressure on jobs and services; and/or 
the threat to young people themselves as they 
are pushed into risky, anti-social, criminal or 
radicalized behaviour. All three framings sug-
gest that for the sake of  society, the economy and 
rural young people, the policy objective must be 
to limit rural out-migration.
Against this background, over the last two 
decades there has been a turn within the social 
sciences toward what is called a ‘mobilities para-
digm’ (Benwell, 2009). The rationale is that be-
cause populations in Africa have historically 
been mobile – relocating nearby or internation-
ally, for shorter or longer periods of  time, indi-
vidually or in groups – the way movement 
through space is talked about varies, rendering 
the term ‘migration’, and the theoretical under-
pinnings of  much migration research, highly 
problematic. Centring the analysis on mobilities 
overcomes sticky issues of  whether or not 
 relocation to a nearby village, an adjoining dis-
trict, or the other side of  the country constitutes 
migration. Moreover, it allows for a more flexible 
understanding of  the nexus between involun-
tary and voluntary relocation.
The mobilities paradigm has ushered in 
new studies on the livelihoods and geographies 
of  young people, taking account not only of  mi-
gration, but also shorter distance and shorter 
duration movements (Hannam et al., 2006). The 
shift from migration to mobilities has also 
brought increased critical attention to the inter-
play between mobilities and youth transitions, 
with Crivello (2011) arguing for the need to situ-
ate young people’s spatial mobilities in relation 
to transitions around school, work, personal re-
lationships, social adulthood and so on. Growing 
up, rural young people must negotiate these 
transitions, and for many, their ability to become 
mobile helps facilitate this across space and time 
(Thorsen, 2006; Porter et al., 2010; Punch, 
2015). Such negotiations start in childhood. 
The interplay between mobility and youth tran-
sitions is shaped by birth order, age, education, 
gender, local circumstances, parental status and 
young people’s own marital status, along with 
broader cultural and political economy contexts. 
Indeed, while mobility may present opportun-
ities for some, for many others it is a necessity (in 
their eyes, or the eyes, for example, of  parents) 
(Porter et al., 2008; Hashim and Thorsen, 2011; 
Punch, 2014); and for still others, it may be of  
no interest at all.
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Young people’s involvement in different forms 
of  mobility is a response to changing socio- 
cultural and economic circumstances over space 
and time (Cole, 2010; Veale and Donà, 2014). 
Mobility is ‘engrained in the history, daily life and 
experiences of  people’ and as with the whole array 
of  forms of  human behaviour, it is ‘inspired by 
different motives, aspirations and obligations’ (de 
Bruijn et al., 2001, p.1). It is imperative to under-
stand how mobility has served, and continues to 
serve, as an important strategy in young people’s 
livelihood building – directly in terms of  access-
ing employment opportunities or land, and in-
directly through access to better education or 
healthcare, which in turn may help shape future 
prospects for employment and social mobility. 
This is equally true for livelihoods involving labour 
migration to large cities or distant places, tran-
sitory or nearby relocations, and/or efforts to 
build livelihoods involving little if  any mobility 
(Carling and Schewel, 2018; Gaibazzi, 2018).
If  youth mobility in SSA continues to attract 
the attention of  researchers, work on the mobil-
ity patterns of  rural youth and how these relate 
to transitions and livelihood building is still rela-
tively scarce (Porter et al., 2017). Much of  the ex-
isting body of  research is focused on urban 
contexts, with specific reference to marginalized 
street or migrant youth, or the wider cohort of  
youth (see Gough, 2008, on Lusaka; Benwell, 
2009, on Cape Town; Langevang and Gough, 
2009, on Accra). For example, poor unemployed 
youth in urban Accra have been reported to 
move into and occupy certain spaces over which 
they then exert some degree of  control. In the 
same context, and with luck, ‘moving around’ 
may position young people to take advantage of  
whatever opportunities present themselves – in a 
market, on a street corner, outside a supermarket 
in a middle-class neighbourhood, or further 
afield (Langevang and Gough, 2009).
In this chapter, we look at young women’s 
and men’s strategies for mobility in rural econ-
omies in Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Côte 
d’Ivoire. We draw on livelihood, life history and 
photo–voice interviews, as well as focus group 
discussions (FGDs), with young people across 
16 sites in four countries (see Chapter 2, this vol-
ume). The chapter focuses on spatial mobilities 
resulting from: involuntary relocations because 
of  conflict in society and/or disruption within 
the family setting; relocations for education; and 
relocations for work. The analysis investigates in 
particular the gendered nature of  youth mobili-
ties and immobilities, and their implications for 
livelihood building. After reviewing work on 
rural youth mobilities we conceptualize youth 
mobilities in terms of  aspirations and imagined 
life projects. The analysis then addresses invol-
untary relocations, relocations for school and 
relocations for work. The last section concludes 
the discussion.
Youth Mobilities, Transitions  
and Life Projects
Mobility, education and work
Mobility, including migration for work, is ‘a process 
and more than a single act or event of  relocation’ 
(Crivello, 2011, p.396). Over the years, mobilities 
of  rural people in SSA have included relocation 
to access education; relocation following mar-
riage; large-scale rural movement in search of  
arable land for farming; forced movement follow-
ing civil unrest; and relocation to towns, cities and 
further afield in search of  employment (Hashim 
and Thorsen, 2011). For rural youth, engagement 
with one or more of  these mobilities is structured 
by social relations, and is also embodied and 
highly gendered (Hashim and Thorsen, 2011; 
Porter et al., 2017). Farrugia (2016, p.838) ar-
gues that rural youth mobilities should be seen 
as embedded in the wider structural processes 
constituted by capitalist modes of  accumulation 
that underlie spatial inequalities. For many rural 
young people, mobility is central to survival, 
transitions and life chances.
Education is an important avenue through 
which young people negotiate their social and 
economic positions (see Chapter 7, this volume), 
and for many, education and mobility are intri-
cately intertwined. Rural youth are often disad-
vantaged in terms of  education quality because 
of  more limited access, the non-availability of  
teachers, inappropriate curricula and having 
less time to study (Meinert, 2003; Hashim, 
2007; Camfield and Tafere, 2009). However, 
suggesting that educational disadvantage can be 
understood solely in terms of  rural–urban com-
parisons, frames relocation for education within 
a simplistic model of  push–pull factors, thus 
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ignoring the more complex and intersecting 
reasons for mobilities in and through education.
Whether they are attending school or not, 
as subordinate members of  households and kin-
ship groups, young people’s labour is integrated 
into the portfolio of  activities, both productive 
(farming, trading, etc.) and reproductive (sweep-
ing, caring for younger siblings, water and fuel 
collection, cooking, etc.), that contribute to 
household and individual livelihoods. Apart 
from working on the family farm, children and 
youth are often encouraged to develop their own 
economic spheres. If  land is available, they may 
be given a plot on which to farm, or encouraged 
into non-farm activities. In rural savannah re-
gions of  West Africa, the long history of  youth 
mobility – for schooling, apprenticeship and/or 
work – suggests it should be seen as a normal 
part of  young people’s lives and therefore of  
youth transitions (Hashim and Thorsen, 2011; 
Thorsen, 2014). In addition to daily journeys to 
school, rural youth may move around locally in 
order to farm; collect firewood, water and live-
stock feed; to buy or sell farm produce; and to 
meet and socialize with peers. Actual movement 
patterns depend on resource availability as 
well as on normative views on gender and age- 
appropriate work, but commonly time and space 
are given to young people with the expectation 
that they engage in independent economic activ-
ity. This expectation is a significant reason 
why many rural youth move beyond their im-
mediate villages (Hashim and Thorsen, 2011; 
Yeboah, 2020).
While both girls and boys participate in pro-
ductive and reproductive activities, in most rural 
environments, the heaviest of  these household- 
level work demands fall on young women, and 
may constrain their mobility and therefore 
their ability to access educational and economic 
opportunities. In their study in rural Malawi, 
Porter et al. (2011) found that the mobility of  
young women of  all ages is constrained because 
of  widespread sensitivities around their suscep-
tibility to sexual assault and promiscuity, which 
only increases with puberty. In contrast, rural 
boys and young men have more freedom to move 
beyond their ‘local environment’ because of  
lower domestic workloads, less concern about 
sexual assault, an implicit understanding that 
they are less controllable, and the perception 
that the mobility of  young men has less impact 
on family welfare. Young men being indulged in 
this way may also reflect the family’s desire not 
to alienate them so that they ultimately stay in 
the local area and attend to their family respon-
sibilities. However in rural northern Ghana and 
other parts of  rural West Africa, the socializa-
tion of  young women towards marriage, includ-
ing the expectation that they become the sole 
provider of  household items such as cooking 
pots and that they should generate their own in-
come, drives their early mobility in search of  in-
come generation and procurement opportunities 
(Hashim, 2005; Hashim and Thorsen, 2011; 
Yeboah, 2020).
Gough and Birch-Thomsen (2016) draw 
attention to how in northern Ghana different 
mobilities enable both young women and young 
men to build their livelihoods by drawing on ex-
perience and capital generated from within their 
villages (e.g. through farming and fishing). They 
also describe how the ability to become mobile 
has enabled young people to exploit more distant 
opportunities, typically in mining, but also in 
the urban informal sector, and thus generate 
further financial resources that could then be in-
vested in assets (e.g. purchase of  a motorbike, 
residential plots and housing) and non-farm 
businesses. Young people’s mobility, in an effort 
to exploit the landscape of  opportunity, is thus 
fundamental to acquisition of  skills, networks, 
knowledge, experience and financial capital.
In her study in the Bisa region of  Burkina 
Faso, Thorsen (2014) highlights the lack of  eco-
nomic possibilities, fluctuations in income from 
farming, and not wanting to remain in chronic 
poverty, as significant drivers of  adolescent boys 
seeking alternative employment opportunities 
elsewhere, whether the decision is taken by 
themselves or by/with their parents. Their ex-
perience of  the rural economy is similar to that 
of  young people in many other contexts across 
SSA (see also Castle and Diarra, 2003; Crivello 
and van der Gaag, 2016; Yeboah, 2020). Never-
theless, and notwithstanding economic drivers, 
a key aspect of  young people’s mobility is social, 
and linked to important life course transitions. 
Young women and men seek more autonomy 
through their mobility and in so doing, negotiate 
new independence from – as well as dependen-
cies and interdependencies within – the family 
and broader kin groups. However, new eco-
nomic resources and reshaped relationships 
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only contribute to successful transitions and 
additional social status if  their mobility respects 
prevalent norms of  ‘good behaviour’ (Thorsen, 
2006, 2014; Thorsen and Jacquemin, 2015).
Mobility focused research draws attention 
to the spatial distribution of  livelihood oppor-
tunities, including farm and non-farm work, in 
young people’s transitions. In the context of  
constrained opportunity, and high levels of  risks 
and uncertainty, rural people have increasingly 
become ‘occupationally flexible and spatially 
mobile’ (Porter et al., 2008, p.6). Apart from 
farming activities most often carried out on vil-
lage lands, where significant mobility may still 
be required, many other income-generating op-
portunities require mobility beyond the village 
boundary. Moreover, for young people from rela-
tively densely populated rural locations, where 
access to land may be a challenge (see Chapter 4, 
this volume), relocation to towns and urban 
areas can be critical for livelihood building, suc-
cessful transitions (Hashim and Thorsen, 2011) 
and the accumulation of  wealth (Kleist and 
Thorsen, 2017). Thorsen’s (2014) work in rural 
Burkina Faso shows that mobility enables young 
men to participate in the global culture of  con-
sumerism. In addition to undergoing individu-
ation and enhancing their autonomy and 
identity, such mobility and the activities it en-
ables help forge intergenerational ties between 
senior relatives, obligations to family relations 
and interdependencies that link generations.
Farrugia (2016) suggests that youth mobili-
ties give rise to ‘translocal subjectivities’ – i.e. en-
gagement with, and temporal connections to, 
multiple spaces, which young people construct 
through mobilities. This involves the mobilization 
of  material and symbolic resources across both 
rural and urban spaces. In effect, ‘rural young 
people’s lives can no longer be located purely in 
one place, but are translocal, or constructed 
through economic, symbolic and affective rela-
tionships between the multiple spaces through 
which they move’ (Farrugia, 2016, p.848).
Social networks
The important role of  both peer and adult social 
networks in the mobility trajectories and transi-
tions of  young people, is well documented in 
both rural and urban locations (e.g. Both, 2010; 
Porter et al., 2011; Thorsen, 2012). Rural young 
people tend to depend heavily on these networks 
as they relocate, and in particular to access em-
ployment opportunities and accommodation in 
unfamiliar contexts. Where these networks in-
volve adults, they may reinforce dependency and 
asymmetrical power relations (Thorsen, 2012), 
but they also potentially serve to strengthen 
interdependencies necessary for the long-term 
survival and security of  the lineage.
Thorsen (2012, p.6) suggests that: ‘The 
thick social relations that engender friendships, 
reciprocities and some level of  responsibilities 
stretch beyond the family and are key to finding 
better paid and more secure jobs and thus to up-
ward social mobility.’ Poorly paid jobs such as 
shoe shining or some types of  hawking can eas-
ily be started independently by young people, 
and as such require little or no adult mediation. 
Tetteh (2014) found that rural young people 
who work as domestics in Ghana exercise agency 
by personally approaching potential employers 
in search of  jobs, but in so doing they may be 
compelled to negotiate their own terms of  em-
ployment and remuneration. While such ar-
rangements give the young people some degree 
of  control over their earnings, inexperience and 
limited bargaining power may result in un-
favourable or even exploitative terms and condi-
tions. Nevertheless, many still find innovative 
strategies to cope with their situations or change 
their employers (Tetteh, 2014).
Rural Youth Mobilities  
and Livelihood Building
Involuntary relocations
The line between relocation being involuntary or 
voluntary is ambiguous, and sometimes results in 
choosing the lesser of  two evils. The distinction is 
further complicated because it brings into play 
power relations between adults, and between 
adults and young people. Their assessments of  
the options available are not necessarily the same, 
and what is deemed preferable by persons with 
more power to make decisions, may preclude ob-
jections from those relocating, and thus bring 
into question whether mobilities are voluntary. In 
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times of  conflict and violence, the room for dis-
agreement and negotiation around relocation 
shrinks, but choices are nevertheless made.
All four countries in focus in this chapter 
have experienced some level of  political conflict 
but protracted conflicts involving military and 
armed rebels, flight and forced relocation have af-
fected Uganda and Côte d’Ivoire most severely. 
Both countries experienced recurrent armed con-
flicts: Uganda from the early 1990s to around 
2010; and Côte d’Ivoire from 2002 until 2007 
and then again in 2010, affecting young people’s 
lives from early childhood into their twenties.
In Uganda, villagers moved into camps for 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) for protec-
tion against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA); 
neither adults nor youth had much influence on 
these decisions in an atmosphere of  fear and vio-
lence. And yet, interviews reveal different strat-
egies for keeping children safe, overcoming the 
limited options for growing food or earning an 
income in the camps, and safeguarding access to 
land and income in the long term. A young man 
in Awach, northern Uganda, described a com-
mon tale of  short-distance childhood mobility in 
war time, weaving together his parents’ death, 
the LRA insurgency, schooling and social net-
works, to show the importance of  both paternal 
and maternal relatives:
I grew up in my uncle’s home. When my 
mother lost her life, we went to stay in her home 
[some 6 km away]. During the insurgency,  
I stayed in IDP camps but not for long. I started 
in Awach [40 km away] where I stayed 3 months, 
then I went and stayed with my aunty for  
3 months, and then my uncle’s daughter called 
me to stay with her [some 30 km away], close 
to the Coo Pe camp in 2001. I stayed until 
2004. I was still young and didn’t go to school 
because they feared that the LRA may abduct 
us. I started primary school near my maternal 
village in 2005, then came to St. Mauritz 
Primary School in Gulu, and I started living 
with my sister. I passed my PLE [Primary 
Leaving Exam] very well and an NGO 
[non-governmental organization] paid for my 
school fees for 1 year; then in Senior 2 it was the 
headteacher who paid my school fees. While  
I was studying, my brother from Amuru told me 
that our land was being entered by people from 
different clans, [and] that I should go back and 
live there. [When I moved] I found that Awach 
Secondary School was far, [so] I decided to leave 
school to take up farming.
Although some young people moved further away, 
the mobilities of  the vast majority were temporary 
solutions of  a local and flexible nature, which re-
sulted in greater safety. But at the same time, living 
in camps undermined the livelihoods of  most 
people, as the camps did not generally offer space 
for farming or other economic activities. Initially, 
the education of  displaced children was disrupted, 
but over the years, schools emerged in the camps. 
More boys than girls spoke about having been ab-
ducted by the LRA. Upon return they had difficul-
ties going back to school, as a 35-year-old woman 
in Awach explained:
In 1998, while I was in Primary 7, the rebels 
abducted me. I returned after 2 months and 
tried to go back to school but dropped out 
because of  the stigma of  abduction from other 
children.
None of  the young men spoke of  going back to 
school after abduction, unless they had relocated 
to live with relatives further away. At the time 
when parents and older siblings began to move 
back to their villages to farm, NGO support en-
abled some youth to continue secondary school-
ing. As was the case for the young man above, 
relocation driven by a concern for land rights 
could disrupt education.
In Côte d’Ivoire, the conflict was spurred by 
an economic downturn and xenophobia, and 
migrants from northern Côte d’Ivoire and neigh-
bouring countries were under threat of  violence 
and eviction from their farms in the southern 
part of  the country. At the same time, young 
people in northern areas were primarily affected 
by the closure of  schools and the rupture in cir-
cular (national) mobilities. Camps were mostly 
located in neighbouring countries and none of  
the young people in our study spoke of  camps. 
Those whose parents or grandparents were mi-
grants spoke about returning to their ancestral 
lands, as did a 28-year-old man near Daloa, who 
was born in Benin but had spent his entire child-
hood in Côte d’Ivoire:
When the crisis [the war] started in September 
2002, I was attending the last year of  primary 
school here in the village. My father had died in 
2000 but the rest of  my family was living in the 
hamlet close to our cocoa farm. At first my 
family joined me in the village compound, then 
we all went back to Benin. Later, in 2004, my 
brothers and I came back but my mother stayed 
in Benin. I came back to finish my schooling. 
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This year I went back to Benin to spend 4 
months with my mother. Now I’m back [in Côte 
d’Ivoire] to pursue my projects. What I would 
like to do, I will do here in Côte d’Ivoire. I’m 
Beninese but I don’t master the conditions there; 
I master them here, especially here in the west of  
the country.
A similar pattern of  back-and-forth mobility 
was seen among migrants with roots in Burkina 
Faso, whose elders had established cocoa farms 
through sharecropping arrangements, two or 
three generations back. Large numbers of  people 
fled during the most violent periods in the war, 
and children were sent back to be safe and to 
continue schooling (Zongo, 2016). However, 
many migrant families relocated from their 
hamlets into large villages or rural towns and in 
the periods of  relative calm, the circulation of  
migrants continued, both over longer and short-
er distances. As with the Beninese youth referred 
to above, people returned well before the peace 
accord was signed in 2007. The interviews did 
not provide much insight into gender differences 
among youth with migrant backgrounds in Côte 
d’Ivoire.
Family rupture due to the death of  one or 
both parents, or divorce and/or remarriage, can 
also bring about involuntary relocation for chil-
dren and young people, as explained by a 
17-year-old woman in Korhogo, northern Côte 
d’Ivoire, and a 24-year-old woman in Luweero, 
Uganda:
My father did quite well, so we were fine until 
he died, then we began to suffer. As my 
grandmother was on her own, I was sent to live 
with her, and because I was helping her, I wasn’t 
enrolled in school. When I turned 15, my family 
brought me to the village to get married. It was 
all very strange! There is no change in my 
everyday life. Before, when I was with my 
grandmother, I spent a little money on clothes 
and the rest was for our food, and now I give 
most of  my money to my mother-in-law.
My parents divorced and I stayed with my father 
on the farm. At 13 years old, I was brought to 
Kasubi to stay with my granny. This was because 
a worker at the farm was sexually harassing me, 
and staying at Kasubi saved me from this. The 
house was crowded with many people, and my 
needs could not be met, so I got myself  a 
boyfriend and that was how I ended up pregnant 
at 15. It was all due to poverty because he had 
promised to provide for me. […] I never knew my 
mother, but after struggling much in life, I felt I 
should find her. I was directed to where she was 
staying but she had married again and never 
told her husband that she had a daughter, so she 
introduced me to her husband as the daughter 
of  her deceased sister. I felt so bad. I came to 
Nsozi Bilye in 2016 to take care of  my sick 
granny and I ended up staying for good. I will 
have to migrate at some point in time, of  that I 
am sure. I came to take care of  my granny so if  
she happens to pass on, then I will have no 
reason to stay here. I doubt her children would 
let me stay even if  I wanted to. They would have 
to divide up the land and I have no share here.
Even in situations of  involuntary relocation 
young people find space to make choices, albeit 
from a limited range, which shape their transi-
tions and social mobility. For girls, coming of  age 
has a strong impact on their pathways depend-
ing on how sexuality and respectability is re-
garded in their community, and what age is 
common for intimate relationships and mar-
riage. The reactions to having a marriage ar-
ranged or being pushed into deep poverty to be 
protected from unwanted sexual advances, as 
we see in the stories above, range from acquies-
cence to seeking a way out. Exiting a bad situ-
ation often involves relocation to the house of  
another relative or cohabiting with a boyfriend 
or prospective husband. Young men’s choices 
rarely implicate life course markers such as mar-
riage but rather livelihood enablers such as edu-
cation and work. Nevertheless, consideration of  
family relationships and long-term access to re-
sources may guide their choices of  living with 
specific kin or discontinuing schooling.
Relocation for education
Chapter 7 (this volume) refers to the disruption 
in children’s and young people’s lives arising 
from relocation, following, for example, the 
death of  a parent, parental divorce, ‘fostering’, 
etc., and the disjointed educational trajectories 
that can result. As the affected child or young 
person usually has little if  any choice in the mat-
ter (i.e. whether and/or where to relocate), these 
cases are similar to, although possibly less dra-
matic than, some of  the involuntary relocations 
discussed in the previous section. As with some 
of  the other examples of  involuntary relocation, 
84 D. Thorsen and T. Yeboah 
while negative impacts on education are pos-
sible, this is not always the case:
When I was about 2 years old, I was taken by my 
paternal uncle to live with him. I was told he 
wanted to relieve my parents from the 
responsibility since they didn’t have money to 
efficiently care for me. He took me to Kizito-
Luweero and I grew up there. I studied at 
Luweero Apex Primary School up to Primary 7 
and my uncle paid for my school fees. I only 
came back to Kakuuto after my Primary 7 
exams. I then went to Luweero Secondary 
School for ordinary and advanced level.
(22-year-old female, Awach, Uganda)
However, the focus in this section is on reloca-
tion by young people when the primary motiv-
ation is to access a wider array or better quality 
of  educational opportunities than those avail-
able locally. As should be expected – both be-
cause of  the number and spatial distribution of  
different kinds of  education establishments, and 
because young people’s agency increases as they 
grow older – this kind of  relocation is not very 
common among primary school students, but is 
increasingly common among secondary school, 
vocational and university students. It also fig-
ures in the futures that some young people im-
agine for themselves (see Chapter 9, this 
volume). In most cases, relocations for second-
ary or tertiary education involve, or will likely 
involve, young people moving from a rural area 
to a town or city. This is so common in Côte 
d’Ivoire that youth mention their guardians, but 
rarely detail how the arrangements came about 
or what their lives are (were) like, living in these 
households. Most mention that they help their 
guardian outside school hours. Some work to 
contribute towards their school expenses, while 
others explain that their guardian does not 
allow them to do work on their own account but 
wants them to focus on their studies. Most note 
that their school expenses are paid by their 
father, or sometimes their mother or a brother, 
often supplemented by monies they earn during 
weekends and holidays. A 20-year-old man in 
Côte d’Ivoire explains:
I went to secondary school in Soubré and 
usually worked during the long vacations 
because I thought, if  I don’t do this, my dad 
can’t send me to school. I did masonry and 
painting. I was forced to play truant from school 
to do piecemeal work, since my father didn’t 
always send money. One time, I spent 2 weeks 
painting with my brother in Abidjan. I have also 
helped one of  my older brothers to sell clothes in 
San Pedro, especially during the month of  
December. This year, when the new school year 
was about to start, my father told my siblings 
and I that he didn’t have the money to send us to 
school. I was so discouraged that I took my stuff  
and went to my mother’s house [his parents 
have divorced]. I only stayed for 2 weeks but 
when I came back, I learned that my younger 
brothers had started school, only I wasn’t going 
back. Later I learned he [my father] had taken a 
credit to send them to school and I didn’t want 
him to become more indebted, so I dropped out 
of  school a year before I would have sat the 
BEPC [Brevet d’Etudes du Premier Cycle] exams.
A similar pattern is observed in Nigeria, where 
secondary and tertiary education involved mo-
bilities of  different durations:
I left my father in 2015 at the age of  19 years. 
I left to pursue my education in Omu Aran [a 
location near Oshogbo in Osun state]. At that 
time, I came home every weekend to support my 
father. He was good to us and catered for us. 
When I finished my secondary level examination 
papers at Omu Aran, I did not come back to Oba 
Oke. I travelled to Offa [in Kwara state, a north 
central state in Nigeria], to pursue admission to 
Offa Polytechnic but also to participate in 
charcoal business with some friends. All the 
savings generated from these activities were 
used for clothing.
(25-year-old male, Oba Oke, Nigeria)
In our research sites, the range of  mobilities 
linked with young men’s secondary education is 
infrequent among the young women. Those 
who reach secondary level education are more 
likely to work with their parents or guardians, to 
work within the locality where they live, or to 
come from families that can cover the whole cost 
for their education. Often young women are per-
ceived to need more protection and they are able 
to protect their reputation and respectability by 
remaining in proximity of  their kin. Their dili-
gence in the economic activities they undertake 
factors in the level of  maturity and social status 
they are accorded, even if  they do not have the 
same level of  geographical knowledge and 
breadth of  social networks as their male peers.
Educational relocations are not just about 
access but also about the pursuit of  a better or a 
different future. For example, in Uganda, a 
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29-year-old agronomist had laid the foundation 
for his future life by relocating from Luweero to 
Kampala to attend university, where he com-
pleted a first degree in agribusiness manage-
ment. Perhaps reflecting his age, degree and his 
current position as an agronomist on a commer-
cial farm, the future he imagines for himself  is 
more expansive than many of  the other inter-
viewees. Already married with two children, he 
has established himself  as an adult man and is 
now contemplating building his social status. He 
imagines himself  getting a master’s degree, 
moving to Busula (where he already has a plot 
of  land), upgrading his political activity from a 
village councillor to a district councillor, and up-
grading his wife’s shop from retail to wholesale 
(she is also a university graduate).
A number of  the interviewees in Ethiopia 
have completed a university degree, are cur-
rently studying for a degree, or hope to go to uni-
versity and/or have siblings who have a degree. 
It is striking that in these interviews there was 
no mention of  mobility: it seems to be simply as-
sumed that relocation is nothing more or less 
than part of  going to university (as it is in so 
many other places!).
Parents and other family relations gener-
ally supported mobility to access higher quality 
education, due in part to wanting their offspring 
or wards to succeed in life. The presence of  close 
relatives, mainly paternal uncles living in areas 
with better schooling, is an important part of  
the story. Such relatives sometimes contribute fi-
nancially to help defray the cost of  formal 
schooling, and this, to a large extent, helps to fa-
cilitate mobility for education.
Vocational training was also part of  young 
people’s strategies, and for many, such training 
was a welcome solution if  they had had to drop 
out of  school. The ability to get involved in voca-
tional training was highly gendered, and the 
transition to adulthood hampered some wom-
en’s training because of  childcare responsibil-
ities and/or the demands of  existing business 
activities:
I would be interested in vocational training but 
not as part of  formal education. I can do a more 
advanced training in [beauty] salon work and 
maybe add on with tailoring if  there is money 
and time. Then, when I don’t have customers for 
the salon, I can do the tailoring work. […] The 
first major constraint is lack of  money to pay for 
the vocational training and to buy the 
equipment. The second constraint is lack of  time 
because this will require me to leave my home 
and maybe go to stay in Gulu, yet I have young 
children.
(18-year-old female, Awach, Uganda)
In addition to childcare, other obstacles have 
stopped women from entering vocational train-
ing. A 33-year-old woman with two children 
from Butuntumula, Uganda, thought that voca-
tional training was a possibility as it did not re-
quire relocation:
I only want to go for vocational training to learn 
handwork like tailoring and running a [beauty] 
salon. There is a vocational institute nearby. 
People who train there start their own 
businesses. The major constraint is money. As 
for formal education, my husband may not 
allow it.
Access to vocational training is easier for un-
married women but the economic standing of  
the family might influence the kind of  training, 
formal or informal, as may mediation by rela-
tives in arranging a more formalized apprentice-
ship. How skills acquisition is labelled differs 
across the four countries. In Nigeria, young 
women who stopped schooling in junior or se-
nior secondary school, talk about having trained 
as a tailor, seamstress, hairdresser or healthcare 
professional, regardless of  whether they learn by 
working with a parent or in a vocational school. 
In contrast, a distinction is made in Côte d’Ivoire 
between apprenticeships that incur the payment 
of  a fee and working alongside a relative. Young 
Ivorian men speak of  being ‘assistant’ masons 
and painters, but ‘apprentices’ when they learn 
carpentry, welding and mechanics.
Such training can, but does not necessar-
ily, involve relocation to other places, though 
the access to apprenticeships is generally easier 
in towns and cities. There is a strong sense 
among young people across the study sites that 
their rural areas lack opportunities for acquir-
ing academic and practical skills, and therefore 
relocation must accompany any additional 
education (or training). For example, a young 
man in Idi Amu and Igbokiti, Nigeria, describes 
how there is no opportunity locally to be 
trained in the artisanal work he has chosen, so 
in order to ‘realize his dream’ he has to move to 
a bigger town:
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Like my own situation, I cannot learn my 
artisan job in this community so I chose to go 
out. This also applies to other young people who 
cannot be trained in their chosen work in this 
community.
Two other men from the same community voice 
a similar sentiment:
I want to move out. […] if  you look around you 
won’t see any higher institution here so this will 
make me move out and go to study.
(18-year-old male, Nigeria)
I can never further my education in this 
community. I prefer to move to a location like 
Sokoto [in northern Nigeria]. This community 
may distract someone from their original plans.
(28-year-old male, Nigeria)
It has long been recognized that for some young 
people, relocation for education may be a first 
step in a longer journey, with further mobilities 
being facilitated by new skills and/or a broader 
perspective gained through education. This is 
clearly illustrated by a 22-year-old woman from 
Awach, Uganda:
When it comes to […] my university life, I will 
stay in Kampala. So, I am in Kampala basically 
for education since it has the best universities. 
After graduating, I feel I should explore another 
region of  Uganda. I have friends from Adjuman 
and Arua so I plan to go there. Based on my 
friends, I think northerners are well-behaved 
people, kind and easy to get along with. I have 
started learning the language as a strategy to fit 
in the region. I don’t think of  going abroad at 
all. Who would take me there? I would be the 
first in my family to go abroad and it’s kind of  
scary for me.
Relocations for work
Much attention has been paid in academia and 
policy to labour migration in SSA, especially to 
circular movements within countries and trans-
nationally, and to irregular migration into Eur-
ope and North America. In fact, our research 
suggests that transnational migration is prob-
ably the least common pathway for rural youth. 
Only in Ethiopia was there evidence of  a sub-
stantial flow of  transnational migrants, reflect-
ing the significant increase in the numbers of  
young women relocating to the Middle East for 
domestic work in the past 20 years (Atnafu and 
Adamek, 2016; Zewdu, 2018). The experience 
of  an 18-year-old woman from Kuyu, Ethiopia, 
is not atypical:
I interrupted my education halfway into Grade 9 
to migrate to Bahrain for work, without telling 
my family. I went through other people. But as I 
did not pay money for going, when I arrived in 
Bahrain the cost of  my travel was deduced from 
my salary. The broker’s payment was also 
deduced, so for the first year I barely had any 
income and I did not have money to send to my 
mother. The work was very difficult for me. I had 
signed a 2-year contract, but I did not finish the 
2 years. I stayed there for 1 year and 3 months 
and returned with 3 months’ salary. I came back 
with the intention of  changing my destination 
to another country, but my family prohibited me 
from migrating again. To some extent, I was able 
to furnish our house. I replaced the old 
furniture.
On the other hand, mobilities associated with 
transnational relocations are central in the im-
agined futures of  some Nigerian youth:
Oh, if  God blesses me, the first place that is in my 
mind is America. It is a country that I love. 
When I go there with my music, I will go up [get 
famous] quick. I believe that about my music! 
You know, 3 years ago I met one man in Ife and 
he called me during the show, when I was 
performing there. He said that he liked the way I 
sing, and if  I bring 50,000 Naira he will help me 
get the visa to go to Malaysia. I just tried my best 
and gave him the money but then later I did not 
see him again.
(22-year-old male, Oba Oke, Nigeria)
While locally significant, these kinds of  trans-
national labour movements do not seem to re-
flect the use or experience of  mobility of  the vast 
majority of  rural youth. Their mobilities, associ-
ated with work and income generation, and 
with accruing social status through economic 
activities, are likely to be on more limited spatial 
and temporal scales. While they tend to be under 
the policy radar, the use of  such mobilities by 
young people to shape and build their livelihoods 
deserve more fine-grained attention.
Labour migration research tends to home 
in on employment – in a traditional sense – as 
working for someone, but a focus on mobilities 
highlights the significance of  even small-scale 
movement for trading-based economic activity. 
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A 29-year-old man in Butuntumula, Uganda, il-
lustrates the centrality of  such mobility to an 
(ultimately unsuccessful) trading venture:
After dropping out of  school in Primary 7, I 
started trading in fish. I bought fish from 
Luweero Town and cycled to the villages around 
Vumba to sell them. Being an amateur in 
business it collapsed due to bad debts.
Some nascent mobile traders have been fortu-
nate to learn the ropes from a parent or others. 
In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, young men in par-
ticular become involved as mobile agents in agri-
cultural value chains, working as microbuyers 
of  cocoa and cashew nut in well-established 
commercial networks.
When the cashew season begins, I go to the 
hamlets and small villages to buy. Some 
producers call me, and I go to their homes to 
buy. I work with a big trader in Korhogo, who 
tells me the price of  cashew nut daily and buys 
all the cashew nuts I acquire. When the cashew 
season finishes, I move into trade in farming 
products. I started working with the trader 
during the time I was in secondary school. 
When I wasn’t in school, I worked in his shop 
and he would give me 1–2000 FCFA.
(28-year-old male, Korhogo, Côte d’Ivoire)
Such mobility-based trade in Côte d’Ivoire is 
highly gendered and provides a particular niche 
for young men, who combine it with a portfolio of  
farm and/or non-farm economic activities. They 
are well integrated into the rural environment 
and establish durable social networks through 
their different strands of  work. Although they 
earn money and respect in their families for their 
work, these young men are still firmly embedded 
in a hierarchical social order in which they are 
subordinate to one or more larger (and generally 
older male) traders.
In Nigeria, a few young women provided 
examples of  how their livelihoods depended on 
local mobilities for trade. For example, a 21-year-
old woman in Oba Oke combines trade in agri-
cultural produce with an itinerant hairdressing 
service:
I engage in the buying and selling of  agricultural 
produce. I buy raw cocoa beans, to dry and  
sell. I buy dried cocoa beans and resell as well.  
I go to nearby villages to buy cocoa and cashew 
nuts. When palm oil is harvested, I buy palm 
kernels to process and sell to retailers. I spend 
the income I generate for the upkeep of  my 
family and myself. In the beginning my husband 
didn’t know this job, and we always quarrelled 
when I came home late from buying and selling 
cocoa beans, kola and palm oil. But his mother 
intervened and explained that he had to be 
patient because the little income earned from 
the work I did would assist and improve the 
family. Now he permits me to continue my work. 
I always carry my tools for hairdressing when I 
travel so I also do hair and this links me with 
more people in the areas where I buy palm oil 
kernels in large quantities.
In contrast to the young men in Côte d’Ivoire 
who are integrated into established trading net-
works, this young Nigerian woman uses the fe-
male niche of  hairdressing to build and 
strengthen her trading networks. Combining 
trade and hairdressing means her short-distance 
circular movements support a portfolio of  in-
come-generating activities consolidated through 
the time spent with other women. It was only 
with the support of  her mother-in-law that she 
was able to negotiate space with her husband for 
her mobility. The mother-in-law’s intervention 
suggests that these negotiations may have been 
much more difficult if  her income was not being 
invested in her young family.
Examples of  relocations to rural areas away 
from the villages we studied, emerged primarily 
in conversations about young people’s plans for 
the future. In Uganda, land markets and the pos-
sibilities they allow for buying or otherwise ac-
cessing land in other parts of  the country, were 
important for young married men who were 
struggling to provide for their families, and thus 
to live up to patriarchal expectations:
I want to buy more land away from home and I 
have been saving since last year. The place 
where I want to acquire the land is in Amuru 
District where the land is very fertile. My plan is 
to buy land for farming and for constructing a 
house. I also want to buy more animals. I will 
migrate when I get the money for buying the 
land and means of  transport for easy movement 
to the farm.
(32-year-old male, Awach, Uganda)
Land scarcity is only one among several drivers 
of  mobility, which tend to play out through gen-
der divisions of  labour. For example, in areas 
where women do not participate much in farm 
work or do not have their own farms, relocation 
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for work seems more acceptable, at least as long 
as the women are single. For married women, re-
location requires agreement with the husband 
to move alone or together.
In sites across all four countries, some 
young people reported either having relocated, 
or were planning to relocate to rural towns for 
shorter or longer periods of  time. Young women 
in particular spoke of  their wish to relocate to 
rural towns in the future to expand their busi-
nesses as tailors, hairdressers, shop owners, res-
taurant owners, etc.:
If  it is the will of  God, I will move to a town to 
engage in different types of  work. I want to live 
in a town and engage in any activity that can 
generate income there. For example, I want to 
open a cafeteria. If  my capacity does not allow 
me, I would open a shop or engage in other 
trading activities. Rural work is not convenient 
for me, especially because of  my health, but I 
also think that the activities in town are more 
profitable than activities in the village.
(26-year-old female, Jabi Tenan, Ethiopia)
Young people’s mobilities do not necessarily fol-
low a pattern from periphery to centre, or from 
lowly- to better-paid work. Indeed, the step from 
rural towns to more densely populated urban 
areas is often insignificant and more dependent 
on the distance from village to city, the availabil-
ity of  work and the ability to save up money, than 
on the size of  the population. In many cases the 
shift to a new place appeared to be more random 
than planned:
A friend helped me to get a job as a maid in 
Entebbe and I was there for a year. My salary 
was never paid on time, and there was a time 
when they owed me 200,000 Shillings but paid 
me only 50,000. When I told my employer that  
I had got a new job in Kikyusa, she took me to 
the taxi park and told me to wait while she got 
the money she owed me from her mobile money. 
But she never came back. Another friend helped 
me get the job in Kikyusa, working as a maid for 
a Rwandese woman. I worked in this woman’s 
home for close to 2 years and it was there that  
I met and married my husband.
(25-year-old female, Luweero, Uganda)
The story of  unpaid wages is common, and par-
ticularly among young people who have re-
located to places where they do not have older 
members of  their family to intervene with the 
employer. Peers cannot play the same role as 
older kin, but they can help in facilitating alterna-
tive employment, which may require mobility 
within the city or rural town. When young 
women and men voice their wish to migrate for 
urban work in the future they tend to speak in 
terms of  ambitious goals and to glorify the poten-
tial outcomes. The same type of  embellishment 
happens in discourses about Europe among our 
Ivorian respondents. A 29-year-old widow and 
mother of  four in Odienné, Côte d’Ivoire, notes 
with a laugh:
My wish is to go beyond Abidjan, but it is really 
difficult to know where it is best to be. If  you are 
in a place and everything goes well for you, it is 
clear that it’s better, but if  you sit somewhere 
and you don’t have anything, then you are not 
better off  than you were before.
Some of  the dreams about distant places seem 
unrealistic, and even some plans for more local 
migration appear lofty and barely attainable. 
However, this amalgam of  dreams and imagined 
futures must be understood as a reflection of  the 
diverse livelihood activities in which young 
people engage, and their familiarity with hazard 
and contingencies that can easily turn their lives 
upside down.
Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter has explored young people’s mobil-
ity and highlighted gender differences that shape 
what young rural women and men do, and how 
this is interlinked with transitions and social mo-
bility. Qualitative data from Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire show that the histor-
ical and continued importance of  mobility in 
much of  rural Africa does not translate into 
rural exodus, but rather into changing patterns 
of  mobility. By shifting the focus from migration 
to mobilities, the chapter overcomes disparities 
in what is defined as migration, what are under-
stood as ordinary relocations (for example for 
education or marriage), and what can be seen as 
strategic mobility to access resources. We have 
not discussed practices that require women to 
move to their husbands’ households, which are 
dominant across our research sites, in terms of  
how they affect women’s access to resources. 
But we do highlight how norms about gender 
and age-appropriate behaviour, and to some 
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extent class, affect women’s ability to use stra-
tegic mobilities to access opportunities, pursue 
the options that they would prefer, and grow 
their economic activities.
Ambiguities in the distinction between vol-
untary and involuntary mobilities surface 
throughout the chapter, and reveal that even 
when relocation is prompted by violence or rup-
ture, some choices are still made by adults and 
young people alike. Relocations are plural, flexible 
and repeated, especially in protracted conflicts, 
and they have different long-term outcomes for 
young women and men. These differences are 
rooted in gendered practices in relation to land 
tenure, but also to perceived needs for protection 
against abduction, brutality and sexual violence. 
Protective measures may involve relocation to a 
relative’s household, but our analysis shows that 
young women have some agency to navigate diffi-
cult or unwanted relocations. Sometimes they do 
this by relocating on their own initiative, and 
sometimes by engaging in intimate relationships, 
and gaining the social status that comes with 
being married and having children. Young men 
are not often pressured into relocations that cata-
pult them into life course transitions, but involun-
tary relocations during protracted conflict can 
affect their ability to pursue educational or occu-
pational paths to more secure livelihoods. And 
yet, our analysis shows that multiple relocations 
may also be part of  accessing educational or oc-
cupational opportunities.
Relocation for education is not limited to 
conflict zones or cases of  familial rupture: indeed, 
in the majority of  our research sites such mobility 
is taken for granted. For secondary education, re-
locations are often of  shorter distance but may 
nevertheless involve living away from the home 
village. Tertiary education almost always requires 
relocation over longer distances. While the perceived 
quality of  education enters into the decisions 
about which school to choose, our analysis shows 
that for secondary education the social relations 
with potential guardians, and the availability of  
subsidized school attendance, or of  work oppor-
tunities, influence both the choice of  institution 
and educational outcomes. The analysis also 
shows the importance of  mobility in vocational 
training, and the constraints facing young 
women who have already transitioned into adult-
hood as wives and mothers.
Relocation for work is the type of  mobility 
that has received the most attention; framed as 
‘circular labour migration’ and increasingly just 
as ‘labour migration’, the implication is that 
migrants will settle elsewhere and not return. 
However, these framings ignore the contingent 
nature of  young people’s mobilities and liveli-
hoods. Our analysis shines a light on how students’ 
journeys during the long holidays can turn into 
temporary work and vocational training, and 
allow young people to occupy an age-appropriate 
space, and reconstruct age-appropriate relation-
ships, within the family.
Policy discourses tend to use crude distinc-
tions between different types of  mobility – such as 
rural-to-rural versus rural-to-urban migration, or 
internal versus international migration – which 
do not adequately reflect the multiple mobilities 
observed, nor the differences associated with gen-
dered norms and practices. Apart from the estab-
lished flow of  female temporary migrants from 
Ethiopia to work in domestic service in the Middle 
East, few young people are able to – or seemingly 
particularly interested in – relocating outside SSA. 
Nevertheless, the majority of  young women and 
men are already engaged in, or envisage, strat-
egies for broadening and consolidating their eco-
nomic activities and achieving social adulthood, 
involving mobility in profound ways.
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Introduction
Youth are at the forefront of  championing the 
innovative technological, gender-aware, and 
climate-smart approaches that will help grow 
and modernize agriculture.
(Young Africa Works Summit 2017, 
MasterCard Foundation)i
When the willingness of  youth to contribute is 
matched with appropriate opportunities, they 
can have a transformative impact on the growth 
of  agricultural productivity.
(Alliance for Green Revolution in 
Africa (AGRA), 2015, p.38)
In recent years, it has often been asserted that 
young people are innovative, risk-taking, early 
adopters of  new technologies, and eager to en-
gage with non-traditional opportunities. Within 
the context of  sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), these 
putative essential features of  rural young people 
have been proposed as a potential driver of  
change in agriculture and other parts of  the 
rural economy (Africa Commission, 2009; FAO 
et al., 2014; AGRA, 2015). However, the argu-
ment continues: resource constraints and 
limited productive opportunities in SSA’s rural 
areas limit the ability of  youth to realize their po-
tential as farmers, and increase the likelihood 
that talented young people abandon rural areas 
altogether through migration (see Chapters 3, 5 
and 9, this volume). In this sense, rural-to-urban 
migration, as a conduit for rural youth away 
from agriculture, is often framed as having 
potential negative impacts on the agricultural 
sector and rural development (The World Bank, 
2015; Deotti and Estruch, 2016).ii This chapter 
examines the empirical basis for this story, using 
a combination of  approaches.
The chapter sets out to address three ques-
tions. The first is, ‘How might we think about the 
notion that youth bring something new to farm-
ing?’ To address this, we examine the explicit 
and implicit assertions in the stylized statements 
which are often made in policy and public dis-
course about young people and farming in SSA. 
This is partly a conceptual parsing of  the differ-
ent ways in which we might interpret claims 
about youth and how they intersect. We comple-
ment this with a review of  evidence about par-
ticular propositions (youth are innovative; youth 
will drive agricultural transformation) that ap-
pear in the literature, drawing on other recent 
studies.
Second, we address the question of  ‘What 
aspects of  farming by young people are visible to 
us through existing empirical windows?’ Not all 
implied traits of  youth as farmers are equally vis-
ible in household survey data. For example, the 
fact that agricultural decisions and outcomes 
are typically described at the farm or household 
level imposes challenges for linking such outcomes 
with youth, an attribute generally ascribed either 
to individuals within a household or to a whole 
demographic segment. We discuss the opportunities 
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and constraints associated with using currently 
available data sources to explore how young people 
farm in Africa.
Third, given the caveats outlined in address-
ing the preceding questions, and conditional on 
the data that are currently available, we ask, ‘Do 
the young in SSA farm differently?’ We use recent 
nationally representative household survey data 
to address this question, focusing on observable 
farm-level practices which are generally linked 
with agricultural intensification. We find that 
younger households (whether evaluated by age 
of  household head or average age of  household 
adults) are characterized by structural differences, 
typically operating smaller farms with fewer 
capital resources. However, farms operated by 
younger households are also slightly more likely 
to use intensification practices and be oriented 
toward markets. After controlling for farm en-
dowments and other factors, we find evidence 
that younger households are significantly more 
likely to use intensification practices: age of  head 
and age of  workforce are both negatively associ-
ated with output marketing, high-value/non- 
traditional production portfolios and input usage. 
Interestingly, after controlling for age of  the 
household head, we find a significant additional 
effect of  the age of  other household members, 
suggesting that relying exclusively on character-
istics of  the head as ‘farm manager’ may obscure 
important contributions made by other young 
household members to decision making. However, 
while statistically significant, our results indicate 
that the ‘age effect’ in the use of  intensification 
practices is very small in magnitude, implying 
that expectations of  a youth-driven transform-
ation of  African agriculture should be examined 
carefully.
Change in Rural Economies
Young people as agents of change
The idea that African young people can be the 
agents for positive change in rural areas is in 
wide circulation. For some, they are viewed as 
the only hope for achieving sustainable agricul-
tural transformation, while for others, their 
positive influence is already being felt. These 
claims have been critically reviewed elsewhere 
and found wanting (Mabiso and Benfica, 2019; 
Sumberg and Hunt, 2019; Glover and Sumberg, 
2020) and we see no need to cover this same 
ground again here. Suffice it to say that there is 
little if  any evidence – direct or indirect – from rural 
SSA that supports these kinds of  propositions. 
Further, as shown by Sumberg and Hunt (2019),
[…] The international research literature on the 
relationship between age and a number of  
indicators of  creative and innovative behaviour, 
point to the conclusion that there is no clear or 
strong evidence for a simple and/or direct 
relationship. Further, in those individual studies 
where such relations are found, they are often 
influenced by context and sector, and individuals 
at the lower end of  the youth age range are 
seldom the most innovative or creative.
(Sumberg and Hunt, 2019, p.135)
In addition to the lack of  evidence, the claims 
that young people are in pole position to trans-
form African rural economies are undermined 
by three critical weaknesses. The first is the fact 
that they fall right into the ‘essentialism trap’ by 
suggesting that young people, as a group, are 
hungry for change, and are innovative, quick to 
adopt new technology, etc. This kind of  conception 
of  youth as a uniform, undifferentiated group – 
across factors of  social difference including 
gender, age, ethnicity, religion, level of  formal 
schooling, wealth, etc. – flies in the face of  the 
basic tenets of  modern sociology. It has taken 
decades to break down entrenched mentalities 
behind statements like ‘women are …’, and it 
would be a shame if  similar essentialisms are al-
lowed take root in the discussion of  rural youth.
The second weakness is muddled thinking, 
in which innovation and innovative behaviour 
are used interchangeably with, for example, trying 
new things, risk taking and entrepreneurship. 
The danger in using quite different ideas such as 
these, as synonymous, is that we run the risk of  
devaluing important, long-standing analytical 
distinctions. This is clearly seen, for example, in 
the case of  entrepreneurship, which in current 
usage in relation to youth in SSA – following the 
approach of  the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitoriii – is now often undifferentiated from any 
kind of  self-employment (Kew et al., 2015).iv 
Gough and Langevang (2017) capture this well: 
‘In light of  their limited possibilities to gain formal 
sector jobs in the public or private sector, young 
people are being encouraged to be “job creators” 
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rather than “job seekers”, thus becoming self- 
employed “entrepreneurs”’ (p.1).
The third weakness stems from the fact that 
claims about young people’s potential to trans-
form the rural economy are seldom if  ever accom-
panied by an acknowledgement (much less any 
analysis) of  the structural and political economy 
impediments that constrain their ability to drive 
change. In effect, the suggestion is that young 
people will drive system-level, transformational 
change, despite being young and inexperienced, 
without access to the full suite of  resources required 
for meaningful innovation, and often excluded 
from the fora and institutions where key deci-
sions are made.
Farming: the challenge of seeing  
the innovation through the difference
The notion of  a farming system or a crop pro-
duction system suggests it is possible and useful 
to categorize farming activity based on key 
indicators like scale, crop and/or livestock com-
bination, commercial orientationv, labour arrange-
ments and the technology used. The objective in 
developing such system classifications is usually 
to maximize variation between, while minimiz-
ing it within, the set of  identified systems. While 
the expectation is that all farms within a given 
category are broadly similar, there will always be 
a degree of  variation in structure, organization, 
the use of  technology, productivity and the like, 
within any given category. Some of  this within 
category (or within system) variation reflects dif-
ferent resource endowments and management 
preferences and capabilities: it would certainly 
be a mistake to read within category variation as 
direct evidence of  innovation or innovative be-
haviour on the part of  an individual or household.
The concept of  innovation – simply put, 
‘improved products and processes’ (Niosi et al., 
1993) – has been central to the mainstream 
understanding of  economic growth for many 
decades (Schumpeter, 1947). None the less, per-
spectives on the relationship between African 
smallholder farmers and innovation have shifted 
dramatically since the colonial period. Initially, 
with farmers portrayed as backward, tradition 
bound and resistant to change (for more sympa-
thetic early portrayals, see Hill, 1963; Allan, 
1965), it was the job of  agricultural extension to 
introduce and promote modern (‘rational’) farm-
ing methods. Framed by diffusion of  innovation 
theory, those who first adopted the new tech-
nologies and practices, i.e. they did what was 
being promoted, were termed ‘innovators’ (Rogers, 
1983). It was not until some decades later that 
the existence and potential significance of  farm-
ers’ own experimentation and innovation came 
briefly to the fore (e.g. Richards, 1986; Biggs, 
1990; Sumberg and Okali, 1997).
Innovation is commonly used to refer to 
both the process through which new products 
and processes emerge, as well as the new prod-
ucts and processes themselves. The former is 
difficult to observe, particularly at farm level, 
while the use and spread of  new products (like crop 
varieties) or processes (like conservation agricul-
ture), promoted by extension or development 
programmes, are usually the focus of  technology 
diffusion studies (Glover et al., 2019; Krishna 
et al., 2020).
For the purposes of  this chapter it is useful 
to think of  innovation or innovative behaviour 
in relation to the rural economy – or to young 
people’s livelihoods – in terms of  doing different 
things and/or doing things differently. A farmer 
who uses (not just tries) fertilizer when no one 
else does, might be considered innovative, as 
might one who applies fertilizer using a micro-
dosing technique, when everyone else broad-
casts. In addition to farm practices, innovation – 
doing different things and/or doing things 
differently – might be observed in the marketing 
or commercialization of  agricultural produce; in 
farm structure or organization; in how agriculture 
is combined with other economic activities; or in 
any aspects of  non-farm economic activities.
In this chapter we are interested in gener-
ational differences in farming practice, but the 
danger of  simply ascribing such differences to 
innovation or innovative behaviour can be illus-
trated with the example of  young tomato grow-
ers in Brong Ahafo, Ghana (Sumberg and Okali, 
2006; Okali and Sumberg, 2012). In the study 
site north of  Techiman, tomatoes – up to three 
crops per year – are produced, as they have been 
for some years, by young people (primarily but 
not uniquely young men). Plots are relatively 
small and the work is hard, particularly during 
the dry season when watering is required morn-
ing and evening. Many of  the young tomato 
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growers do not bother to grow food crops – having 
little if  any household provision responsibilities – 
but focus solely on tomatoes because of  the 
high potential return. Many rely on a mother or 
sister to feed them. The point is that the differ-
ences between the young tomato growers and 
the older generation, who grow a range of  food 
crops and are unlikely to produce tomatoes, has 
little to do with innovation, and everything to so 
with the young people’s physical strength, limited 
responsibility and desire to accumulate capital 
quickly. There is much more scope for looking at 
innovative behaviour among the tomato produ-
cers, where, for example, only a few make use of  
petrol pumps to facilitate irrigation or try to cir-
cumvent the women who control access to the 
market (Okali and Sumberg, 2012).
Evidence from technology  
adoption studies
The vast empirical literature on technology use 
offers decidedly mixed evidence about young 
farmers’ inherent propensities to use modern in-
tensification strategies. In a systematic literature 
review of  the determinants of  using conservation 
agriculture practices, Knowler and Bradshaw 
(2007) found that of  18 studies controlling for 
age of  farmer, three found a negative relation-
ship (i.e. younger farmers are more likely to 
adopt such strategies), five found a positive rela-
tionship, and ten found no statistically signifi-
cant relationship. Their review of  the literature 
also indicated no consistent finding with respect 
to farmer age and propensity for technology 
adoption. Meijer et al.’s (2015) literature review 
of  factors affecting the uptake of  agricultural 
and agroforestry innovations among smallholder 
farmers in SSA found no consistent connection 
between uptake and age of  farmer. Kassie et al. 
(2015) found that after controlling for other 
factors, there was often a negative correlation 
between farmer age and adoption of  different 
conservation agriculture practices in Kenya, 
Malawi, Ethiopia and Tanzania, although coeffi-
cient estimates were highly variable across practices 
and countries, and not always significant. Other 
recent empirical efforts find little evidence for a 
‘youth effect’ in agricultural intensification. 
Diao et al. (2019) find that younger farmers in 
Ghana are not more likely to intensify or use 
modern inputs, compared with older farmers; 
constraints to adoption seem non-age specific 
(e.g. market access is important for technology 
adoption). Andersson Djurfeldt et al.’s (2019) 
mixed methods study in Zambia also found no 
age-related intensification or productivity rela-
tionship, which they attribute in part to the 
limited resources of  younger household heads. 
In contrast, Guo et al.’s (2020) meta-analysis of  
33 empirical studies found a significantly positive 
association between age and use of  sustainable 
intensification practices in Southern Africa.
Empirical Windows on Young  
Farmers: Data and Measurement 
Challenges
In order to begin to evaluate some of  the claims 
made – however vaguely – about young farmers 
and their potential contributions to the trans-
formation of  agriculture, we would ideally like to 
draw on well-measured observations of  such 
characteristics as energy, risk aversion, innovation, 
receptivity to new ideas, early adoption of  new 
technologies and so on. Standard household 
survey instruments, however, generally afford 
few windows on to these characteristics and the 
outcomes potentially associated with them.
The propensity to innovate is often ascribed 
to young people as a key characteristic.vi Innov-
ation (like decision making) is not easily observ-
able, almost by definition. Survey instruments 
are generally set up to track practices that are 
already ‘on the radar’, and predefined questions 
about farming practices will certainly miss in-
novation and experimentation at the margins. 
However, through these surveys we can gener-
ally observe a suite of  intensification practices 
which are heavily promoted by extension and 
development programmes, including, for ex-
ample, the use of  improved crop varieties, inor-
ganic fertilizer and other inputs. Increasingly, 
surveys are also tracking practices that map on 
to more agroecological or ‘climate-smart’ ap-
proaches to agriculture (Hammond et al., 2017; 
Ngoma et al., 2020).vii So, a first approach to 
evaluating the propensity of  young farmers to 
drive change might examine the use of  these 
two kinds of  practices.
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A number of  challenges arise in attempt-
ing to link individual attributes (age, gender, 
education level or any other property of  
youth) with practices and outcomes typically 
observed at the farm level (e.g. technology 
use, productivity, farm orientation). First, 
many outcomes are only reported at the 
household level. Second, while it is true that 
in some cases we observe plot-level practices 
and outcomes, which in theory could be 
linked with different ‘managers’ within the 
household, in practice, this does not generate 
much analytical purchase. This is because in 
the Living Standards Measurement Study – 
Integrated Surveys on Agriculture data and 
similar data sets where plot-specific control 
and/or management is mapped to particular 
household members, the vast majority of  
plots are said to be managed by the head, 
with the majority of  the remainder mapped 
to the head’s spouse(s). For example, using 
nationally representative samples, 90% of  
plots in Zambia were managed by the head, 
8% by the spouse and just 2% by other mem-
bers, while in Tanzania and Ethiopia, the 
head was identified as the primary decision 
maker on 94% and 95% of  cropped plots, 
 respectively.viii
In recognition of  the limitations of  assign-
ing a single household member as plot manager, 
recent surveys are increasingly asking about mul-
tiple contributors to decision making. Table 6.1 
shows the share of  cropped plots with decisions 
made by different combinations of  household 
members, when joint or consultative decision 
making is recorded. While significantly more 
inclusive than descriptive statistics derived from 
a single manager, we still see relatively low inci-
dence of  members other than the head or 
spouse(s) recorded as contributing to decision 
making, with less than a tenth of  Tanzanian 
plots and less than a quarter of  Ethiopian plots 
having recorded decision making input from 
members other than the head and/or spouse(s).
This regularity in farm survey data has sev-
eral possible implications. First, taken at face 
value, it suggests that for the most part young 
people do not farm (other than by supplying 
labour) until they become household heads or 
spouses. A second possibility is that young 
people are engaged in managerial decision mak-
ing on at least some plots, either solely or with 
other household members, but this managerial 
contribution remains opaque given a default 
preference to designate the head as plot man-
ager. There are many reasons to suspect that the 
second of  these alternatives is likely in many 
cases. Consider the not atypical case of  a house-
hold with an aged patriarch, his wife or wives, 
and several adult children who are still at home. 
Tradition may dictate that the patriarch is desig-
nated as the household head, even where the de 
facto management of  many of  the household’s 
productive activities (on and off  the farm) are in 
the hands of  other members. To adequately explore 
this possibility, new modes of  data collection will 
need to be developed that more carefully probe 
the locus (or loci) of  decision making within 
Table 6.1. Share of cropped plots by household position of decision maker (including joint or consultative 
decision making).
Decision maker Tanzania Ethiopia
Head only 43% 30%
Spouse only 3% 1%
Head and spouse 45% 45%
Other household member, alone or with another member 9% 24%
Total 100% 100%
Notes: Data are from the 2012–2013 Tanzanian Living Standards Measurement Study – Integrated Surveys on 
Agriculture (LSMS–ISA), and 2015–2016 Ethiopian LSMS–ISA surveys. For Tanzania, up to three household members 
are identified in response to the question ‘Who decided what to plant on this plot in the long rainy season?’ asked for 
cropped plots (up to three members were possible joint decision makers). For Ethiopia, for cropped plots, in addition to 
the to the question ‘Who in the household makes primary decisions concerning crops to be planted, input use and the 
timing of cropping activities on this field?’, up to two other members could be identified as consulted by the primary 
decision maker.
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households. In the meantime, we might cre-
atively reinterpret ‘farmer age’ (or other farmer 
characteristics) as something better measured 
through an aggregate measure of  the family 
farm workforce. We offer an example of  one way 
to undertake this in the next section. A third pos-
sibility, which is not mutually exclusive of  the 
first two, is that young household members who 
are not the head or a spouse are farming on plots 
which do not show up in the household plot ros-
ter. To keep things tractable, our discussion in 
this chapter focuses on the first two alternative 
readings of  the data. However, an important av-
enue for future empirical work would be to valid-
ate the assumption that information on all plots 
farmed by all household members is effectively 
captured by typical survey instruments.
Do the Young Farm Differently? 
Available Empirical Evidence
Despite these acknowledged limitations, we use 
data from nationally representative surveys of  
rural farm households in Tanzania, Zambia and 
Ethiopia to explore the degree to which alterna-
tive measures of  household age correspond to 
multiple agricultural practices and outcomes. 
First, we describe the association with farmer 
age and structural characteristics of  farms, such 
as size of  landholdings and value of  productive 
assets. This allows us to engage with debates 
on whether young farmers consistently face 
constraints in accessing land and other product-
ive resources. Then, after controlling for these 
factors, we explore whether younger farmers are 
more likely to engage in intensification, agroeco-
logical or climate-smart practices.
The data we use for this analysis come pri-
marily from the LSMS–ISA for Ethiopia and Tan-
zania, and the Rural Agricultural Livelihoods 
Survey (RALS) (CSO, 2012) for Zambia.ix All 
are nationally representative panel surveys, in 
which the same households were visited during 
the different waves of  data collection. We use three 
waves of  panel data for Ethiopia (2011–2012, 
2013–2014 and 2015–2016) and Tanzania 
(2008–2009, 2010–2011 and 2012–2013) 
and two waves of  data for Zambia (2011–2012 
and 2014–2015). In Ethiopia, 3969, 3776 and 
4951 households appear in each respective 
wave and in Tanzania, 3265, 3918 and 5010 
households appear in each respective wave. In 
 Zambia, 8839 households were surveyed in 
2012, with 7254 reinterviewed in 2015.
To address the issue raised in the previous 
section about a potential mismatch between the 
household head and the locus of  managerial 
agency in a distributed or collective set of  deci-
sions, we define several ways of  measuring 
‘household age’: age of  the nominal household 
head; average age of  all adult members; and 
average age of  all adult members excluding the 
household head. The correlation between these 
measures is shown in Table 6.2, with very 
similar estimates for each country. We see that 
households with younger heads generally also 
Table 6.2. Correlation between alternative measures of ‘household age’.
Variables Age of head Avg. adult age
Avg. adult age  
(excluding head)
Tanzania
Age of head 1
Avg. adult age 0.7287*** 1
Avg. adult age (no head) 0.4056*** 0. 8832*** 1
Zambia
Age of head 1
Avg. adult age 0.7296*** 1
Avg. adult age (no head) 0.4650*** 0.9056*** 1
Ethiopia
Age of head 1
Avg. adult age 0. 6959*** 1
Avg. adult age (no head) 0. 2820*** 0. 8367*** 1
Notes: All Pearson correlation coefficients are significant at p<0.001 level (***).
98 J. Chamberlin and J. Sumberg 
have younger adult members, although this cor-
relation is imperfect, suggesting that there may 
be value in evaluating alternative measures of  
household youthfulness.
We explore the proposition that younger 
farmers and households face particularly acute 
asset endowments, by plotting non-parametric 
associations between structural characteristics 
of  farms and the age of  the household. Fig. 6.1 
shows these relationships graphically for Tanza-
nia, Zambia and Ethiopia (represented by panels 
a, b and c, respectively). Here we use age of  
household head as our measure of  household 
age, but the use of  average adult age yields very 
similar results. For all three countries, farm size, 
labour and capital endowments are generally 
increasing with household age. Vertical lines 
indicate 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of  
household head age distributions. The positive 
relationship between per capita land endowments 
and household age indicates that as households 
become older, landholdings are generally in-
creasing faster than the increases in household 
size. The value of  productive assets (only avail-
able for Tanzania and Zambia) are also increas-
ing with age. By focusing on the left-hand side of  
these graphs, we generally find descriptive support 
for the idea that younger households operate 
with fewer productive resources than do older 
households, on average. Interestingly, the graphs 
of  value of  crop production per hectare (a frequently 
used measure of  farm productivity) generally 
show an inverse U-shape, indicating that while 
resources tend to increase throughout the range 
of  household ages, land productivity follows a 
different pattern, first rising and then falling 
(although peaking at different ages in each of  
the countries).
To further examine some of  these structural 
conditions, as well as the practices and outcomes 
of  interest, we tabulate descriptive statistics 
covering a broad range of  characteristics on the 
samples from the most recent wave for each 
country, and use quartiles of  household average 
adult age to organize our findings (Table 6.3). 
Several things stand out from these unconditional 
descriptive statistics. The number of  members is 
greatest in the second quartile, and is consistent 
with an inverse U-shaped labour endowment 
which is lowest for very young and very old 
households. Farm size, farm size per household 
member and productive assets all increase 
with age. Echoing the findings in the graphs 
previously shown, we see that land endowments 
increase faster with age than labour endowments, 
meaning a growth in per capita land availability 
with age. The value of  productive assets is highest 
in the middle range for Tanzania and increasing 
for Zambia (again, this variable is not available 
for Ethiopia). This is consistent with the stylized 
notion that many young households in rural 
Africa – and throughout the world – have 
relatively smaller asset endowments than older 
households.
In terms of  intensification practices and 
outcomes, technology usage is highest generally 
in the second quartile, rather than in the young-
est quartile. Overall, management practices do 
not vary strongly by age category. Farm orienta-
tion does not change dramatically across age 
categories, although the youngest households 
market a marginally higher share of  their 
production. The value of  crop production per 
hectare is declining across all categories for 
Zambia and Ethiopia, but is highest in the middle 
ranges for Tanzania. These unconditional results 
indicate that the youngest households are not 
obviously at the forefront of  agricultural change. 
This could reflect lower resource endowments 
(land, labour, capita), but these young house-
holds are likely to be less experienced and may, 
for example, have their eyes on activities other 
than crop production.
To examine the relationship between house-
hold age and intensification practices and out-
comes, we specify a number of  regression models 
which control for resource endowments and 
other observable characteristics (Table 6.4). The 
practices of  interest in these regressions are fer-
tilizer usage, pesticide usage, herbicide usage 
and usage of  improved maize seed, while the 
outcomes of  interest are commercialized share 
of  value of  production and high-value share of  
value of  production.x For ease of  exposition, we 
show only the coefficient of  interest from model 
specifications that control for age of  head (rows 
labelled ‘a’), the average age of  household adults 
(rows labelled ‘b’), and with simultaneous 
controls for age of  head and average age of  non-
head members (rows labelled ‘c’). Other control 
variables include the sex of  household head, 
farm size, number of  household members, the 
value of  productive assets, distance from the 
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Fig. 6.1a. Selected farm characteristics as affected by age of household head (Tanzania). Vertical lines indicate 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of household 
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Fig. 6.1b. Selected farm characteristics as affected by age of household head (Zambia). Vertical lines indicate 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of household 
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60 80
Fig. 6.1c. Selected farm characteristics as affected by age of household head (Ethiopia). Vertical lines indicate 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of household 
head age distributions. Sample truncated at 99th percentile for graphs. Courtesy of the authors.
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Table 6.3a. Descriptive statistics of sample, by quartile of household average adult age, Tanzania.
Quartile of household average adult ageb
TotalVariables 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Age of household head 31.1 42.6 49.0 61.6 45.3
Avg. age: all members 18.4 21.0 24.7 40.2 25.7
Avg. age: members aged 15+ 24.8 30.4 35.6 51.7 35.1
Number of members 4.4 6.1 5.9 4.1 5.1
Number of members aged 15–64 2.7 3.4 3.2 1.9 2.8
Farm size (ha) 2.2 3.5 3.2 2.5 2.8
Number of plots 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.3
Landless households (%) 48 36 29 20 34
Farm ha/person 0.19 0.32 0.38 0.58 0.36
Value of productive assetsa 184 350 335 185 259
Value of crop productiona 285 289 246 173 244
Marketed share of production (%) 36 33 31 23 30
High-value share of production (%) 14 17 17 14 15
Fertilizer (kg/ha) 11.9 16.3 9.5 10.1 11.8
Pesticide (avg. land share) (%) 3 3 3 2 3
Herbicide (avg. land share) (%) 11 11 11 10 10
Uses improved maize seed (%) 56 64 59 52 58
Has irrigation (%) 3 3 5 2 3
Hired labour (%) 44 45 43 43 44
aValues in 2015 USD.
bQuartiles of sample defined over average age of all household members aged 15 or more.
Table 6.3b. Descriptive statistics of sample, by quartile of household average adult age, Zambia.
Quartile of household average adult ageb
TotalVariables 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Age of household head 35.2 42.8 48.2 62.6 47.0
Avg. age: all members 17.1 19.4 22.3 37.2 23.9
Avg. age: members aged 15+ 25.4 29.8 34.4 49.9 34.7
Number of members 6.0 6.7 6.2 4.4 5.8
Number of members aged 15–64 3.3 3.5 3.1 2.0 3.0
Farm size (ha) 3.9 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.3
Number of plots 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.8
Landless households (%) 2 1 1 1 2
Farm ha/person 0.69 0.70 0.79 1.29 0.87
Value of productive assetsa 1831 2073 2827 2944 2413
Value of crop productiona 238 237 228 211 229
Marketed share of production (%) 38 37 35 30 35
High-value share of production (%) 9 8 8 7 8
Fertilizer (kg/ha) 120.2 117.9 112.6 97.1 112.0
Pesticide (avg. land share) (%) 6.2 5.8 6.1 4.6 5.7
Herbicide (avg. land share) (%) 4.9 5.1 4.7 4.1 4.7
Uses improved maize seed (%) 65 66 64 56 63
Has irrigation (%) 19 20 17 14 17
Mechanized traction (own) (%) 0 0 1 1 1
Mechanized traction (hired) (%) 1 1 1 1 1
Animal traction (own) (%) 23 25 24 20 23
Animal traction (hired) (%) 1 1 1 1 1
Hired labour (%) 38 39 37 39 38
Continued
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year dummies and administrative control dum-
mies (at the regional level for Tanzania and Ethi-
opia, and at the district level in Zambia).xi The 
full estimation output for all specifications is pro-
vided in the Appendix Tables 6A–6C.
Beginning with Tanzania, we find a strong 
negative correlation between all measures of  
household age and the practices and commer-
cial outcomes of  interest. Comparing specifica-
tions using household head versus average age 
of  the family workforce (rows a and b), we find 
that the coefficient estimates are consistently 
larger for the household average adult age than 
for the household head age (although the overall 
magnitude is small, a topic which we address 
further below). For example, in the model of  
improved maize seed usage (column 4), the esti-
mated coefficient for average adult age is twice 
the size of  the coefficient for the age of  the 
household head. This finding is consistent with 
the idea that some decision making of  young 
household members other than the head is im-
portant for the practices on which we have data. 
When we simultaneously control for age of  head 
Table 6.3c. Descriptive statistics of sample, by quartile of household average adult age, Ethiopia.
Quartile of household average adult ageb
TotalVariables 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Age of household head 33.7 42.6 49.0 60.5 46.4
Avg. age: all members 19.0 21.4 24.7 38.8 25.8
Avg. age: members aged 15+ 25.4 30.2 35.1 49.7 34.9
Number of members 5.4 6.3 6.2 4.5 5.7
Number of members aged 15–64 3.3 3.6 3.4 2.1 3.1
Farm size (ha) 0.7 1.4 1.1 0.6 1.0
Number of plots 8.4 9.9 9.8 8.2 9.2
Landless households (%) 37 23 23 26 27
Farm ha/person 0.11 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.15
Value of crop productiona 397.6 359.4 307.8 267.9 331.3
Marketed share of production (%) 10 9 8 7 8
High-value share of production (%) 20 21 19 17 19
Fertilizer (kg/ha) 443.1 252.0 786.4 145.5 414.3
Pesticide (avg. land share) (%) 8 9 8 6 8
Herbicide (avg. land share) (%) 24 22 23 15 21
Uses improved maize seed (%) 12 13 13 9 12
aValues in 2015 USD.
bQuartiles of sample defined over average age of all household members aged 15 or more.
Quartile of household average adult ageb
TotalVariables 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Practices conservation tillage (%) 25 27 29 27 27
Practices crop rotation (%) 43 47 46 44 45
Practices intercropping (%) 11 11 11 9 10
Uses crop residues (%) 49 51 51 51 51
Uses mulch (%) 12 14 15 13 14
Has erosion control structures (%) 24 24 23 20 23
Practices agroforestry (%) 5 5 4 4 5
a Values in 2015 USD.
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Table 6.4. Influence of household age on farm orientation.















(a) Age of household head (years) –0.000810** –0.000320** –0.000908*** –0.00172*** –0.00345*** –0.00103***
(0.000349) (0.000129) (0.000204) (0.000659) (0.000286) (0.000236)
(b) Avg. age of household adults –0.00136*** –0.000500*** –0.00127*** –0.00359*** –0.00387*** –0.00139***
(0.000447) (0.000165) (0.000279) (0.000848) (0.000349) (0.000286)
(c) Age of household head (years) –0.000396 –0.000267* –0.000738*** –0.000800 –0.00333*** –0.000813***
(0.000402) (0.000159) (0.000240) (0.000849) (0.000335) (0.000281)
Avg. age of other household adults –0.000345 4.94e-05 –0.000545* –0.00209* –0.000709* –0.000621*
(0.000473) (0.000222) (0.000327) (0.00113) (0.000405) (0.000318)
Zambia
(a) Age of household head (years) –5.35e-05 –0.000438** –7.75e-05 –0.000472 –0.00150*** –0.000690***
(0.000319) (0.000198) (0.000138) (0.000369) (0.000194) (0.000174)
(b) Avg. age of household adults 0.000714 –0.000982*** 0.000137 –0.000177 –0.00162*** –0.000972***
(0.000436) (0.000272) (0.000179) (0.000485) (0.000269) (0.000241)
(c) Age of household head (years) –0.000777* –3.50e-05 –0.000278 –0.000971** –0.00138*** –0.000460**
(0.000398) (0.000246) (0.000200) (0.000443) (0.000233) (0.000195)
Avg. age of other household adults 0.00109** –0.000697** 0.000548* 0.000560 –0.000252 –0.000144
(0.000545) (0.000341) (0.000297) (0.000558) (0.000340) (0.000278)
Ethiopia
(a) Age of household head (years) 0.000121 –0.000401 –0.00133** 0.000213 –0.000519* 5.16e-05
(0.000403) (0.000393) (0.000564) (0.000528) (0.000277) (0.000266)
(b) Avg. age of household adults –0.000509 –0.00111** –0.00246*** –0.000108 –0.00108*** –9.64e-07
(0.000606) (0.000443) (0.000817) (0.000779) (0.000407) (0.000466)
(c) Age of household head (years) 0.000276 –9.47e-05 –0.00103* 0.000297 –0.000472 1.97e-05
(0.000459) (0.000463) (0.000609) (0.000614) (0.000296) (0.000279)
Avg. age of other household adults 0.000461 –0.00127** –0.00142 –0.000177 –0.000344 0.000529
(0.000671) (0.000553) (0.000987) (0.000965) (0.000467) (0.000641)
Notes: Each country panel shows coefficient estimates from three sets of specifications: (a) controlling for age of household head only; (b) controlling for average age of all adults in 
household; and (c) controlling for both age of household head and average age of all other household adults. Other controls include household-, farm- and community-level controls, 
and district and year dummies. Each set of outcomes for a given specification is estimated using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework, to address correlation in the error 
terms associated with each outcome. Cluster robust standard errors, shown in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-cluster correlation. Significance levels are 
denoted as follows: *= p<0.10, **= p<0.05, ***= p<0.01.
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and average age of  non-head adults (in row c), 
we find that while the coefficient for head’s age is 
generally larger and more precisely estimated (as 
evidenced by small standard errors), the age of  
other adults does contribute further to explaining 
outcomes. Simply put, while younger heads do 
seem to have greater propensities to use modern 
inputs and have a more commercial orientation, 
at the same time there appears to be additional 
impacts of  a younger workforce on the use of  
these practices and on the commercial outcome. 
In other words, for two households identical in 
all respects, including the age of  the head, but 
differing in the average age of  the household la-
bour force, the household with the younger work 
force is more likely to use modern inputs and en-
gage more intensively with agricultural markets.
Findings for Zambia are remarkably similar 
to those for Tanzania. The only qualitative excep-
tion is the herbicide model results, which indicate 
that an older workforce is more likely to use herbi-
cide. This result may reflect the labour-saving 
aspects of  herbicide being particularly relevant 
for households with older members. Findings for 
the models of  use of  some inputs (pesticide and 
herbicide) and for commercialized share of  pro-
duction for Ethiopia are also similar to those for 
Tanzania and Zambia. The insignificant findings 
for high-value share of  production may have to do 
with a difficult distinction between high-value 
and staples crops in Ethiopia, where some staples 
(e.g. teff, ensete) have high commercial value and 
are widely marketed, and crops that are grown 
primarily for market in other countries (e.g. oil-
seeds), are also widely grown for home con-
sumption in Ethiopia. Similarly, Ethiopia’s input 
acquisition context is somewhat different to 
other countries in the region: the vast majority 
of  fertilizer and seed acquisitions by smallholders 
are via a highly regulated and centralized coopera-
tive system, rather than via the private sector. 
Still, in comparing rows a and b, it is worth noting 
that not only are the coefficient estimates on age 
of  head uniformly smaller than for the average 
age of  the household workforce, the former are 
not always negative, while the latter are consist-
ently negative (if  not always significant). Here, as 
in the other countries, it seems that the ‘age effect’ 
on smallholder intensification and commercializa-
tion is not confined to the named household head.
These results are consistent with younger 
households being more likely to adopt modern 
practices and commercial farm orientations than 
older households, after controlling for resource 
endowments. However, the age effects we find 
are exceedingly small in magnitude. Table 6.5 
shows estimated values of  outcome variables at 
different ages of  the household head (with other 
variable values at sample means). We find that 
even the strongest effects are relatively muted. 
For example, the expected share of  marketed crop 
output for a 20-year-old head is only 7% more 
than that of  a 40-year-old head in Tanzania (and 
only 3% more in Zambia). Other variables show 
a much smaller age effect. For example, the like-
lihood of  fertilizer use by a 20-year-old Tanza-
nian household head is less than 2% greater than 
that of  a 40-year-old head (in Zambia the age 
difference is not statistically different from zero). 
Results using average age of  adults instead of  
age of  head are of  similarly small magnitude.
As farm orientation has multiple dimensions 
which are not always easy to treat discretely, we 
attempt to distil some of  this variation using fac-
tor analysis on the Zambian data. This results in 
two different composite factors, which we refer 
to as intensification types A and B: higher scores 
for intensification type A indicate greater com-
mercialization of  staples, fertilizer and improved 
maize seed usage, while higher scores for intensifi-
cation type B indicate greater commercialization 
of  high-value crops (like cotton, tobacco and 
horticultural plants), and pesticide usage. These 
represent two different modes of  intensification–
commercialization. Factor loadings for both types 
are shown in the Appendix Table 6D.
Table 6.6 shows regression results for models 
in which the scores for factors A and B are the 
dependent variables. The age of  the household 
head is negatively associated with both, indicat-
ing that younger households are more likely to 
be associated with either orientation.
Another way to examine ‘innovativeness’ is 
to examine whether the unexplained portion of  
variation in farm productivity, after controlling 
for input use and other observable time-varying 
conditions affecting production, is associated 
with farm household age. To do this, we estimated 
a production function for aggregate value of  
production per hectare using a fixed effects esti-
mator. The individual fixed effects estimate from 
this model captures the portion of  the variability 
in productivity outcomes which is associated 
with the individual, but not otherwise explained 
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by model covariates (i.e. observed inputs and 
management decisions). This fixed effects estimate 
has sometimes been interpreted as a latent meas-
ure of  individual farming ability (e.g. Deininger 
et al., 2013; Jin and Jayne, 2013; Chamberlin 
and Ricker-Gilbert, 2016). We then calculated the 
correlation between this ‘ability’ proxy and our 
various measures of  household age (Table 6.7). 
The correlation coefficients are all negative and 
highly significant, indicating that unobserved 
factors associated with land productivity are 
negatively associated with household age. One 
interpretation of  this is that younger households 
are more productive, although in ways which 
are difficult to measure directly through existing 
household survey data.
Much effort and resources have been expended 
to promote the use of  climate-smart approaches 
and sustainable intensification (SI) production 
techniques in Zambia in recent years, although 
it should be noted that some of  these same practices 
have been promoted over decades. To the extent 
that these practices represent non-traditional 
management choices, they may be taken as 
measures of  ‘doing things differently’. Table 6.8 
shows regression results for models in which the 
dependent variable is a farm-level measure of  
use of: (1) minimum or zero tillage; (2) grain–
legume crop rotation; (3) intercropping; (4) crop 
residue retention; (5) mulching; (6) erosion con-
trol structures, such as bunds or terraces; and 
(7) agroforestry. All practices were measured 
jointly in a seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR) framework to allow for correlated error 
terms. Results indicate that age of  head is posi-
tively associated with the use of  most of  these 
practices – agroforestry is the single exception. 
This suggests that younger households are not 
generally more likely to engage in such practices. 
However, it should be acknowledged that if  SI 
Table 6.5. Predicted farm orientation outcomes for Tanzania and Zambia.

















(a) Predicted outcome |
head age = 20
0.400 0.171 0.180 0.041 0.128 0.491
(b) Predicted outcome |
head age = 30
0.366 0.161 0.172 0.038 0.118 0.474
(c) Predicted outcome |
head age = 40
0.331 0.151 0.163 0.034 0.109 0.457
Difference (b) – (a) –0.034 –0.010 –0.009 –0.003 –0.009 –0.017
Difference p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.013) (0.000) (0.010)
Difference (c) – (a) –0.068 –0.020 –0.017 –0.006 –0.018 –0.034
Difference p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.013) (0.000) (0.010)
Zambia
(a) Predicted outcome |
head age = 20
0.348 0.195 0.524 0.131 0.0559 0.599
(b) Predicted outcome |
head age = 30
0.332 0.188 0.524 0.128 0.0551 0.591
(c) Predicted outcome |
head age = 40
0.317 0.181 0.523 0.124 0.0544 0.582
Difference (b) – (a) –0.015 –0.007 –0.001 –0.004 –0.001 –0.008
Difference p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.867) (0.071) (0.591) (0.031)
Difference (c) – (a) –0.031 –0.014 –0.001 –0.007 –0.001 –0.017
Difference p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.867) (0.071) (0.591) (0.031)
Notes: Each country panel shows predicted outcomes at different ages of household head, and the significance of 
differences between these predicted outcomes, after controlling for household-, farm- and community-level controls, and 
district and year dummies. P-values are shown in parentheses.
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promotion preferentially targets older farmers, 
then we might expect such associations, even if  
younger households might be more receptive to 
new practices in general.
Finally, much has been said about young 
people’s affinity for modern technologies, in-
cluding mobile phones and other information 
and communications technologies (ICTs) (FAO 
et al., 2014; AGRA, 2015). In our data set, we 
observe mobile phone usage reported along with 
the main purpose of  usage. Table 6.9 shows 
regression results for binary indicators of  whether 
or not a household (1) uses a mobile phone for 
any purpose; (2) uses a mobile phone to call fam-
ily and friends; or (3) uses a mobile phone for 
business activities, such as sending or receiving 
money, negotiating sales transactions or obtaining 
market information. In the model, the dependent 
variable in column 4 is the number of  business 
activities for which a mobile phone is used. Coef-
ficient estimates indicate that households with 
younger heads are more likely to report using 
mobile phones than those with older heads; they 
are more likely to use mobile phones for business 
activities; and on average younger household 
heads use mobile phones for a greater variety of  
business activities. These results could be read as 






Age of household head (years) –0.00299*** –0.00368***
(3.34e-06) (1.33e-09)
Max. educational attainment –0.0129*** 0.0744***
(0.000132) (0)
Female head (1/0) –0.132*** –0.0815***
(3.90e-08) (0.000942)
Farm size (ha) 0.00406*** –0.000201
(0.00135) (0.901)
Household members (count) 0.0181** –0.0122
(0.0293) (0.147)
Productive assets (ZMW) 2.64e-07** –1.31e-07
(0.0269) (0.249)
Hours to town of 50k+ 3.66e-05 –6.93e-05***
(0.181) (0.00609)
Population density 0.382*** 0.580***
(0.000302) (0)
Rainfall (mm) 0.000280*** 0.000510***
(0.00380) (4.02e-09)




District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Mundlak–Chamberlain device Yes Yes
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors, shown in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-cluster 
correlation. Significance levels are denoted as follows: **= p<0.05, ***= p<0.01. FE = fixed effects.
Table 6.7. Correlation between unobserved 
household farming ‘ability’ and age, for Zambian data.
Variables Correlation coefficient
Age of household head –0.0417***
Average adult age –0.0649***
Average adult age  
(excluding head)
–0.0307***
Notes: Adults are members aged ≥15. ‘Ability’ is the 
recovered fixed effect estimate from a production function 
using the fixed effects estimator. Significance levels are 
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Table 6.8. Correlates of sustainable land management practices in Zambia.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Min./zero tillage Crop rotation Intercropping Crop residue Mulching Erosion control Agroforestry
Age of household head (years) 0.00107*** 0.00141*** 0.000222 0.00126*** 0.000504* 0.000197 –0.000515***
(0.000332) (0.000300) (0.000282) (0.000423) (0.000286) (0.000336) (0.000182)
Max. educational attainment 0.00282* 0.00517*** 0.00230* 0.00346 0.00217* 0.00166 0.00144
(0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00131) (0.00230) (0.00128) (0.00159) (0.00104)
Female head (1/0) –0.0169 0.0132 0.0128 –0.00535 –0.0126 –0.0242* 0.00352
(0.0136) (0.0120) (0.00959) (0.0166) (0.00942) (0.0131) (0.00709)
Farm size (ha) –0.000129 0.00175* –0.000103 –0.000571 0.000181 –1.60e-05 –0.00108**
(0.000364) (0.00103) (0.000316) (0.000445) (0.000325) (0.000280) (0.000471)
Household members (count) –0.00616** –0.00125 0.00222 0.00508 0.00133 0.00149 –0.00298
(0.00298) (0.00522) (0.00172) (0.00329) (0.00155) (0.00222) (0.00435)
Productive assets (ZMW) 6.02e-09 6.25e-08 –1.77e-08 –4.33e-08 1.54e-08 –1.56e-08 2.92e-08
(1.46e-08) (5.69e-08) (1.35e-08) (2.95e-08) (1.28e-08) (1.96e-08) (3.97e-08)
Hours to town of 50k+ 2.31e-06 4.70e-06 6.15e-06 –1.88e-05 3.76e-06 –1.10e-05 2.36e-05***
(1.10e-05) (1.34e-05) (9.45e-06) (1.40e-05) (9.04e-06) (1.01e-05) (7.16e-06)
Population density 0.00450 0.0547* 0.0135 0.123*** 0.0850*** 0.0673*** 0.0399***
(0.0458) (0.0286) (0.0326) (0.0255) (0.0235) (0.0223) (0.00944)
Rainfall (mm) –0.000110*** 7.30e-05 3.71e-05* 5.53e-07 –6.61e-05* 1.20e-05 –0.000126*
(3.35e-05) (7.35e-05) (2.22e-05) (5.40e-05) (3.56e-05) (2.44e-05) (7.31e-05)
Intraseasonal rainfall CV –0.0322 –0.173 0.190*** 0.179** 0.147*** 0.0196 –0.0896
(0.0724) (0.118) (0.0480) (0.0822) (0.0541) (0.0450) (0.150)
Constant 0.263 –0.425 –0.217 –0.266 –0.811*** –0.521** –0.454***
(0.379) (0.259) (0.290) (0.292) (0.206) (0.257) (0.116)
Observations 16,454 16,454 16,454 16,454 16,454 16,454 16,454
Mundlak–Chamberlain device Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The average age of other household adults is the average age of all members, other than the head, who are aged ≥15. Cluster robust standard errors, shown in parentheses, are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and within-cluster correlation. Significance levels are denoted as follows: *= p<0.10, **= p<0.05, ***= p<0.01. FE = fixed effects.
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lending themselves to the conventional narra-
tive of  young farmers being more engaged with 
ICT in rural Africa, but caution is advised as we 
know little about who within the household is 
actually using the phone.
Qualitative research undertaken as part of  
the International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment (IFAD) Youth Research project across four 
sites in each of  four SSA countries (see Chapter 2, 
this volume) supports the conclusion that there 
is little evidence for an ongoing, youth-led rural 
economic revolution. The qualitative research does 
not provide much support for the idea that young 
people are using different agricultural technology 
or using technology differently. Further, while many 
young people market some of  their agricultural 
produce, there is little evidence that young 
people are engaged in innovative processing 
activities or linking to value chains characterized 
by higher value products, value addition, safety 
requirements and quality differentiation (Rear-
don, 2015).
More broadly, while most young women 
and young men engage in one or more non-farm 
income-generating activities, overwhelmingly these 
tend to be the same low-investment, low-technology, 
and relatively low-skill activities, including petty 
trading, food preparation, catering and artisanal 
trades, which dominate the rural opportunity 
landscape (see also Flynn and Sumberg, 2018; 
Yeboah et al., 2020; Chapter 3, this volume). One 
suggestion is that even in areas of  significant 
agricultural commercialization, there are still rela-
tively few meaningful opportunities for investment, 
skill upgrading and risk taking. Another is that 
the intergenerational nature of  much farm and 
non-farm economic activity, and the importance 
of  social relations for accessing land, capital and 
Table 6.9. Correlates of mobile phone usage in Zambia.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
1=use mobile  
phone for any 
purpose
1=use mobile  
phone to call  
family or friends
1=use mobile  
phone for any 
business activity
# of business 
activities for which 
mobile phone used
Age of household head (years) –0.00152*** 0.000624 –0.00234*** –0.00804***
(0.000543) (0.000385) (0.000529) (0.00138)
Max. educational attainment 0.0245*** –0.00205 0.0296*** 0.109***
(0.00251) (0.00177) (0.00234) (0.00739)
Female head (1/0) –0.0421** 0.0277** –0.0746*** –0.199***
(0.0197) (0.0127) (0.0190) (0.0494)
Farm size (ha) –0.00288* –0.000235 –0.00247 –0.0196***
(0.00156) (0.000869) (0.00158) (0.00649)
Household members (count) –0.0247*** –0.00811 –0.0179** –0.0151
(0.00898) (0.00630) (0.00857) (0.0254)
Productive assets (ZMW) 1.96e-07 7.79e-08 1.64e-07 9.53e-07*
(1.61e-07) (4.95e-08) (1.51e-07) (5.57e-07)
Hours to town of 50k+ –7.10e-05*** 2.71e-05* –0.000106*** –0.000288***
(2.14e-05) (1.51e-05) (2.08e-05) (6.03e-05)
Population density –0.0845* –0.0215 –0.0943** –0.0445
(0.0434) (0.0321) (0.0399) (0.145)
Rainfall (mm) 0.000472 7.84e-05 0.000577** 0.00150**
(0.000305) (0.000218) (0.000286) (0.000726)
Intraseasonal rainfall CV –0.238 0.0440 –0.235 0.159
(0.555) (0.379) (0.508) (1.569)
Observations 6813 6813 6813 7747
R-squared 0.164 0.215 0.140 0.172
Mundlak–Chamberlain device Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The average age of other household adults is the average age of all members, other than the head, who are 
aged ≥15. Cluster robust standard errors, shown in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-cluster 
correlation. Significance levels are denoted as follows: *= p<0.10, **= p<0.05, ***= p<0.01. FE = fixed effects.
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skill, effectively blur the lines between youth and 
non-youth economic activity.
Discussion
Our empirical evaluation in the preceding sec-
tion suggests two conclusions which stand 
somewhat in counterpoint to each another. On 
the one hand, we do find fairly pronounced and 
widespread evidence that younger households 
are more likely to adopt modern practices and 
have more commercial orientations, compared 
with older households, and despite the observ-
able difference in resource endowments that 
also characterize young rural households. How-
ever, these effects are generally quite small in 
magnitude, even when the estimates are fairly 
precise. This suggests that rhetoric about un-
leashing a whirlwind of  youth-led agricultural 
transformation is probably misplaced. Education, 
specialized training and access to credit and 
other investment resources may play important 
roles in facilitating young farmers to realize 
their productive potential – but the same could 
certainly also be said for older adults.
Our finding that household average adult 
age seems to offer more explanatory power than 
the age of  the household head suggests that the 
default position of  measuring ‘farmer character-
istics’ in terms of  the nominal household head 
requires further critical scrutiny. We feel it is very 
likely that distributed models of  decision making 
may better map on to the reality of  smallholder 
households and their various agricultural and 
non-farm activities. This is perhaps particularly 
true of  contemporary SSA, where land constraints 
may keep adult children within natal households 
for longer than they might desire, and where 
traditional cultural norms may allocate nominal 
headship to individuals based on seniority, gender 
and genealogical position, even when the farm 
management aspects of  headship have devolved 
to other members. There is some qualitative evi-
dence that suggests this is the case, e.g. Andersson 
Djurfeldt et al.’s (2019) study on household posi-
tionality and intrahousehold participation in 
farm management in Zambia. Our argument in 
this respect is similar to arguments for more nu-
anced and creative collection of  data on gen-
dered patterns of  intrahousehold resource control 
and decision making (Doss et al., 2018) and 
more general critiques of  uncritical adoption of  
unitary household models of  decision making 
(Agarwal, 1997). The intrahousehold resource 
allocation literature has focused much of  its 
attention on gendered access to and control over 
household assets and the implications for individ-
ual and household welfare outcomes (e.g. Doss, 
2013; Oduro et al., 2015). Similar critical rein-
terpretations of  intrahousehold agency and 
dynamics with respect to farm management and 
production – and the role that young adults play 
therein – may be very illuminating. This will 
require more creative approaches to data col-
lection. Recent efforts to collect information 
from multiple contributors to decision making 
are a step in the right direction, but still offer 
limited insights into the agency of  non-head 
members, and may poorly reflect more com-
plex situations of  collective intrahousehold 
agency and collaborative managerial deci-
sions. Another issue is that cultivation plots 
which are entirely controlled by subordinate 
members of  a household may not even show 
up in household rosters. Qualitative evidence 
such as that provided by Andersson Djurfeldt 
et al. (2019) suggests this is not unlikely for 
some types of  households.xii If  we are serious 
about understanding how young people farm 
(and do other things), it is incumbent on us to 
do more critical evaluation of  how well stand-
ard household instruments capture individu-
al-level and collective economic activity.
We should acknowledge that the regression 
models we employ in the analysis for this chapter 
use continuous linear measures of  age, rather 
than discrete categories of  ‘young’. As such, the 
modelling portion of  our analysis may be char-
acterized as the exploration of  age effects, rather 
than youth effects per se, in conditioning our pri-
mary outcomes of  interest. We may note, how-
ever, that we did estimate alternative specifications 
for these models with discrete ‘youth’ dummies 
and the overall story is very consistent with the 
results presented here. As the discrete definition 
of  a ‘youth’ indicator is fundamentally arbitrary 
(is 15–25 years of age a better definition than 15–28? 
Should we use the same definition of  youth for 
heads and for household labour?), we have 
elected to restrict our discussion in this chapter 
to the linear models as presented. We also esti-
mated models with non-linear measures of  age, 
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but generally found that linear models per-
formed as well or better and are more easily in-
terpreted, particularly in the specification which 
includes the age of  the head and the average age 
of  the household adults. Further empirical work 
may examine alternative analytical approaches 
in more detail.
Another important point relates to the nature 
of  the farming activities and outcomes we are able 
to examine with survey data. Ideally, we would 
like to say something about innovation, entre-
preneurial disruption and the like, but we are 
limited in our ability to observe these. It may be 
the case that youth-driven changes are taking 
place that we simply are unable to observe because 
we are not asking the right questions. While this 
is a possibility, it would be a mistake to simply 
assume it is the case.
Finally, it is important to recognize that we 
only observe those who stay in farming. As such, 
our results are representative only of  those who 
are actually farming, not of  all the young people 
who might have farmed if  things had been dif-
ferent (e.g. more access to land, fewer competing 
opportunities in urban areas). The individuals 
with the most transformative potential may not 
be the ones starting farm households (or staying 
on their parents’ farms). That said, the standard 
conceptualization of  the structural transform-
ation process suggests that the least efficient farm-
ers will be the first to leave (Johnston and Mellor, 
1961). If  the latter is the case, then policies that 
reduce barriers to farming (e.g. via land market 
promotion, resettlement schemes, credit facilita-
tion) may induce entrance by individuals with 
lower inherent productive or innovative capacity. 
In any case, observational data may never be able 
to fully address the selection bias at work here, 
and there may be limited scope for experimental 
approaches. Nevertheless, thinking about this 
question more carefully may clarify new oppor-
tunities for empirical research.
Conclusions
We find some support for many of  the stylized 
assertions about youth in African agriculture. 
Younger household heads have smaller farms, 
smaller households and fewer capital resources. 
However, after controlling for these constraints, 
we observe marginally higher propensities to 
engage with intensification practices and com-
mercial orientations which are objectives of  much 
current policy and programming. These findings 
are in line with the narrative of  young people’s 
inherent vim and vigour being an asset for agri-
cultural growth and transformation in SSA.
However, the very limited magnitude of  these 
age effects suggests that much caution should be 
exercised in making this argument. More work is 
needed to understand the conditions under which 
young farmers thrive. It is not clear that policies or 
programmes that target the land, capital or other 
endowments and constraints of  young farmers, 
will have bigger impacts than transformative in-
vestments that are accessible by all farmers. It is 
probably not useful (and certainly not realistic) to 
divorce young people from their resource con-
straints: the implications of  this are that there are 
probably few viable policy avenues for unleashing 
the much vaunted, latent youth whirlwind of  in-
novative effervescence.
In any case, the locus of  change in rural 
economies may be happening off  the farm, and 
in ways that are opaque to our current ways of  
monitoring the system (i.e. household surveys). 
Examples include medium-scale farm invest-
ment; agribusiness and value chain expansion; 
urban demand and the supermarket revolution; 
and lower barriers to global agricultural mar-
kets. It is not at all clear what role youth may 
play (if  any) in such areas, but new ways and a 
different focus of  research and data collection 
may allow that question to be probed to a further 
extent than we are able to here.
Notes
i www.mastercardfdn.org/yaw2017-infographic/ (accessed 26 November 2020).
ii To be fair, most assessments of rural youth out-migration evaluate it as an essentially positive part of the 
structural transformation process, although the potential for negative impacts on agricultural productivity is 
mentioned in many reports, usually operating through loss of productive labour (e.g. The World Bank, 2015; 
Deotti and Estruch, 2016; IADB et al., 2017; FAO et al., 2018).
iii www.gemconsortium.org/ (accessed 26 November 2020).
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iv See Margolis (2014) for discussion of some of the data-related reasons underlying such conflation.
v By ‘commercial orientation’, we refer to the degree to which the farm production portfolio is organized 
around generating marketable surplus (as opposed to satisfying household consumption requirements). 
Unless otherwise specified, we use a common shorthand measure of this: the share of total value of crop 
production which is sold (sometimes referred to as the ‘household commercialization index’).
vi Attitudes toward innovation, and the propensity to innovate, are ideas that partially overlap with other 
personality features, such as risk aversion, creativity and receptivity to new ideas. A number of empirical 
measures of risk aversion – a trait that maps on to some notions of entrepreneurial disposition – have been 
developed. These are not part of most large-scale household survey data sets, however, and so we do not 
discuss them in detail. Creativity and openness to new ideas are similarly measurable in principle, although 
typically not part of available survey data.
vii See Hammond et al. (2017) for discussion of measurement challenges with tracking climate-smart agricultural 
practices with existing household survey instruments.
viii Data are from the 2015 Zambian Rural Agricultural Livelihoods Survey (RALS) (CSO, 2012) RALS, 2012–2013 
Tanzanian LSMS–ISA, and 2015–2016 Ethiopian LSMS–ISA surveys. For Zambia, responses to the ques-
tion, ‘Who primarily decided how to use this field?’ were asked for all fields reported by the household. For 
Tanzania, we report the first response to the question, ‘Who decided what to plant on this plot in the long 
rainy season?’ asked for cropped plots (up to three members were possible joint decision makers). For 
Ethiopia, we report the response to the question, ‘Who in the household makes primary decisions concern-
ing crops to be planted, input use and the timing of cropping activities on this field?’ asked for cropped plots.
ix The LSMS–ISA data were produced as part of a World Bank project (www.worldbank.org/en/programs/lsms/
initiatives/lsms-ISA, accessed 26 November 2020), in collaboration with the Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency 
(CSA) and the Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in each of those respective countries. Detailed 
descriptions of instrument design, sampling frame and other aspects of data collection are provided for Ethiopia 
by CSA (2017) and for Tanzania by NBS (2014). The Zambian RALS was produced by the Indaba Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute (IAPRI), collaborating with the Zambia Central Statistical Office (CSO) and the Ministry 
of Agriculture (MoA). For more details on RALS questionnaire and sampling design, see CSO (2012).
x High-value crops were defined as all non-staple crops, i.e. horticultural crops, high-value oilseeds, food 
crops such as sugarcane, and non-food crops such as tobacco and cotton.
xi We also include time averages of time-varying household characteristics to control for unobserved 
time-varying heterogeneity, which may bias our results. This formulation, sometimes referred to as the 
‘Mundlak–Chamberlain device’, is based on the assumption that time averages are correlated with unob-
served time-invariant factors (Mundlak, 1978; Chamberlain, 1984; Wooldridge, 2010). This estimator is 
referred to as the ‘correlated random effects model’, showing that it provides consistent estimates under the 
conditionality of its assumptions. Each set of outcomes for a given specification is estimated using a seem-
ingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework, to address correlation in the error terms associated with each 
outcome. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the enumeration level.
xii ‘[One] variety of positionality involves young men and their wives who live in extended, multi-generational 
families, where they together with their children constitute the middle segment of these families. They have 
been allocated family land by their parents and farm independently but continue to live close to the parental 
generation and view the patriarch as the household head, even if he is not involved in any of their produc-
tion or marketing decisions and they are not accountable to him in terms of incomes raised and saved’ 
(Andersson Djurfeldt et al., 2019 p.7), and ‘a handful of respondents were also single, unmarried men who 
had been allocated land by their parents and continued living with their parents, but were farming independ-
ently and were not accountable to their parents’ (Andersson Djurfeldt et al., 2019). Given the low incidence 
of plots identified as controlled by members other than head and/or spouse in household survey data, it 
would seem that the types of households referred to above may not fully report on the land managed by all 
individuals identified as household members.
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Table 6A1.  Full regression estimates for Tanzania (specification 1, see Table 6.4).














Age of household head (years) –0.00344*** –0.00103*** –3.120* –0.000320** –0.000908*** –0.00172***
(0.000286) (0.000236) (1.638) (0.000129) (0.000204) (0.000659)
Female head (1/0) 0.0145 –0.0317* 12.22 0.00209 0.0118 –0.00250
(0.0331) (0.0184) (17.49) (0.0111) (0.0295) (0.0767)
Farm size (ha) 0.00393** 0.00198* –1.469 0.000721 0.00127 0.0145***
(0.00153) (0.00118) (1.393) (0.000527) (0.00175) (0.00431)
Household members (count) –0.00314 –0.00277 –12.71 –0.000165 0.00671* 0.0132
(0.00399) (0.00304) (16.65) (0.00168) (0.00349) (0.0128)
Value of productive assets 2.62e-09 1.13e-09 3.83e-06 1.47e-09 6.53e-10 1.05e-08
(4.22e-09) (3.64e-09) (4.44e-06) (2.42e-09) (3.02e-09) (1.37e-08)
Travel time to market 0.000200*** 0.000125* –0.378 –9.86e-05*** –2.06e-05 –0.000389**
(7.40e-05) (7.31e-05) (0.290) (3.12e-05) (7.21e-05) (0.000176)
Observations 10,009 10,009 10,009 10,009 10,009 10,009
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak–Chamberlain device Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6A2.  Full regression estimates for Tanzania (specification 2, see Table 6.4).












Improved maize  
seed (=1)
Avg. age of household adults –0.00386*** –0.00139*** –3.747* –0.000500*** –0.00127*** –0.00359***
(0.000349) (0.000285) (2.097) (0.000165) (0.000279) (0.000848)
Female head (1/0) 0.0142 –0.0323* 10.96 0.00189 0.0115 –0.00516
(0.0329) (0.0181) (17.83) (0.0111) (0.0297) (0.0771)
Farm size (ha) 0.00393** 0.00198* –1.555 0.000720 0.00126 0.0145***
(0.00159) (0.00119) (1.392) (0.000531) (0.00176) (0.00435)
Household members (count) –0.00860** –0.00472 –18.02 –0.000865 0.00492 0.00827
(0.00411) (0.00308) (17.42) (0.00169) (0.00349) (0.0127)
Value of productive assets 2.89e-09 1.23e-09 4.15e-06 1.51e-09 7.38e-10 1.08e-08
(4.23e-09) (3.64e-09) (4.46e-06) (2.42e-09) (3.01e-09) (1.37e-08)
Travel time to market 0.000205*** 0.000125* –0.374 –9.86e-05*** –1.98e-05 –0.000394**
(7.55e-05) (7.40e-05) (0.289) (3.12e-05) (7.22e-05) (0.000176)
Observations 10,009 10,009 10,009 10,009 10,009 10,009
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak–Chamberlain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes










Table 6A3.  Full regression estimates for Tanzania (specification 3, see Table 6.4).














Age of household head (years) –0.00333*** –0.000811*** –1.841 –0.000267* –0.000738*** –0.000800
(0.000336) (0.000280) (1.228) (0.000159) (0.000240) (0.000849)
Avg. age of other household adults –0.000705* –0.000620* –0.484 4.94e-05 –0.000545* –0.00209*
(0.000406) (0.000318) (0.867) (0.000222) (0.000327) (0.00113)
Female head (1/0) 0.0266 –0.0456** 19.86 0.00965 0.0222 0.00101
(0.0393) (0.0208) (18.71) (0.0132) (0.0250) (0.0845)
Farm size (ha) 0.00378** 0.00211* –1.641 0.000656 0.00122 0.0144***
(0.00150) (0.00118) (1.358) (0.000515) (0.00174) (0.00424)
Household members (count) –0.00492 –0.00423 –14.02 –0.000832 0.00616 0.0156
(0.00438) (0.00315) (17.70) (0.00185) (0.00381) (0.0135)
Value of productive assets 2.52e-09 9.61e-10 5.05e-06 1.55e-09 6.60e-10 9.53e-09
(4.26e-09) (3.66e-09) (4.67e-06) (2.43e-09) (3.05e-09) (1.37e-08)
Travel time to market 0.000219*** 0.000143** –0.146 –0.000101*** –1.99e-05 –0.000407**
(7.43e-05) (7.18e-05) (0.169) (3.38e-05) (7.40e-05) (0.000187)
Observations 9048 9048 9048 9048 9048 9048
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak–Chamberlain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




berlin and J. S
um
berg 
Notes: Significance levels are denoted as follows: * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01. FE = fixed effects.
Table 6B1. Full regression estimates for Zambia (specification 1, see Table 6.4).














Age of household head (years) –0.00153*** –0.000682*** –0.220*** –0.000386*** –0.000123 –0.000629*
(0.000194) (0.000174) (0.0826) (9.96e-05) (9.53e-05) (0.000373)
Max. educational attainment 0.0119*** –0.00309*** 10.54*** –0.000673 0.00412*** 0.0309***
(0.00120) (0.000905) (0.617) (0.000483) (0.000748) (0.00169)
Female head (1/0) –0.0426*** –0.0186** –2.689 –0.0181*** –0.00416 –0.0602***
(0.00761) (0.00761) (3.518) (0.00355) (0.00364) (0.0144)
Farm size (ha) 0.00142** 0.00113** –0.755*** 0.000152 0.000451* 0.000120
(0.000623) (0.000443) (0.201) (0.000142) (0.000249) (0.000694)
Household members (count) 0.000133 0.00748*** –2.685** 0.000287 0.000871 –0.00307
(0.00262) (0.00247) (1.240) (0.00128) (0.00195) (0.00472)
Productive assets (ZMW) 3.68e-08 3.28e-08 –6.97e-05*** 3.74e-08 1.02e-07** –3.75e-08
(3.18e-08) (2.02e-08) (2.46e-05) (2.99e-08) (4.95e-08) (5.08e-08)
Hours to town of 50k+ 9.04e-07 –8.02e-06 –0.0166*** 7.01e-06* 1.19e-05*** –5.59e-05***
(7.37e-06) (6.25e-06) (0.00424) (3.89e-06) (3.26e-06) (1.52e-05)
Population density 0.184*** 0.0738** 54.85*** 0.0529*** 0.0353*** 0.341***
(0.0216) (0.0330) (8.538) (0.0157) (0.0134) (0.0186)
Rainfall (mm) 0.000230*** 8.03e-05** 0.0236** 1.19e-05 –1.71e-05 0.000127**
(2.96e-05) (3.59e-05) (0.0118) (1.19e-05) (1.34e-05) (5.67e-05)
Intraseasonal rainfall CV 0.0136 0.259*** 11.38 0.0781*** –0.0532 –0.0434
(0.0581) (0.0577) (20.58) (0.0264) (0.0324) (0.106)
Observations 16,273 16,273 16,273 16,273 16,273 16,273
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes










Notes: Significance levels are denoted as follows: * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01. FE = fixed effects.
Table 6B2. Full regression estimates for Zambia (specification 2, see Table 6.4).














Avg. age of household adults –0.00164*** –0.000966*** 0.0655 –0.000655*** 5.65e-05 –0.000292
(0.000270) (0.000241) (0.117) (0.000141) (0.000122) (0.000488)
Max. educational attainment 0.0109*** –0.00369*** 10.60*** –0.00109** 0.00418*** 0.0308***
(0.00124) (0.000930) (0.632) (0.000513) (0.000776) (0.00172)
Female head (1/0) –0.0505*** –0.0213*** –4.906 –0.0198*** –0.00542 –0.0672***
(0.00749) (0.00744) (3.447) (0.00354) (0.00363) (0.0142)
Farm size (ha) 0.00158** 0.00116*** –0.710*** 0.000175 0.000377* 0.000170
(0.000620) (0.000442) (0.194) (0.000135) (0.000208) (0.000663)
Household members (count) –0.00180 0.00632*** –3.170** –0.000849 0.000704 –0.00511
(0.00255) (0.00244) (1.245) (0.00126) (0.00189) (0.00468)
Productive assets (ZMW) 3.76e-08 3.45e-08* –7.01e-05*** 3.78e-08 1.01e-07** –3.76e-08
(3.13e-08) (1.97e-08) (2.46e-05) (3.00e-08) (4.89e-08) (5.07e-08)
Hours to town of 50k+ 7.76e-07 –8.16e-06 –0.0162*** 6.65e-06* 1.18e-05*** –5.51e-05***
(7.41e-06) (6.30e-06) (0.00419) (3.96e-06) (3.28e-06) (1.51e-05)
Population density 0.185*** 0.0743** 54.67*** 0.0536*** 0.0351*** 0.341***
(0.0215) (0.0329) (8.540) (0.0156) (0.0134) (0.0188)
Rainfall (mm) 0.000235*** 7.98e-05** 0.0251** 1.37e-05 –1.54e-05 0.000127**
(2.91e-05) (3.54e-05) (0.0121) (1.18e-05) (1.32e-05) (5.45e-05)
Intraseasonal rainfall CV 0.0133 0.256*** 13.94 0.0777*** –0.0541* –0.0374
(0.0571) (0.0579) (22.02) (0.0265) (0.0325) (0.105)
Observations 16,433 16,433 16,433 16,433 16,433 16,433
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6B3. Full regression estimates for Zambia (specification 3, see Table 6.4).














Age of household head (years) –0.00141*** –0.000454** –0.416*** –0.000224* –0.000289** –0.00111**
(0.000233) (0.000195) (0.109) (0.000118) (0.000137) (0.000446)
Avg. age of other household adults –0.000261 –0.000141 0.352** –0.000336* 0.000452** 0.000636
(0.000339) (0.000278) (0.158) (0.000175) (0.000205) (0.000551)
Max. educational attainment 0.0119*** –0.00315*** 11.38*** –0.000889 0.00488*** 0.0321***
(0.00133) (0.00101) (0.661) (0.000564) (0.000880) (0.00178)
Female head (1/0) –0.0505*** –0.0185** –4.759 –0.0193*** –0.00311 –0.0569***
(0.00869) (0.00759) (4.293) (0.00431) (0.00426) (0.0165)
Farm size (ha) 0.00166*** 0.00110** –0.635*** 0.000155 0.000431* 8.28e-05
(0.000581) (0.000455) (0.190) (0.000159) (0.000238) (0.000761)
Household members (count) 0.000689 0.00647** –1.454 –0.000271 0.00116 –0.00206
(0.00281) (0.00267) (1.428) (0.00143) (0.00199) (0.00516)
Productive assets (ZMW) 3.13e-08 3.30e-08* –7.39e-05*** 4.05e-08 9.19e-08** –4.17e-08
(3.33e-08) (2.00e-08) (2.49e-05) (3.16e-08) (4.45e-08) (5.09e-08)
Hours to town of 50k+ –4.07e-06 –5.96e-06 –0.0181*** 7.25e-06* 1.11e-05*** –6.62e-05***
(7.59e-06) (6.14e-06) (0.00444) (3.90e-06) (3.14e-06) (1.56e-05)
Population density 0.189*** 0.0729** 61.59*** 0.0586*** 0.0391*** 0.355***
(0.0224) (0.0296) (9.164) (0.0165) (0.0145) (0.0175)
Rainfall (mm) 0.000234*** 8.67e-05** 0.0202 1.33e-05 –1.96e-05 0.000112*
(3.08e-05) (3.39e-05) (0.0129) (1.26e-05) (1.47e-05) (6.04e-05)
Intraseasonal rainfall CV 0.00327 0.279*** 11.33 0.0857*** –0.0528 –0.0165
(0.0614) (0.0552) (22.26) (0.0273) (0.0346) (0.112)
Observations 15,178 15,178 15,178 15,178 15,178 15,178
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak–Chamberlain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes










Table 6C1. Full regression estimates for Ethiopia (specification 1, see Table 6.4).














Age of household head (years) –0.000519* 5.16e-05 0.000121 –0.000401 –0.00133** 0.000213
(0.000277) (0.000266) (0.000403) (0.000393) (0.000564) (0.000528)
Max. educational attainment 0.000489 0.00249 0.00656*** –0.00277 0.00370 0.00300
(0.00253) (0.00245) (0.00253) (0.00286) (0.00321) (0.00290)
Female head (1/0) –0.0374 –0.0110 0.0241 –0.0500 –0.0213 0.0315
(0.0263) (0.0328) (0.0398) (0.0306) (0.0444) (0.0278)
Farm size (ha) 0.000164 0.000470 0.000967** –0.000531 0.00140 0.000125
(0.000285) (0.000739) (0.000376) (0.000453) (0.00122) (0.000284)
Household members (count) 0.00422 –0.0122 0.0107 0.00235 –0.00928 0.00767
(0.00619) (0.00771) (0.00751) (0.00821) (0.00780) (0.00709)
Travel time to market –1.72e-05 5.58e-05 –0.000566*** –0.000205** –0.000343* –0.000558***
(6.59e-05) (5.72e-05) (0.000123) (9.20e-05) (0.000205) (0.000177)
Observations 9285 9285 9285 9285 9285 9285
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak–Chamberlain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6C2. Full regression estimates for Ethiopia (specification 2, see Table 6.4).














Avg. age of household adults –0.00108*** –9.64e-07 –0.000509 –0.00111** –0.00246*** –0.000108
(0.000407) (0.000466) (0.000606) (0.000443) (0.000817) (0.000779)
Max. educational attainment 0.000214 0.00243 0.00634** –0.00300 0.00323 0.00286
(0.00253) (0.00244) (0.00251) (0.00288) (0.00320) (0.00286)
Female head (1/0) –0.0426 –0.0136 0.0239 –0.0514* –0.0168 0.0288
(0.0261) (0.0324) (0.0388) (0.0299) (0.0436) (0.0266)
Farm size (ha) 0.000164 0.000470 0.000970** –0.000530 0.00140 0.000129
(0.000288) (0.000739) (0.000379) (0.000457) (0.00122) (0.000284)
Household members (count) 0.00374 –0.0121 0.0104 0.00170 –0.0104 0.00755
(0.00619) (0.00766) (0.00754) (0.00822) (0.00789) (0.00716)
Travel time to market –1.62e-05 5.53e-05 –0.000568*** –0.000205** –0.000339* –0.000560***
(6.56e-05) (5.72e-05) (0.000123) (9.23e-05) (0.000205) (0.000177)
Observations 9297 9297 9297 9297 9297 9297
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak–Chamberlain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes










Table 6C3. Full regression estimates for Ethiopia (specification 3, see Table 6.4).














Age of household head (years) –0.000472 1.97e-05 0.000276 –9.47e-05 –0.00103* 0.000297
(0.000296) (0.000279) (0.000459) (0.000463) (0.000609) (0.000614)
Avg. age of other household adults –0.000344 0.000529 0.000461 –0.00127** –0.00142 –0.000177
(0.000467) (0.000641) (0.000671) (0.000553) (0.000987) (0.000965)
Max. educational attainment 0.000157 0.00193 0.00684** –0.00261 0.00375 0.00297
(0.00256) (0.00249) (0.00266) (0.00297) (0.00336) (0.00300)
Female head (1/0) –0.0391 –0.0224 0.0310 –0.0494 –0.0104 0.0363
(0.0269) (0.0333) (0.0381) (0.0320) (0.0468) (0.0307)
Farm size (ha) 0.000199 0.000540 0.000886** –0.000554 0.00147 0.000140
(0.000276) (0.000835) (0.000415) (0.000457) (0.00129) (0.000304)
Household members (count) 0.00578 –0.0134 0.00823 0.00662 –0.0118 0.00744
(0.00645) (0.00815) (0.00741) (0.00856) (0.00823) (0.00750)
Travel time to market –2.43e-05 6.38e-05 –0.000530*** –0.000220** –0.000349 –0.000584***
(6.97e-05) (6.06e-05) (0.000125) (9.55e-05) (0.000219) (0.000187)
Observations 8523 8523 8523 8523 8523 8523
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak–Chamberlain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Significance levels are denoted as follows: * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01. FE = fixed effects.
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Commercialized share of production 0.2738 0.2317
High-value share of production –0.0582 0.4112
Fertilizer (kg/ha) 0.3737 –0.0641
Pesticide (farm share) –0.0323 0.4177
Herbicide (farm share) 0.0690 0.0537
Improved maize seed (=1) 0.4139 –0.0541
Notes: Table shows scoring coefficients based on varimax rotated factors. Factors are derived from variables 
measuring: commercialized share of production; high-value share of crop production; fertilizer application rate (kg/ha); 
share of land under pesticide; share of land under herbicide; and usage of improved maize seed.
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Introduction
Education has long been constructed as intrinsic 
to the development and modernization of  sub- 
Saharan African (SSA). A dominant rationale 
for investment in education in SSA has framed it 
predominantly in terms of  the development of  
human capital (Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1962; 
Montenegro and Patrinos, 2014). With refer-
ence to the arguments of  this chapter, a key 
issue is that human capital depends on the sep-
aration of  education and work, as if  these are 
clearly distinct and separable activities, whose 
relationship can be analysed as a closed system. 
In addition, as we discuss below, the macroeco-
nomic perspectives of  human capital theory 
(HCT) provide few insights into the local-level 
interactions between education and work, or the 
historical educational inequalities that have pre-
vailed in and across SSA. This chapter draws on 
qualitative research into youth livelihoods in 
four SSA countries that has addressed the local 
social dynamics of  work and education from the 
perspectives of  young people themselves. Firstly, 
it illuminates the extent to which youth in the 
four different national contexts value education. 
It then turns to young people’s lived experiences 
of  juggling both schooling and work from an 
early age, highlighting the wide disparity be-
tween idealized notions of  ‘transition’ and the 
complexities of  youth livelihoods. Finally, it 
explores the gendered dimensions of  this social 
landscape, and how these produce different 
pressures that force young women in particular 
out of  education. We conclude with implications 
for young people’s current and future engage-
ment with the rural economy, and for education 
policy.
Education and Work
This section locates our analysis within the 
policy and research literatures. It first gives an 
overview of  policy concerns about the education 
of  young women and men in SSA. Noting that 
the research discussed here spans Sustainable 
Development Goal 4 (SDG 4) (education quality), 
SDG 5 (gender equality) and SDG 8 (the right to 
decent work), we engage in particular with HCT, 
as the dominant lens used within international 
policy to understand the relationship between 
education and work. We challenge HCT’s binary 
construction of  education and work as if  these 
were mutually exclusive. We critique how 
the theory’s universalistic assumptions lead to 
the construction of  individualized deficit, where 
limited engagement in education by young 
people in poor rural contexts is attributed to 
their lack of  aspiration. This contrasts sharply 
with our analysis, which shows that rural youth 
value education highly.
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We further critique HCT’s assumptions of  a 
linear construction of  education and work as if  
these were two distinct life stages. In particular, 
the reduction of  the ‘education–work’ relation-
ship to a ‘black box’ simply fails to attend to the 
complexities of  young people’s engagement in 
the nexus of  work and education within the in-
formal economies of  rural SSA. Importantly, for 
the final strand of  our analysis, the way HCT 
conceptualizes work – and in particular the priv-
ileging of  wage employment – compounds the 
historical misrecognition of  women’s invisible 
work and fails to address the gendered economy 
of  education and work in these contexts.
Having argued for the significance of  con-
text, we conclude this section by turning to research 
which illuminates the elitist and gendered ways 
education was developed in SSA in colonial 
times, how this has associated education with 
social mobility, and set in motion particular im-
aginaries of  both education and work (see also 
Chapter 9, this volume). Drawing upon contem-
porary research into education and work, we 
highlight how these legacies endure, so that the 
processes of  schooling and work continue to re-
produce inequalities and exclusions, in which 
gender is routinely implicated.
Education inequalities
Education has long been a key concern of  inter-
national policy agendas, such as Education for 
All, the Millennium Development Goals and the 
Sustainable Development Goals. A strong policy 
focus on increased access resulted in enrolment 
in primary education in SSA rising by 75% be-
tween 1999 and 2012 (UNESCO, 2015). Despite 
the recent shift in focus to educational quality 
(The World Bank, 2018; Wulff, 2020), access to 
learning remains a critical issue that cannot be 
considered separate from a concern for quality. 
UNESCO (2018) show that out-of-school rates in 
SSA increase throughout schooling, rising from 
21% at primary level, to 36% at lower secondary 
and 57% at upper secondary.
When further disaggregated, these statistics 
illuminate deep inequalities. For example, while 
the adjusted gender parity index for 2017 shows 
slightly more females completing primary school, 
by upper secondary fewer than four females com-
plete school for every five males (UNESCO, 2018). 
SSA also has the highest level of  out-of-school 
youth of  any region of  the world (31%), al-
though this is much worse in rural contexts 
(37%) than urban contexts (20%). Differences 
between rich and poor are even more stark, with 
51% of  the poorest youth being out of  school 
versus 16% of  the richest. In addition, SSA has the 
lowest percentages of  any world region for trained 
primary and secondary school teachers. Overall, 
what these figures show is that education in SSA is 
riven by inequalities that continue to benefit urban 
populations rather than rural, richer people ra-
ther than poorer, and males rather than females.
As noted above, the overriding policy con-
cern has now veered towards educational quality, 
with urgent calls being voiced by institutions such 
as The World Bank to address what they call a 
‘global learning crisis’ (The World Bank, 2018). 
In the eyes of  some powerful actors, this provides 
further justification for the deregulation, privat-
ization and liberalization of  the education sector. 
The introduction of  market dynamics into edu-
cation (Benavot and Smith, 2020) continues what 
was started by the Structural Adjustment Pro-
grams (SAPs) of  the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and The World Bank. The implemen-
tation of  SAPs since the 1980s has been strongly 
critiqued, particularly for their impact on state 
spending for social infrastructure, including edu-
cation (Jomo and Fine, 2006; Tikly, 2019). As Ilon 
(1994) comments, the resulting hollowing out 
of  the state created the conditions for the rise of  
low-fee private schooling in many Global South 
contexts, including SSA. Diminished state funds 
to support public education – particularly at a time 
of  strong demographic growth – led to a middle- 
class flight from state schools, which has contrib-
uted to the difficulties of  sustaining the quality 
of  provision. Importantly, as discussed further 
below, current policy concerns about quality – 
and particularly how it should be quantified – 
have reduced education to ‘learning’ in ways 
that have diverted attention from the politics of  
education (Hossain and Hickey, 2019).
Policy perspectives on education  
and work
As Marginson (2019) notes, policy narratives 
that connect education and work have demon-
strated an unquestioning reliance on HCT (see, 
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e.g. The World Bank, 2020). HCT frames invest-
ment in education in terms of  the development 
of  human capital, which translates in turn into 
improved life opportunities and higher wages for 
the individual, and more widely, to increased 
productivity, consumption and economic devel-
opment. The key metric used in HCT is rate of  
return to schooling, which involves calculating 
the proportional increase in an individual’s labour 
market earnings from each additional year of  
schooling completed. Montenegro and Patrinos 
(2014) provide further elaboration, including 
details of  the statistical processes.
Many critiques of  HCT have been voiced. 
These include questions about its evidence base; 
its assumptions about opportunity costs (Bennell, 
1996); its static economic model (Resnik, 2006); 
its generalization of  a particular set of  socio- 
economic relations to other quite different eco-
nomic and educational contexts (Marginson, 
2019); and relatedly, its failure to take account 
of  the different histories of  education systems in 
the Global South (McGrath et al., 2019). Overall, 
HCT directly correlates investment in education 
with productivity increases and higher work- 
related earnings. However, this linear relationship 
does not account for education as a complex of  
socially situated processes. As Resnik (2006) 
puts it, HCT has become a doxa, a set of  unques-
tioned presuppositions, that reductively assumes 
an ‘education–economic growth black box’.
The black box assumes linear, incremental 
relations between education and work in a devel-
opmental trajectory that is both individual and so-
cietal. For the individual, it involves a normative 
journey through childhood, youth and finally to 
adulthood. Education is critical to this trajectory, 
preparing individuals for the world of  work as part 
of  a step by step progression through different life 
stages. For instance, The World Bank (2006) as-
sumes the life course to reflect ‘five phases’ of  indi-
vidual development, with learning being the ini-
tial stage, followed by ‘starting a productive 
working life’, ‘adopting a healthy lifestyle’, ‘form-
ing a family’, and ‘exercising citizenship’. These 
phases are projected as if  they are near universal. 
As we show below, in the contexts of  our research 
it is impossible to divide the life course into neat 
phases, where learning necessarily comes before 
starting to work; where starting a family is distinct 
from schooling; or where having responsibilities is 
something that can be associated with adulthood.
Despite the push to engage children in 
schooling, the gaps in uptake have been of  some 
concern, particularly in low-income contexts 
which would seem to have most to gain from invest-
ment in education, whether for the individual or 
more widely in terms of  national development. 
The World Bank (2014) discusses how poverty 
creates a ‘failure of  aspiration’ that results in 
(and from) limited engagement in schooling. 
Here, the explanation for non-engagement in 
schooling is readily turned into a question of  in-
dividual deficit, related to individuals’ failure to 
recognize the (economic) benefits of  education. 
Although engaging briefly with more socio-
logical theories, this document from The World 
Bank highlights as key concerns the ‘choices’ 
made by poor people and the ‘irrationality’ of  
their beliefs. This implicitly takes up the language 
of  rational actor theory, whose ‘narrow econo-
mistic’ understanding of  practice lacks attention 
to context and ignores the collective histories 
through which particular ‘structures of  prefer-
ence’ have been constituted (Bourdieu and Wac-
quant, 1992, p.123).
Similarly, a World Bank analysis of  the high 
number of  out-of-school youth in SSA suggests 
that this problem can be addressed by changing 
the attitudes to education of  young people and 
parents (Inoue et al., 2015). Drawing on psycho-
logical research, much of  it conducted outside of  
SSA, these authors pinpoint young people’s 
‘behaviour and personality traits, goals, motiv-
ations and preferences’ (Inoue et al., 2015, p.48) 
as leading to poor educational outcomes. Again, 
such commentary constructs the problem as an 
issue of  individual deficit, and context is assumed 
irrelevant. When this report considers more 
contextualized research (e.g. Pryor and Ampiah, 
2003), the complex range of  issues this illumin-
ates (including concerns about education quality) 
are again used to reiterate the dominant trope 
that poor attitudes to schooling are the default 
cause of  low educational participation and poor 
outcomes. As more research explores rural youth 
livelihoods in the Global South, this trope is 
being increasingly challenged, however, includ-
ing by the analysis we present below.
Turning more directly to work, a further 
limitation of  HCT is the way it privileges wage 
employment in the formal economy. This may 
still be a dominant mode of  economic engage-
ment in the Global North, but it is very far from 
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accounting for the livelihood experiences of  
people – young and old – in rural contexts of  
SSA. In this region there is a large informal 
economyi, in which both young people and 
women are over- represented (see also Sumberg 
et al., 2020). The International Labour Organ-
ization (ILO, 2018b) reports for example that 
85% of  employment in Africa is in the informal 
sector, with informal sector employment ac-
counting for almost 90% of  women’s employ-
ment, as opposed to 82% of  men’s employment. 
For young people, this increases to almost 95%. 
Significantly for our interests here, informal 
employment dominates agriculture, at almost 
98%. ILO (2018b) notes that globally, informal 
employment is closely related to education 
levels; in Africa, those with no education are 
predominantly engaged in informal employ-
ment (94%); reducing to 88% for those with pri-
mary education; 68% for those with secondary 
education; and finally, to 27% for those with ter-
tiary education.
Informal economies also include high levels 
of  unpaid work and this falls disproportionately 
on women (McDowell, 2014; ILO, 2017; UN 
Women and ILO, 2020). As Finlay et al. (2019) 
point out, the Living Standards Measurement 
Survey – Integrated Surveys on Agriculture 
(LSMS–ISA), overseen by The World Bank, posi-
tions women’s work as secondary to that of  
men, and by privileging regular, paid activity, 
makes it likely that women’s work is not recog-
nized as ‘work’ at all. Importantly, women in 
Africa are over-represented in ‘vulnerable’ii  
employment categories. ILO (2018a) reports 
that 76% of  women are in such work, compared 
to 58% of  men.
Drawing on LSMS–ISA data for Uganda, 
Koolwal (2019) shows that rural women have 
the highest total work burdens of  paid and un-
paid work compared to other groups (rural men, 
urban men and urban women). She highlights 
the need for more research into how to record 
rural women’s work, particularly as the defin-
ition of  employment has recently been narrowed 
to ‘work for pay or profit’ by the International 
Conference of  Labour Statisticians. This will 
compound the invisibility of  women’s reproduct-
ive work (e.g. caring for younger siblings, water 
and fuel collection, cooking, etc.), which histor-
ically has been misrecognized, even if  it has always 
been central to capitalist economies (Pateman, 
1988; Butler, 1997; Mies, 2014). As Rai et al. 
(2019) note, while SDG 5 (focused on gender 
equality) calls for the recognition of  women’s 
reproductive and domestic labour, SDG 8 (focused 
on the right to decent work) continues to use 
indicators that prioritize work in the formal 
economy. Importantly, all these measures con-
flate sex and gender, and in so doing, reinscribe a 
female/male binary (Dunne, 2008).
Contextualizing education and work
The strong association between informal work 
and lower levels of  education is important in 
relation to the promise of  social mobility that 
education is seen to offer. Here, the history of  
schooling in SSA is significant. Its introduction 
during colonial eras was far from universal – 
schools were developed first in urban areas and 
generally served only elite groups, on a single- 
sex basis. Schooling was strongly influenced by 
missionary activity, in ways that were gendered 
and racialized (Clignet and Foster, 1964; Scanlon, 
1964; Bolibaugh, 1972; Ball, 1983; McClintock, 
1995; Vavrus, 2002; Leach, 2008; Healy, 2011; 
Guidi, 2018; Bryant, 2020; Crossouard and 
Dunne, 2020). Rural areas were largely neglected, 
while the selection of  knowledge and its organ-
ization in school curricula generally followed 
what was done in the colonizing countries, and 
served the colonial project (Dunne and Adzahlie- 
Mensah, 2016; Feldman, 2016; Adzahlie-Mensah 
and Dunne, 2018; Bryant, 2020). The symbolic 
authority of  western schooling came to be seen as 
a passport to a secure professional career and social 
mobility (Ball, 1983; Stockwell, 2012). Moreover, 
the differential provision of  education sedimented 
social divisions between the urban and the rural 
that endure to this day (Nwauwa, 2020).
Largely, all SSA countries now attempting 
to work towards SDG 4 (foreground education 
quality) and SDG 5 (gender equality) face mul-
tiple challenges. Research has shown that leg-
acies of  colonialism have endured in schools in 
ways that reproduce inequities and exclusions 
(Dunne and Adzahlie-Mensah, 2016; Adzahlie- 
Mensah and Dunne, 2018). In addition to exclu-
sions related to location, religion, language of  
instruction and ethnicity, this literature shows 
the practices of  schooling to be deeply gendered. 
Indeed, drawing upon theoretical insights from 
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Butler (1990) and Connell (2005), it demonstrates 
how the institutionalized practices of  schooling 
serve to secure the reproduction of  gender bin-
aries in ways that can involve gender violence 
(Mirembe and Davies, 2001; Dunne et al., 2005, 
2006; Bakari and Leach, 2007; Dunne, 2007, 
2008; Humphreys et al., 2015).
Alongside literature focused on gender and 
education in SSA, some research into youth live-
lihoods takes up the intersections of  schooling 
and work in different rural contexts of  the Glo-
bal South. This generally suggests that even in 
the face of  considerable obstacles, young people 
value education, seeing it as key to realizing social 
mobility and securing a professional career (see 
also Camfield, 2011; Boyden, 2013; Yeboah et al., 
2017; Ansell, 2018). Like Farrugia (2018), this 
literature often problematizes the notion of  
‘transition’ from school to work, and then to 
independent adulthood, showing this to be a 
western construction that bears little resemblance 
to youth livelihoods in SSA (see also Nilsson, 
2019). Rather than a linear, sequential transition 
from school to work, to parenthood, synchron-
ous working and schooling is the norm. This in-
cludes paid and unpaid work, which together 
often provide rural families with little more than 
basic subsistence (Boyden, 2013; Chuta and 
Morrow, 2015; Maconachie and Hilson, 2016). 
Some young people make valiant attempts to 
continue their schooling, but navigating the 
very different spaces of  schooling and their com-
plex lives in the community leads to significant 
identity tensions. For example, young people who 
have considerable social responsibilities, as parents, 
carers and/or wage earners, can find themselves 
infantilized and humiliated by their treatment in 
the classroom (Dunne and Ananga, 2013).
Research Contexts
We now turn to our research into rural youth 
livelihoods and imagined futures in four SSA 
countries: Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria in West 
Africa; and Ethiopia and Uganda in East Africa. 
These countries all have large youth populations, 
large rural economies, low educational outcomes, 
and important gender gaps in educational 
access and outcomes. All four have a history of  
state turbulence, fuelled by ethnic divisions that 
were sedimented during the age of  imperialism. 
Nigeria and Uganda were once British colonies, 
and Côte d’Ivoire was part of  French West Africa. 
Ethiopia was not formally colonized, but still 
witnessed interventions reflecting the imperial 
ambitions of  different European countries. To 
frame the discussion, Table 7.1 below draws on 
the World Inequality Database on Education 
(WIDE). The figures presented illustrate the poor 
educational outcomes for young people across 
the four different countries, in addition to im-
portant differences for females and males, and 
between rural and urban contexts. It is import-
ant to note that these statistical aggregates con-
ceal the very different populations of  these coun-
tries. We also note the fallibility of  such data, 
including for example that participation data 
are likely to be exaggerated (Humphreys et al., 
2015). A further caution is that national- level 
data conceals wide disparities between regions 
within a country. In Nigeria, for example, the 
study did not include any sites in the north, where 
education outcomes are significantly worse than 
in the south.
Despite their limitations, these national 
statistics indicate considerable differences be-
tween rural and urban contexts across all meas-
ures. For instance, with respect to primary com-
pletion, those individuals in the rural contexts 
of  Ethiopia are less than half  as likely to com-
plete than urban pupils. Gender differences are 
evident – while female and male completion 
rates at primary school are at parity in some 
contexts, in all four countries female youth are 
more likely to be out of  school than male youth: 
just over half  of  female youth are out of  school 
in Nigeria and Ethiopia, increasing to 72% in 
Uganda. Intersecting gender and rural/urban 
categories would show yet deeper differences in 
favour of  males.
Table 7.2 draws on LSMS–ISA data and 
depicts labour allocations for female and male 
youth, again confirming differences in young 
females’ engagement in schooling, and import-
ant differences in the extent females and males 
are involved in farming, the wage employment, 
or report no economic activity. As noted earl-
ier, an important qualification here is how 
LSMS–ISA methodologies can lead to under- 
reporting of  women’s work. For example, 
Koolwal (2019) discusses the high levels of  ‘own 
use’ agricultural production in Nigerian survey 
data, particularly for women, noting that under 
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the new definition of  ‘employment’, this would 
no longer be categorized as ‘self-employed in agri-
culture’. She also notes problems with the lan-
guage of  some survey questions, and whether 
women recognize how this relates to their work. 
For example, whether they would identify as being 
involved in ‘business’, when their activities are 
small scale and often conducted alongside house-
hold activities. The same issue of  non-identification 
with particular categories may well apply to ques-
tions that probe time spent on particular activities. 
Overall, Koolwal highlights the need for more 
nuanced attention to contributions of  women’s 
work to the rural economy, to ensure this is 
adequately recognized.
Research Methodology
The study involved engagement with female and 
male youth using predominantly qualitative 
participatory research methods (see Chapter 2, 
this volume). These sought to develop an 
in-depth understanding of  youth perspectives 
on their livelihoods and imagined futures; what 
part education played in both; and how all of  this 
was gendered. The study was conducted in four 
different rural locations in each country. With 
slight variations from site to site, the research 
in each location involved four sex-segregated 
focus group discussions (FGDs), two with female 
youth and two with male youth; eight liveli-
hood interviews; 12 life history interviews; 
six photo–voice interviews focusing more spe-
cifically on imagined futures; and six inter-
views with adults (see Chapter 2, this volume). 
Each set of  interviews involved approximately 
equal numbers of  females and males with differ-
ent educational backgrounds. The interviews 
were conducted with the support of  local re-
searchers in each location and with partici-
pants’ consent, were recorded, translated and 
Table 7.1. Selected education statistics for Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire. From World 
Inequality Database on Education (WIDE, www.education-inequalities.org/, accessed 26 November 
2020). For definitions of indicator categories, see www.education-inequalities.org/indicators.
Gender Location
Country / measure National average Female Male Rural Urban
Uganda
Primary completion (%) 49 49 49 41 77
Out-of-school children (%) 13 13 13 14 10
Upper sec. completion (%) 17 11 17 7 34
Out-of-school youth (%) 65 72 57 66 61
Higher educ. attendance (%) 5 5 6 2 15
Ethiopia
Primary completion (%) 42 39 44 31 76
Out-of-school children (%) 32 32 32 34 17
Upper sec. completion (%) 10 8 12 4 28
Out-of-school youth (%) 49 53 44 53 35
Higher educ. attendance (%) 5 5 6 1 19
Nigeria
Primary completion (%) 69 62 77 55 89
Out-of-school children (%) 37 37 33 44 15
Upper sec. completion (%) 44 36 67 28 67
Out-of-school youth (%) 51 54 47 58 38
Higher educ. attendance (%) 7 7 10 3 15
Côte d’Ivoire
Primary completion (%) 51 44 59 33 65
Out-of-school children (%) 23 26 20 29 15
Upper sec. completion (%) 15 12 19 4 24
Out-of-school youth (%) 57 67 47 70 48
Higher educ. attendance (%) 4 3 4 0 6
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fully transcribed. The excerpts presented here 
draw on this large data set.
The data were analysed using a combin-
ation of  qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
Alongside thematic analysis, some coding was 
applied to provide a quantitative depiction of  
whether farming, migration or education fig-
ured in the interviewees’ imagined futures. The 
analysis takes up three broad themes: first, how 
youth value education; second, the non-linear 
relationships between education and work; and 
finally, the gendered dimensions of  these educa-
tion–work relationships.
Research Findings
The value of education to rural youth
The first key point is that the majority of  rural 
youth in our research appear to value education. 
This finding generally challenges accounts in 
policy and some research literature (psychological 
research in particular) that there is a need to 
address poor ‘attitudes’ to education. Youth some-
times commented on the lack of  relevance of  the 
school curriculum to rural livelihoods, declaring 
more interest in vocational education. However, 
on the whole, in addition to the benefits that lit-
eracy could bring, schooling was associated with 
social mobility and increased social status:
Schooling assists one to rise to a lofty height. 
Education makes one professional like lawyer, 
doctor and other enviable jobs in the society.  
As well as that, schooling makes reading and 
writing easy.
(23-year-old male, Igbariam Eziafor, Nigeria)
When you are a teacher, people will respect you 
in the community, the kids you are bringing up 
will also respect you and you will have many 
friends. You will be able to give people knowledge. 
Also, when you are morally upright, people will 
admire you and try to live the way you do.
(20-year-old female, Mucwini, Uganda)
[…] Educated people have a lot of  opportunities. 
For instance, you can’t be employed by the 
government even in the lowest position without 
some level of  education. You can’t be a kebele 
[the smallest administrative unit] manager or 
employed elsewhere without education. In the 
case of  women, there is a big difference between 
educated and uneducated women in terms of  
their physical neatness and ideas.
(25-year-old male, Bora, Ethiopia)
Education often figured in youths’ imagined fu-
tures (see Chapter 9, this volume), as part of  a 
portfolio of  activities combining farming with 
other commerce and trading, different voca-
tional activities (e.g. welding, carpentry, hair-
dressing, tailoring), or professional positions. 
Many individuals, both females and males, ex-
pressed the desire to further their education 
should they have the opportunity. Where educa-
tion was no longer possible for young people 
who were already married, it was often desired 
for their children, where again, the association 
between education and upward economic and 
social mobility was clear:
I want to be successful and become a notable 
personality in the community. I want to build a 
house, ride on my car, marry a good wife and 
she will give birth to good children and I will 
train them in school and they will study what 
I could not study and be greater than me.
(25-year-old male, Igbariam Eziafor, Nigeria)
Table 7.2. Labour allocations of individual youth 
(aged 15–24) for Uganda, Ethiopia and Nigeria. 
From Living Standards Measurement Survey – 
Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS–ISA; no 
data for Côte d’Ivoire).
Gender
Country / labour allocation Female Male
Uganda
Wage employment (%) 13 25
Non-farm business (%) 10 8
Farming (%) 76 78
In school (%) 47 55
No activity reported (%) 6 2
Ethiopia
Wage employment (%) 9 7
Non-farm business (%) 12 10
Farming (%) 36 55
In school (%) 40 46
No activity reported (%) 26 18
Nigeria
Wage employment (%) 3 3
Non-farm business (%) 11 8
Farming (%) 15 28
In school (%) 48 53
No activity reported (%) 31 20
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I didn’t go to school, so why do I send my 
children to school? Because it is painful for me 
that I wasn’t able to do that – it really upsets me. 
So that’s why I say to my children that they will 
study, so that tomorrow they can do well in life.
(28-year-old male, Daloa, Côte d’Ivoire)
I would like also to raise my young children, my 
brother and my sister’s children to study and be 
educated and that in the future they can get jobs.
(male, Awach, Uganda)
This does not mean that the young people neces-
sarily voiced a concrete plan of  action for their 
future education, which would demand a particu-
lar set of  capitals, and relatedly, an awareness of  
the field and how to play it (Bourdieu, 1977). 
Their desire to continue in education was often 
expressed in vague ways, sometimes with quali-
fiers about funding becoming available, such as 
‘if  I can find a sponsor’. Two different coding 
processes for the extent that education figured in 
the imagined futures of  the participants revealed 
a significant gap between those who could elab-
orate specific plans for their future education, as 
opposed to a wider group that also included those 
who expressed a more general sense that educa-
tion was valuable, either for themselves or for 
their children. In the case of  Nigeria, 80% of  the 
participants valued education, although only 
50% had specific plans. For Ethiopia, 82% val-
ued education, while 41% had specific plans. 
Even if  unformulated and perhaps unrealizable, 
the ambitions of  those individuals without spe-
cific plans should not be discounted.
In general, as Nwauwa (2020) suggests, 
education is seen as opening up new, brighter fu-
tures, creating opportunities for social mobility. 
Critically, however, the jobs that are opened up 
in principle by schooling, are not readily avail-
able in the rural economy. The young women 
and men also showed awareness that complet-
ing school does not guarantee employment:
There is no work. There are many youth who 
have completed their education but often walk 
aimlessly on the street.
(33-year-old male, Kuyu, Ethiopia)
They further noted the importance of  personal con-
nections for securing salaried work – educational 
qualifications are not enough. As a 24-year-old 
male from Kuyu, Ethiopia, commented, ‘I do 
not  have any relative working in an office. 
I do not know any person who can support me to 
get a job.’
In many cases, however, this did not seem 
to diminish their convictions that they could 
improve their social status through education. 
Although many were forced out of  education at 
an early stage, those who had completed second-
ary education spoke of  their desire to continue 
into higher education. Awareness of  the limita-
tions in education provision in rural as opposed 
to urban contexts provoked commentary on so-
cial inequalities in access to education, which 
again was associated with high social standing:
I have completed the education system that we 
have here which is secondary school level. I have 
to move out to study further, but I have financial 
constraints. [...] Money is required for everything; 
I don’t have money and I am not educated as I 
wish. [...] people with good profession and rich 
men have a voice in the society, they are well 
respected and occupy esteemed positions.
(20-year-old female, Idi Amu and 
Igbokiti, Nigeria)
As commonly recognized, access to primary or 
secondary education is often difficult and some 
participants had to travel several hours a day to 
get to school. Although elders often spoke of  
sending their children to school outside the com-
munity to access better education, the quality of  
teaching was relatively unchallenged by the 
young people themselves. Indeed, in stark con-
trast to the assumptions within international pol-
icy arenas that rural youth may not value educa-
tion, it was striking that most seemed willing to 
devote scarce resources to pay for their education 
(and indeed had done so in the past). We consider 
this further in the next section, before exploring 
the gendered landscape of  education and work.
Schooling and work in the rural economy
In contrast to the ideal of  a linear trajectory 
from schooling into work that is projected within 
international policy circles, both female and 
male youth often worked from an early age. 
Many began to work before starting school, and 
continued to work throughout their studies, 
moving opportunistically between different ways 
of  generating income. Combining school and work 
from an early age was routine, often including 
helping on the family farm and in the home 
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(especially girls). Seasonal work was also com-
mon, both for females and males. As demonstrated 
in Humphreys et al. (2015), it is clear that the 
school timetable does not sit well with the 
exigencies of  rural youth livelihoods in these 
contexts, even if  these mismatches are not typic-
ally addressed within current concerns for ‘qual-
ity’ education.
Responses to a question about the challenges 
associated with combining work and school 
sometimes showed the major impact this could 
have on education:
I was attending my school and supporting my 
grandmother during my free time. I did not fail 
in any of  the Grades (1–9). I completed Grade 
10. [...] However, I could not get a pass mark.  
I had a lot of  household activities; I was the only 
one who supported my grandmother. I did not 
get sufficient time to study hard.
(20-year-old female, Jabi Tehnan, Ethiopia)
We can see here the impact of  unpaid, domestic 
labour on this young woman, an issue we return 
to below. In another example, a young man re-
flected on the impact on his schooling of  having 
to devote time to work:
[…] The biggest [challenge] I have is that there is 
no money, if  there was money, I would have 
completed my schooling before now, that is by 
concentrating squarely on schooling. That is 
why I fish, so that I can support myself.
(22-year-old male, Igbariam Eziafor, Nigeria)
However, many others refuted the idea that com-
bining work and school was problematic:
We went to farm between 5:30–7:00 am, then 
we got dressed for school by 7:30 am, and in the 
evening after school hours around 4:00 pm,  
I went for hawking. [...] There were no challenges 
as such, because if  we do not go to farm in the 
morning and sell few things from the farm we 
will not have money to take to school. But it has 
never disturbed school.
(25-year-old female, Oba Oke, Nigeria)
When I was at school, when we didn’t have 
class, my mother gave us a plot of  land and we 
grew rice. Every Friday, I get my produce, I set up 
a table outside the house, and I sold it. I didn’t 
have any issues, I had no problem combining 
school with trading.
(28-year-old female, Daloa, Côte d’Ivoire)
In many cases continuing in school was only 
possible because of  the income from such work; 
this allowed the costs of  schooling to be covered, 
and provided some support to the young per-
son’s family:
I started my own farming in the year 2012.  
It was only maize because by that time as I was 
still studying, and weeding maize was easier.  
The maize I was cultivating paid my school fees 
and I also gave some to my mother and we eat  
it at home.
(22-year-old male, Awach, Uganda)
In some instances, working had been beneficial 
in terms of  gaining experience in areas that 
school addressed in a more ‘bookish’ way. For 
example, a 28-year-old male in Daloa, Côte 
d’Ivoire, had been in and out of  school, being in-
volved in farming, masonry work and different 
forms of  petty commerce. He had developed an 
interest in carpentry from working with his 
uncle in Abidjan and returned to school to com-
plete a ‘technical’ Baccalaureate. As he remarked, 
‘That’s when what I call good things started to 
happen.’ He now works as a carpenter himself  
and is aiming to set up his own carpentry shop.
While this is a story of  improving personal 
circumstances, where family connections have 
been enabling, many other young people recounted 
how continuing in school could be put at risk by 
unforeseeable downturns in family fortunes. Ill-
ness, injury or death of  a parent or guardian 
were often cited as major reasons for individuals 
having to commit themselves to work, rather 
than education. As a young Ethiopian man 
commented:
Because of  the death of  my father, life became 
difficult for us so I was forced to stop my 
education. If  my father had huge tracts of  land, 
we would have rented it out and used it as 
source of  income but we don’t have that much 
land, and I had to quit my education and started 
supporting myself  and the family.
(21-year-old male, Bora, Ethiopia)
The life story of  a 31-year-old woman now living 
in Luweero, Uganda, is illustrative of  the dislocated, 
gendered trajectories of  some participants. She 
started primary school in Butambama because 
her brother was living there, and stayed through 
to Primary 4 Term 2. When she was in Primary 
3 her parents divorced and her mother left home; 
her father then married another woman. She did 
not cope well without her mother, commenting: 
‘Our elder brothers took us up and raised us up 
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and made decisions concerning our lives.’ She 
then went to stay in Kiyingi village where her 
other brother lived. He took her to another school 
in Kiboga where she remained from Primary 4 
until Primary 7: ‘I got very poor grades – actually 
I failed and my brother did not feel the worth of  
paying my fees anymore.’ After Primary 7 her 
brother suggested she learn tailoring, and intro-
duced her to a woman in Kiboga town who was 
to train her. She did housework for the woman 
for 2 years, but the woman never paid her as she 
had promised. This woman also had a nephew 
‘who she wanted me to marry against my will’. 
A friend helped her escape and took her to Mu-
kono to work in a house. The police got involved, 
and on the third day in her new job the brother 
came ‘in anger’ and took her back to where her 
mother stayed: ‘My mother too was not happy 
with me.’ She was later taken to her father’s home, 
but she was uncomfortable with the stepmother, 
so after a week she returned to her mother who 
took her to a cooking and tailoring course in 
Nsambya. Then her mother fell sick, and her 
elder brother took her again to help him sell ma-
tooke at a stall on Kawempe town. At one point 
the brother disappeared, and she ran out of  money: 
‘I decided to do paid casual work for neighbours. 
I worked as a hotel attendant, serving customers 
[their] food.’ It was during this time that she ‘got 
a man’. Her husband was a casual labourer at 
building sites. His maternal grandparent was 
staying in Kawempe and offered him land in 
Luweero, and this is how they came to Luweero.
Disruption of  schooling was even more 
extreme for participants in contexts affected by 
civil war, whose education profiles, to say noth-
ing of  the education to work transition, were 
anything but linear. The experience of  a 35-year-
old woman from Awach, Uganda, makes the point:
I started schooling [in] Primary 1 when people 
were not yet in the camp. In 2002 I moved to 
Gulu town and started schooling at Laliya 
Primary School. I schooled for 2 years in this 
school [Primary 3 and Primary 4]. In 2004,  
I was transferred to Aworanga Primary School, 
which is still in Gulu town. I was in this school 
for 2 years too [Primary 5 and Primary 6]. In 
2005, I moved back to Awach Sub-County and 
joined Awach Mission Primary School 
[Primary 7]. In this same year, I dropped out of  
school because there was no money now for 
school fees.
In general, it was remarkable that schooling 
figured in any prominent way in the young peo-
ple’s livelihood narratives, given that they were 
constantly navigating different kinds of  low-paid 
work, and responding to wider crises, whether 
provoked by deteriorating family circumstances 
or wider social upheavals.
The interviews did not specifically probe the 
costs of  schooling, but alongside many who 
talked simply about school fees, other costs that 
were mentioned included uniforms, examin-
ation fees, charges for photocopies, books, food 
and transport costs. Some talked about having to 
‘dig’ for the teacher, so schooling was provided 
in return for their unpaid work. Overall, attend-
ing school was evidently a significant financial 
burden. In many cases it was shouldered, at least 
in part, by the young people themselves, at the 
same time as they were contributing to family in-
come, and sometimes also to the costs of  schooling 
for their younger siblings. We return in the con-
cluding section to the evident gap here between 
the young people’s accounts of  their experiences 
of  education and work, and international policy 
commitments to the availability of  ‘free’ or 
‘affordable’ quality education through the life 
course, along with the assumed separation 
between school and work.
The gendered landscape of education  
and work
As shown above, females and males are involved 
in both education and work, but there are im-
portant gender differences framing their engage-
ment, which impacts differentially on their 
education. Work itself  is mostly mapped to sex, 
in a conflation of  sex and gender, so that differ-
ent forms of  work are viewed as appropriate 
for female or male youth. Although some voca-
tional work such as tailoring can be done by 
both sexes, young men are typically involved in 
activities such as farming, barbering (male hair-
dressing), carpentry, decorating, motorcycle taxi, 
tiling and welding; while young women work in 
farming, hairdressing, manicure/pedicure, cook-
ing, trading and different forms of  hospitality, 
including bartending. Going against expectations 
of  what kinds of  work are done by a woman or 
man could put one’s gender into question. For 
example, in Côte d’Ivoire, preparing food is 
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generally seen as women’s work, to the extent 
that a young man who cooked and sold food to 
pay for his school fees was called by his sister a 
‘girl boy’. This was explained as meaning some-
one who ‘is a boy, but not a boy. I could say he is 
a girl’ (26-year-old male, Soubré).
While all of  the respondents work in one 
way or another, males are more able than females 
to engage in different kinds of  paid work outside 
the home. In contrast, many females are rou-
tinely involved in unpaid domestic labour, along-
side helping on the family farm, as this Nigerian 
female recounted:
When I came back from school, I cooked food, 
washed clothes and did other home chores. 
Also, during the weekend I went to live with 
my parents in the farm settlement every 
Friday to help them out with farm work and 
then return home on Sunday. There were not 
many challenges. […] I would have loved to 
continue with my education, but I couldn’t 
due to lack of  money, that was why I stopped 
schooling.
(30-year-old female, Umumbo, Nigeria)
This young woman’s account of  her day contrasts 
with that of  a Nigerian man, who explained how 
he was constantly and proactively engaged in a 
succession of  different forms of  paid work, 
which he used to finance his education:
While I was growing up as a young boy, I always 
followed my parents to farm. At the same time, 
I learnt electrical artisan work while growing up 
to support myself. I assisted my father on the 
fishing activities and fished for myself. I did all 
kinds of  daily jobs, like field maintenance job. 
I did charcoal processing job for some months. 
[...] Whenever the charcoal season is gone,  
I always looked for other job, like the 
maintenance in the big farm and assisting the 
tractor operators.
(25-year-old male, Oba Oke, Nigeria)
Working outside the home and indeed outside 
the community – doing artisan work such as 
carpentry, electrical work, masonry or decorat-
ing – is possible for young men without wider 
recriminations. For females, the risks are much 
greater, as codes of  moral propriety frame the 
work and livelihoods that are open to them. 
Their futures are dominated by the expectation 
that they marry; this was openly discussed as a 
question of  family honour and dishonour, particu-
larly if  a young woman becomes pregnant outside 
of  marriage. At times, marriage is represented as 
something that is arranged for young females; 
in other instances, as something they actively 
engage with:
I am the first child of  my parents. They were not 
well-to-do, though they were farmers but could 
not get basic subsistence. We don’t always have 
what to eat, despite that they tried to give us 
basic education. When suitors started coming 
for my hand in marriage I decided to marry 
since I was the first child so that I can help my 
parents in training my younger ones at least up 
to secondary school.
(30-year-old female, Igbariam Eziafor, Nigeria)
A married woman will move to her husband’s 
home, and is no longer the responsibility of  her 
parents. With a few exceptions, while main-
taining their respectability, this typically ended 
their education. While some young men were 
living independently of  their parents, for 
 females this was much less common and was 
often associated with stigmatized forms of  
work and social marginalization. For ex-
ample, in Daloa, Côte d’Ivoire, a 30-year-old 
sex worker recounted how her parents and the 
father of  her child had been killed in the civil 
war. Finding herself  destitute and without 
education, she had taken up sex work as she 
had no other way of  making a living. She spoke 
of  the opprobrium she suffered as she walked 
down the street, and even her clients refused 
to look at her. Similarly, a young female in 
Nigeria who lived independently and worked in 
a bar described not being respected in society. 
She spoke of  the kind of  life that a woman had 
to avoid, in ways that illuminated the complex 
moral codes associated with the work and edu-
cation of  young women. She acknowledged 
both the social status attached to being literate 
and the shame of  becoming pregnant outside 
marriage:
I wouldn’t want to be an illiterate. An illiterate 
is someone who doesn’t go to school at all. 
There are other ways someone can become 
illiterate, like someone who gets pregnant 
while in school.
(19-year-old female, Umumbo, Nigeria)
Although not explored further in the interview, 
the association of  pregnancy with ‘becoming’ il-
literate is indicative of  the ways young women 
are forced out of  schooling if  they fall pregnant, 
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as well as sometimes finding themselves rejected 
by their families. The ways female elders talk 
about the education of  their daughters indicated 
how moral codes idealize the ‘good’ marriage, 
and indeed provide the justification for young 
women’s education:
For my daughters, my advice always for them is 
to be educated with a skill and be employed so 
that they can get a good husband. In my culture 
the pride and honour of  every woman is her 
husband. So, marriage for my daughters is very 
important.
(46-year-old female, Umumbo, Nigeria)
Other female elders in the same context echoed 
similar sentiments, adding that having a skilled 
job with a steady income would mean young 
women could ‘have a voice in the home’ (70-year-
old female, Igbariam Eziafor, Nigeria).
To some extent, education is viewed as cre-
ating the potential for change in the world of  
work and in the home. There is some acknow-
ledgement that women are now taking up pro-
fessional positions (as doctors, lawyers, teachers) 
and marriage is taking place at a later age, as a 
result of  education. As discussed in Chapter 9 
(this volume), having a professional career or 
a wage job was often central to the imagined 
futures of  young rural women (and men), as 
part of  changing relations that were important 
for the next generation:
I have experienced being a housewife and found 
out that is not good at all. […] I have decided that 
all my children will be educated and acquire at 
least an NCE [Nigeria Certificate in Education for 
teaching]. Even if  they don’t want to become a 
teacher, they can get job in other areas. I will not 
like my daughters to become a housewife 




At the same time, the gendered landscape of  
education and work in the rural economies of  
the research sites showed that completion of  sec-
ondary school – and sometimes primary school – 
was out of  reach for many if  not most young 
women, in part because of  the burden of  unpaid 
labour and the moral judgements that framed the 
kinds of  work they could do outside of  the home. 
Many young men also struggled to complete pri-
mary and secondary school, but for different 
reasons.
Conclusions: The Inequalities  
of Schooling and Work
The social landscape of  schooling and work in 
SSA suggests that education is valued by young 
women and young men. Nevertheless, it remains 
inaccessible to many, despite national and inter-
national policy commitments to the Sustainable 
Development Goals and ‘affordable’ quality edu-
cation throughout the life course. In contrast to 
the idealized life trajectory that sees schooling 
leading to work (as assumed in HCT), these are 
simply not sequential or mutually exclusive. 
Many young people start to work before they 
start school, and then routinely combine mul-
tiple forms of  work with attending school. This 
work is used to pay fees and other costs of  school, 
as well as for young people to support their fam-
ily. Clearly against many policy assumptions and 
strategies for intervention, leaving school is not 
a question of  lack of  aspiration; many young 
people see education as important in their im-
agined futures. Overwhelmingly, they foreground 
the cost of  education as the reason for leaving 
school. In the rural economies of  SSA, education 
still, at least in principle, offers the promise of  so-
cial mobility, but remains out of  reach for many.
However, the gendered landscape of  educa-
tion and work impacts differentially on female and 
male youth. Again, this is not a question of  indi-
vidual deficit. Deeply gendered expectations of  
what is appropriate for young women and men 
shape their trajectories through the intersecting 
spaces of  home, school and work. In the process 
they sustain a patriarchal morality in which 
young women are overwhelmingly constructed as 
wives, mothers and homemakers, who further 
contribute in gendered and moralized ways to paid 
activities that are more routinely recognized as 
‘work’. Young women’s education may be valued, 
but often in an instrumental way in terms of  mar-
riage capital; or the value of  marriage may be con-
sidered in supporting the welfare of  others. The 
importance of  the family as a main source of  sup-
port means that those who fall outside its norms 
are left vulnerable, forced into forms of  work that 
bring them into disrepute and so compound their 
marginalization.
The narratives of  rural young people raise 
many questions about the overwhelming reli-
ance on HCT to understand the relationship 
between education and work. It does not account 
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for social relations that fall outside its narrow 
economistic rationalities; these cannot address 
local social contexts of  schooling and work, and 
the wider set of  capitals that enable some to 
benefit from schooling, while excluding others; 
and it cannot attend to the intersections of  school-
ing with different forms of  work, including un-
paid work and work done at school (e.g. ‘digging’ 
for the teacher). Young people’s narratives also 
prompt questions about the school curriculum, 
what this proposes as ideals of  life and work for 
young women and men, and how the rhythms 
of  schooling accommodate rural livelihoods.
Importantly, contemporary concerns for 
‘quality’ education – while clearly fully justifi-
able – seem far from addressing the matters 
highlighted in this chapter. A particular issue is 
the translation of  the broader ambitions of  SDG 
4 into a much narrower set of  targets. These 
misrecognize the politics of  education and 
over-rely on learning metrics as a solution to 
complex social and cultural issues (Benavot and 
Smith, 2020). The narrow focus on pupil attain-
ment also makes pupil assessment central to 
these metrics, and seems to assume it to be an 
unproblematic, predominantly technical issue. 
This ignores extensive critical commentary on 
educational assessment as a complex social 
practice. The danger here is that education is re-
duced to learning only what is easy to measure, 
in order to allow straightforward comparison of  
outcomes across substantially different con-
texts. The contemporary policy focus on learn-
ing also silences questions about what is to be 
learned, and by whom this is determined. As Bi-
esta (2009, p.39) notes, the term learning ‘de-
notes processes and activities but is open – if  not 
empty – with regard to content and direction’. 
Significantly, such learning metrics also reduce 
gender to a female/male binary, in ways that 
yield no understanding of  how gender is pro-
duced within different social and cultural con-
texts, whether in the family, work or schooling 
(Dunne, 2008).
Overall, the research illuminates the deep 
inequalities that structure the rural economy, 
and the part that school plays in sustaining them. 
To help address these, there is a clear need for 
in-depth research into the intersections of  work 
and schooling that does not assume schooling to 
be a black box, but explores its processes in a 
contingent and contextualized way, that is at-
tentive to the dynamics of  local social relations 
and their particular histories.
Notes
i Following ILO (2018b) the informal sector consists of ‘units engaged in the production of goods or ser-
vices, with the primary objective of generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned. [...] 
They are owned by individual household members or several members of the same or different households. 
Typically, they are operating at a low level of organization, on a small scale and with little or no division 
between labour and capital as factors of production.’
ii Those in ‘vulnerable employment’ include own-account workers and contributing family workers; the category 
is set against those who are in paid employment, who enjoy more job security and better working conditions 
(ILO, 2018a).
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Introduction
This chapter revisits Alcinda Honwana’s con-
cept of  ‘waithood’ (Honwana, 2012), which has 
become central to much youth research and pol-
icy discourse in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
North Africa and the Middle East. In academic 
articles and policy debates, the concept is now 
widely used as shorthand to describe the situ-
ation in which youth are being held back and 
becoming frustrated by their inability to attain 
social adulthood. Despite waithood being critic-
ally interrogated in the research literature (e.g. 
Kovacheva et al., 2018), its growing popularity 
in policy and public discourse has not been ac-
companied by critical debate about the value of  
the concept itself. Rather, the idea that youth are 
‘in waithood’ is now largely taken for granted, 
and the meaning of  waithood is often reduced to 
inactivity, despite Honwana’s recognition that 
youth are ‘creatively harnessing all the means at 
their disposal to manage their lives’ (Honwana, 
2012, p.20).
One implication of  the popular discourse of  
‘youth in waiting’, is that it locates the problem 
with young people themselves, rather than with 
social, economic and political structures and re-
lations. Changing this means shifting the per-
spective from seeing youth as the ‘problem’, to 
recognizing that society is unable to come to 
terms with the fact that young people today are 
facing structural conditions that undermine 
their potential to progress in their lives. Honwana 
(2012, p.58) herself  pointed to neoliberal eco-
nomic policies as having created the structural 
conditions in which young people find it hard to 
get work, while she contends that other markers 
of  social adulthood (e.g. marriage and living in-
dependently from parents) are dependent on 
having work.
This chapter interrogates the concept of  
waithood based on the findings of  qualitative re-
search in Uganda, Ethiopia and Nigeria. Specific-
ally, the analysis is based on 158 life history 
interviews. The argument developed here is that 
emphasizing ‘the inability to enter the labour mar-
ket’ (Honwana, 2012, p.19) as the key feature of  
waithood downplays the other features of  social 
adulthood that young people are attaining. While 
Honwana has presented a nuanced perspective on 
the lives of  youth in her book, her eventual focus 
on the labour market as the key to adulthood has 
removed much of  the subtle distinction from the 
discussion. In policy discourse, waithood is now 
closely associated with youth unemployment and 
underemployment. Further, as commonly used, 
waithood also pays insufficient attention to gen-
der dynamics and the ways in which many young 
women attain social adulthood without entering 
the labour market. Specifically, it overlooks the ac-
tive negotiation by young people of  various social 
relationships and expectations.
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The chapter proceeds by first discussing 
Honwana’s conceptualization of  waithood and 
linking it to other relevant scholarship. It then 
situates the concept within the literature on 
rural youth and aspirations. Based on empirical 
data gathered from young rural women and 
men in Nigeria, Ethiopia and Uganda, the mean-
ing of  farming and other economic activities in 
their lives, particularly in relation to social sta-
tus, is presented. Other avenues for claim mak-
ing on social recognition, status and respect are 
then analysed, with a focus on marriage, family 
life and active citizenship. Throughout the chap-
ter the gendered nature of  the process of  becom-
ing a social adult is emphasized.
Waithood: The Debate
Honwana’s concept
The concept of  waithood was first introduced by 
Singerman (2007). It then gained traction fol-
lowing the publication of  the book Generation in 
Waiting (Dhillon and Yousef, 2009), which ar-
gued that institutions were failing young people 
in the Middle East and North Africa, leaving 
them ‘in waiting’. However, it was Honwana’s 
(2012) book The Time of  Youth that brought 
waithood to centre stage and led to its integra-
tion into policy discourse. She explains the con-
cept of  waithood as:
[…] a prolonged and uncertain stage between 
childhood and adulthood that is characterized 
by their inability to enter the labour market and 
attain the social markers of  adulthood [p.19]. 
[…] Waithood is a neither-here-nor-there 
position in which young people are expected to 
be independent from their parents but are not 
yet recognized as social adults. No longer a brief  
transitional stage in the life-course, waithood is 
becoming a permanent condition, as many 
young people remain stuck in this in-between 
situation. Indeed, waithood is becoming a new 
but socially attenuated form of  adulthood 
[p.20].
(Honwana, 2012, pp.19–20)
In this conceptualization, the emphasis is on 
having ‘not yet’ reached social adulthood (as it is 
understood within a given society), while it is 
also suggested that labour market activity is the 
primary pathway through which it is reached. 
The 2007 World Development Report, Develop-
ment and the Next Generation, conveys a similar 
message when it states that the period of  youth 
is the key period for transition from puberty to 
economic independence (The World Bank, 
2006, p.2). While the report acknowledges other 
transitions to adulthood (including learning, 
staying healthy, forming families and exercising 
citizenship), it clearly prioritizes the transition to 
productive citizens who contribute to economic 
development.
A key aspect of  waithood is its relational di-
mensions: the connection between economic 
activity and achieving relative autonomy, and 
between aspirations and expectations in relation 
to economic activity and its outcomes. As put 
forward by Honwana, waithood implies that 
economic activity is what enables young people 
to live relatively independently from parents, get 
married and provide for a family – markers that 
are almost universally important for social 
adulthood (Durham, 2004). The ability to attain 
these markers earns a person status and recog-
nition, which again underlines that waithood is 
a relational concept. Quoting young people from 
across the African continent, Honwana conveys 
the frustration and anxiety of  young women 
and men who are unable to attain such relative 
autonomy and status (Honwana, 2012, pp.19–38). 
Leavy and Smith (2010) point out that expect-
ations and aspirations in relation to the outcomes 
of  economic activity are strongly influenced by 
socio-cultural factors. Both adults and youth 
want to live up to the ideal type of  social adult-
hood. Young people have clear ideas about what 
constitutes ‘respectable work’, which means 
that if  someone gains financial independence 
based on low-status economic activities, they 
may still lack the social status of  a respectable 
adult. Of  course, ideas about ‘respectable 
work’ can be expected to change over time. 
White (2019, p.15) underlines the importance 
of  the relational dimension of  youth aspirations: 
‘We cannot fully understand what young 
people want for themselves without under-
standing what they want for their families and 
communities.’
Langevang (2008, p.2044) examines per-
spectives on social adulthood among young 
Ghanaians and finds that in their view, youth is 
about ‘becoming somebody’ by maturing socially 
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and economically, in order to get married and 
have a family. She also finds that young people 
adhere to notions of  neat transitions from edu-
cation to a formal job, even when these are 
highly unlikely. Many studies find that youth 
from poor and rural backgrounds aspire to for-
mal employment in white- or blue-collar jobs 
(OECD, 2017; Yeboah et al., 2017; Elias et al., 
2018). On the other hand, it is recognized that 
transitions experienced by most young people 
are fluid and complex, and these people often 
find themselves in multiple roles and transitions 
at the same time, moving in and out of  work 
and education (Langevang, 2008; Locke and te 
Lintelo, 2012; Nilsson, 2019).
Numerous scholars, including Honwana 
herself, argue that neoliberalism has contrib-
uted to structural conditions in which young 
people find it hard to achieve their aspirations 
(Ansell, 2014; Bessant et al., 2017; Sukarieh 
and Tannock, 2018). For example, Honwana 
states:
The structural adjustment policies promoted by 
The World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund in Africa failed to promote 
economic growth and job creation; […]. While it 
is true that the quality of  the educational system 
needs to be strengthened and should 
complement labour-market needs, the key issue 
is the lack of  enough jobs.
(Honwana, 2012, p.58)
While Honwana repeatedly refers to structural 
adjustment programmes of  the past, other 
scholars have argued that neoliberal policies 
continue to inhibit job-rich economic growth, as 
such policies tend to stimulate profit generation 
over job creation (Bessant et al., 2017; Sukarieh 
and Tannock, 2018). Mueller et al. (2019, p.10) 
conclude that: ‘Africa does not necessarily face a 
youth challenge, but rather the broader chal-
lenge of  promoting inclusive growth and decent 
employment in today’s competitive global econ-
omy’ (see also Betcherman and Khan, 2018; Fox 
et al., 2020; Sumberg et al., 2020). Presenting a 
broader critique of  the debate on work, Ferguson 
and Li (2018) argue that because a majority of  
the world population is not in formal employ-
ment, a profound analytical ‘decentring’ of  
waged and salaried employment as the pre-
sumed norm is required. Policies focused on youth 
employment have, however, not focused on ad-
dressing these structural conditions (Sumberg 
et al., 2020). Instead, interventions have priori-
tized training and skill development, and entre-
preneurship, which keep youth ‘busy’ without 
creating new jobs (see also Fox and Kaul, 2017). 
A narrow conceptualization of  waithood as 
‘youth in waiting’ perpetuates the idea that 
interventions need to keep youth occupied, 
without altering the adverse structural condi-
tions in which the chances of  finding meaning-
ful employment are very low, especially in rural 
areas.
Africa’s rural population is expanding des-
pite ongoing urbanization, and so is the rural 
workforce (Losch, 2016; Mueller et al., 2019). 
Agriculture, and particularly small-scale farm-
ing, is and will remain the most important 
source of  adult and youth employment, cur-
rently accounting for 44% of  all employment in 
Africa (Filmer and Fox, 2014, p.29; ILO, 2017a). 
For rural youth, structural conditions like ger-
ontocracy and patriarchy have been highlighted 
for their negative impacts on opportunities, for 
instance when land access is hampered by the 
older generation (Richards, 2005; Amanor, 
2010; White, 2012; Andersson Djurfeldt et al., 
2019). It has also been noted that in some con-
texts, high population density resulting in pres-
sure on land, inhibits the farming activities of  
young people (see Chapter 4, this volume; White, 
2012). Further, their gendered positionality 
within the household influences how different 
young people engage in (family) farming, and 
the kinds of  opportunities made available them 
(Andersson Djurfeldt et al., 2019).
Agency, rural livelihoods and social 
markers of adulthood
What is problematic about the concept of  wait-
hood is the very word itself: it implies ‘waiting’ in 
the sense of  inactivity. This is contradicted by 
numerous studies that show young people en-
gaging in multiple economic activities, often 
simultaneously. The real ‘waiting’ may be for so-
cial recognition and respect, but in this sense, 
waiting is inseparable from ‘growing up’. In-
deed, Honwana (2012) herself  does not suggest 
at any point that young people are doing noth-
ing. The third chapter of  The Time of  Youth, ‘Get-
ting by’, explores the wide range of  activities in 
which they are involved, most of  which are in 
144 M. Oosterom 
the informal economy. She suggests that this 
demonstrates that young people are not giving 
up on their aspirations: ‘… [they] resourcefully 
take action in pursuit of  a livelihood’ (Honwana, 
2012, p.61). It has been argued that aside 
from any direct financial reward, young peo-
ple’s social and economic actions allow them to 
make claims on family and other resources 
(Ferguson, 2015). Unfortunately, the distinc-
tion between waithood and inaction has been 
largely overlooked, and most policy and public 
discourse has appropriated the term in ways 
that suggests all youth are both inactive and 
stuck (ILO, 2017b).
Especially for urban youth, studies have 
demonstrated how they are getting by, while at 
the same time clearly conveying their feelings of  
disillusionment and frustration, and the sense 
that they want more out of  life (Fuh, 2012). For 
young people living in rural areas, it is important 
to understand the meaning and sentiments asso-
ciated with farming and other rural economic 
activities; and what kinds of  social and economic 
outcomes they hope for. Sommers (2012) finds 
that young men in rural Rwanda are unable to 
attain the idealized marker of  social adulthood: 
constructing a home to which they can bring a 
wife. Note that here, it is the lack of  land on 
which to construct a house that is the problem, 
not a lack of  paid work. Both the real and ex-
pected outcomes will be influenced by social rela-
tionships and will be context specific (Sumberg et 
al., 2012). The conditions young people find 
themselves in influence their aspirations, which 
may, over time, be adjusted to align with what is 
feasible (Leavy and Hossain, 2014). This includes 
the opportunities and social expectations that 
come with their gendered position within the 
household and community (Andersson Djurfeldt 
et al., 2019). While a common assumption is that 
young people are not interested in farming, exist-
ing studies highlight that many young people 
would farm if  working conditions were better 
and financial returns were higher (White, 2012; 
Leavy and Hossain, 2014; Sumberg et al., 2017; 
Elias et al., 2018, p.90; White, 2019), or they al-
ready combine farming with other activities (see 
Chapter 3, this volume; Yeboah et al., 2020). For 
rural youth in Ethiopia, Tadele and Gella (2012) 
find that the desirability of  farming depends on a 
host of  factors including whether someone is still 
in school or not, gender, age and level of  formal 
education. Staying in Ethiopia, Bezu and Holden 
(2014) find that those young people whose par-
ents have land are more likely to plan for a future 
in agriculture.
While young women and men in rural 
areas may have difficulty realizing their eco-
nomic independence, many are attaining other 
markers that are part of  the transition to adult-
hood: cohabiting, starting families, taking care 
of  relatives, and assuming other responsibilities 
(Berckmoes and White, 2014). None the less, 
formalizing a marriage appears to be a general 
aspiration among young people because it gen-
erates social standing and respect (Berckmoes 
and White, 2014; Reynolds-Whyte and Acio, 
2017). For young women, cohabiting might 
allow escape from a challenging home or family 
situation, but new vulnerabilities may arise if  
the relationship breaks down, especially if  children 
are involved. While returning to the parental 
home may be an option for some, social institu-
tions to support children of  separated parents 
are generally lacking or inadequate (Berckmoes 
and White, 2014; Hopwood, 2015; Reynolds- 
Whyte and Acio, 2017).
Studies that have used the concept of  wait-
hood have emphasized young people’s economic 
activities and social status (Langevang, 2008), 
while civic–political activities have received less 
attention. However, one important dimension of  
the transition to adulthood is becoming an active 
citizen, especially when the meaning of  citizen-
ship is extended beyond voting, to a much wider 
range of  engagements in public life and decision 
making (Wood, 2014). It is clear that young 
people across Africa make their voices heard 
(Resnick, 2019). Honwana (2012) herself  dedi-
cates a full chapter to youth politics, focusing es-
pecially on urban protests, where young people 
appeared to be in the vanguard. Other studies 
have shown young people’s active political en-
gagement at the micro level. For example, Jeffrey 
and Dyson (2014, 2016) use the concept of  ‘pre-
figurative politics’ to explain the actions of  edu-
cated, unemployed and underemployed young 
males in India, who negotiate with local state au-
thorities to advance the interests of  their com-
munities. In a study of  student politics in India, 
Jeffrey and Young (2012) conclude that ‘waiting’ 
does not imply passiveness, as students belong-
ing to different castes remain politically active 
while having no economic prospects.
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Studies of  youth citizenship in rural set-
tings are limited, but existing evidence does sug-
gest similarities to what has been observed in 
urban areas. Often, the focus is on civic activities 
that help improve the welfare of  the community 
and strengthen local networks. Turner (2015) 
shows how young people in Supingstad, in 
South Africa’s north-west province, actively ne-
gotiate the powers and authority of  chiefs and 
mobilize against corruption. Korzenevica (2016) 
has documented how Nepalese youth periodic-
ally come home to take over the farm work, so 
that their parents can participate in local polit-
ical meetings. As returning home reflects a con-
scious decision about the importance of  public 
life, she argues it must be considered an act of  
citizenship.
What is revealed from the existing litera-
ture, is that discussions of  waithood have been 
dominated by a focus on narrowly defined eco-
nomic activities, without properly connecting 
them to social and civic–political lives. Honwana 
herself  has emphasized young people’s agency 
in making a life when she discusses their polit-
ical and social actions, and claims to social sta-
tus and citizenship. However, her emphasis on 
young people’s inability to enter the labour mar-
ket unduly limits the understanding of  the mul-
tiple pathways that young people use to make 
claims on society in order to enhance their social 
status. This is not to underestimate the import-
ance of  work in many young people’s lives, but 
the almost exclusive focus on work means other 
actions and claims to social recognition are over-
looked or undervalued.
The remainder of  this chapter takes a closer 
look at these other dimensions of  young people’s 
lives. The sections that follow present the findings 
of  life history interviews with young women 
and men in rural areas of  Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Nigeria. Field work was conducted in four different 
sites in each country (see Chapter 2, this volume). 
All interviews focused on the factors that led to 
the economic and other activities the interview-
ees were engaging in at the time of  research in 
2018 and early 2019. They were also asked 
about their imagined futures, and their life ex-
pectations. The interviews emphasized the role 
of  family and relatives, as well as education and 
mobility. The findings show that young women 
and men are making claims to respect and social 
recognition in various ways, with engagement in 
economic activity being only one. Starting a family, 
taking care of  elders and relatives, continuing in 
education, and being active in public life are also 
important avenues for gaining respect and status.
Too Busy to Wait
Work
This section first addresses farming activities and 
subsequently other economic activities in which 
rural young women and men are engaged.
Farming is part of  the upbringing of  most 
young people in rural SSA. From an early age, 
both girls and boys help on the farm, along with 
other domestic and economic activities before 
and after school, during weekends and holidays, 
and sometimes instead of  going to school. The 
ways in which farming figures in imagined fu-
tures, depends on a number of  factors. For many, 
there is no other option but to farm, as there are 
few other opportunities. Other important factors 
are whether farming and non-farm activities 
generate enough income to build a house, eat, 
pay for education, and ‘progress in life’. Whether 
one can meet expectations in relation to social 
becoming – including the ability to pay for one’s 
own education or for the education of  one’s 
children – through farming and livestock rear-
ing is, for obvious reasons, related to questions 
of  access to and quality of  land and other 
resources, as well as access to markets.
In Ethiopia, there were differences between 
areas where agricultural activity was somewhat 
profitable and where it was not. In Wondo Genet, 
many young people were involved in producing 
and trading khat, on family land or through 
sharecropping. For many, especially if  they had 
relatively large plots, this generated sufficient in-
come to pay for their children’s education and/
or continue in education themselves. Those who 
were able to save money imagined themselves 
eventually building houses in town, while main-
taining their links to rural areas. In Kuyu wore-
da, on the other hand, all young people referred 
to the shortage of  land and the fact that much of  
the land was infertile: ‘The main problem in our 
area is lack of  land. Not having land is not hav-
ing life,’ said a 27-year-old woman. Land short-
ages and lack of  fertile land clearly affect how 
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young people imagine their prospects, given that 
opportunities for further study are limited. They 
rarely have enough good quality land through 
their families in this area, and sharecropping or 
other contractual arrangements are considered 
to be too disadvantageous. In fact, those who 
have no land or only limited land are longing for 
access to land. Narratives about urban migra-
tion and – for those who can afford it – migration 
to the Gulf  states, are more common in this area.
It is clear that agriculture is considered 
hard work, while the conditions in which it is 
done are associated with low status and poten-
tial harm to one’s health in the longer term. 
While many are proud when their harvests are 
good, they do not feel respected. In the Acholi re-
gion of  northern Uganda, the phrase ‘Atye ka 
yele’ [I am struggling] is used frequently and in 
various ways to describe rural lives: ‘Atye ka yele 
kede pur’ [I am struggling with farming], ‘Atye ka 
yele ki culu kwan pa lutino na’ [I am struggling to 
pay for education of  my children], ‘Atye ka yele 
ku biacara mamega’ [I am struggling with my 
business]. These phrases indicate the difficulties 
young people face, while they also show how 
hard they are trying. There is considerable un-
certainty about whether farming can generate 
sufficient food and income for even the most 
basic subsistence in this poor region.
Young women and men in Wondo Genet 
woreda in Ethiopia are hoping to ‘upgrade’ their 
agricultural activities by introducing new tech-
nology. One young man explained how he previ-
ously did manual labour, but because his income 
increased, he could buy equipment:
When you face a problem or have few choices, 
you do everything. I did manual labour as a last 
resort. Now I have changed it [I no longer do 
this] because it takes much energy and reduces 
one’s lifespan. Now, I pump water through a 
generator to support my farming.
With money earned by using a horse and cart to 
transport people’s goods, this same respondent 
funds his weekend college. He hopes to buy a 
motorcycle, with the hope that it will make 
everything he does less tiring.
In Nigeria, young women and men often 
say that they want to stop farming because the 
manual labour in the hot sun is too demanding, 
and even harmful. Others, however, talk of  their 
love for farming and how they take pride in what 
they are able to produce. This is especially so 
when farming offers prospects of  a respectable 
life, including producing enough to (eventually) 
marry and have a home. For example, one 
26-year-old male from Idi Amu, Nigeria, who is 
the only one in his family to have gone to univer-
sity, was farming while working as a teacher, 
and earning additional money as a photog-
rapher at parties. He said:
I love farming, I cannot drop it for anything.  
I also believe that an average Nigerian is a 
farmer. When Obasanjo was the President he 
was farming and even till now. To be sincere 
with myself, I would like to do more teaching 
and farming. The reason I want to do it more is 
that I’m envisaging of  becoming rich from the two.
Referring to both ‘average Nigerians’ and the 
President as farmers, he underlines the respect-
ability of  farming. While his parents and siblings 
also farm and do other things, he acknowledges 
that because of  his degree he was expected to 
provide relatively more food and money to the 
family. He wants to honour these expectations 
and be a responsible man. He lives on his own, 
but his fiancée often stays with him, and he pro-
vides for her: ‘It is my responsibility despite the 
fact that I have not even married her.’ The story 
of  this young man illustrates how he is crafting 
his identity as both a farmer and respectable 
member of  the community.
Also in Nigeria, young women and men are 
hoping agriculture will become more mechan-
ized. ‘I cannot leave the farm work no matter how 
rich I am, even if  I am extremely rich, I will go into 
mechanized farming,’ said one man (25 years 
old, Idi Amu). When given the opportunity, many 
indicate they would like to go and work in com-
mercial farming areas where more technology is 
used. Comparing his situation to the Ilorin area, 
where large-scale, mechanized farming is com-
mon, a young man from Oba Oke, says:
The youth in Ilorin are more exposed and aware of  
mechanization for production and this beautifies 
agriculture. To me, manual farming is a barrier, 
because agriculture is more interesting to practice 
using mechanization. Youth in Ilorin who are 
around 20 years of  age own 20 acres of  farmland.
(25-year-old male, Oba Oke, Nigeria)
The examples cited here demonstrate that the 
question of  whether youth do or do not want to 
farm is far too simplistic. More often than not, 
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farming is done under hard and challenging 
conditions. There is a strong sense that more 
technology would change this, and a clear desire 
for farming to be more respected. The future that 
young people imagine is one where farming al-
lows them to marry, raise a family, put their chil-
dren in good schools, and (for some) enable the 
construction of  a home ‘in town’. Many would 
want to remain involved in farming, but prefer-
ably supervising and managing farm labour ra-
ther than doing the work themselves.
In each of  the three countries, a small per-
centage of  the youth interviewed engage only in 
farming: the majority are engaged in multiple 
farming, off-farm and non-farm activities. Young 
people in each location list numerous activities, in-
cluding wage work and self-employment, ranging 
from low-paid activities such as charcoal burning 
and brewing, to more rewarding pursuits like 
trading and transport. As with farming, certain 
non-farm activities are seasonal and cannot be re-
lied upon for a secure and stable income. Oppor-
tunities for formal employment are rare and only a 
few of  the young people work as teachers or 
nurses in local schools and facilities.
The observation that most young people 
farm one way or another, and that many also en-
gage in one or more off-farm or non-farm in-
come-generating activities, suggests that youth 
engagement with the labour market is pervasive 
(for more on the microdynamics of  this engage-
ment, see Carreras et al., 2020). Yet, the returns 
from these activities are often low, and they offer 
no clear prospects for upward mobility. However, 
they do offer (sometimes long-term, sometimes 
temporary) opportunities for income gener-
ation, and might lead to activities that are better 
paid and of  higher status.
The opportunities for engaging in off-farm 
and non-farm activities are gendered. In all four 
sites in Uganda activities such as cooking in can-
teens, brewing and market trading are con-
sidered more appropriate for women, while 
mechanics roles are considered more appropri-
ate for men. In fact, the findings for Uganda 
showed that young women have fewer options 
when it comes to non-farm activities, as some 
roles are considered exclusive to young men. 
Findings suggested a kind of  hierarchy in eco-
nomic activities in terms of  the social standing 
they could generate. As demonstrated for farm-
ing, young women and men tend to have clear 
ideas about non-farm activities, and to what ex-
tent these activities are ‘decent’ and what makes 
them respectable. Thus, working in a bar at 
night serving male customers, was ‘indecent’ for 
women in Uganda, but that did not necessarily 
stop them. For young men in Nigeria, engaging 
in trade enhanced their opportunities for mobil-
ity, which they associated with greater auton-
omy. However, even if  the activity generated a 
substantial income, like in the case of  certain 
motorcycle taxi riders, young men felt frowned 
upon by (adult) family members as this kind of  
work was not considered a proper ‘adult’ job and 
was not given much respect. Young women in 
both Nigeria and Uganda who engaged in tailor-
ing reported they preferred the cleanliness of  
their work, as opposed to ‘dirty farm work’, and 
also the increased social standing associated 
with providing a service that required ‘profes-
sional’ interactions with customers.
While many young people are involved in 
more than one economic activity, we encoun-
tered numerous young people who blame the 
youth themselves for any lack of  progress in 
their lives. For example, a young man from 
Nigeria with a BA degree said:
It is very sad that young people are facing 
challenges today but part of  our problem is 
laziness, as a result of  what is happening in the 
society; in this era there is no youth that wants 
to do hard jobs when there are cunning ways to 
make quick money. Let us speak the truth, 
young people do not want to work but want to 
make big money by means of  exploitation and 
other bad means.
(26-year-old male, Idi Amu, Nigeria)
Thus, the notion of  ‘lazy youth’ is not just a per-
ception that adults have of  youth, but it also cir-
culates among the young people themselves. 
Better-off  and better educated youth may be re-
luctant to acknowledge the structural barriers 
that make it harder for their impoverished or 
otherwise disadvantaged peers to progress. 
A struggle for recognition and respect is central 
to relationships across socio-economic classes, 
and not limited to youth.
Marriage and family life
While many adults opined that young people 
were no longer respecting certain ‘traditional’ 
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values, it was clear from our research that most 
youth are working hard to earn respect and 
meet society’s expectation of  them. In all three 
countries, taking care of  elders, especially par-
ents, is important for young people. An Ethiop-
ian woman from a relatively better-off  family, 
which was supporting her in university from in-
come generated by growing khat, said:
[After university] I want to live with my family 
for some time because they are suffering with 
me at the present. I would like to dedicate 80% 
of  my income to my parents. After that, I would 
pray to have a good husband. At that time, out 
of  my salary, I would invest 70% in my own 
family and the remaining in my parents. I would 
never stop supporting my family.
(18-year-old female, Wondo Genet, Ethiopia)
Similarly, many young Nigerians said how im-
portant it was to ‘be a blessing to’ and to ‘hon-
our’ their parents. The possibility of  moving 
elsewhere in search of  work involved consider-
ation of  what it would mean for parents and 
other family members.
Supporting the family extends beyond 
parents and siblings. In the Acholi region of  
northern Uganda, which was affected by over 
20 years of  armed conflict, many young people, 
often while still very young themselves, were 
responsible for the upbringing of  younger sib-
lings and the children of  relatives. As guard-
ians they show real commitment in paying for 
the schooling of  their own and foster children, 
which in this context can mean a significant 
sum of  money despite the promise of  Universal 
Primary Education that was supposed to cut 
the costs of  primary education (Levine, 2016). 
Even if  a foster child still has a parent, in many 
cases, their young carers report that they do 
not receive any kind of  support from them. 
How heavy the responsibilities can become is il-
lustrated by a 21-year-old female in Awach 
who has three children with her husband (6, 5 
and 2 years old). Four years ago, they started 
caring for two of  her late sister’s children (12 
and 8 years old), who had been abandoned by 
their father. Then 2 years ago, they also took in 
her brother’s children (6 and 3 years old), after 
he moved to Kampala to look for work. He 
stopped sending money after some time and no 
longer even calls. All of  the foster children are 
of  school age and the income the family gener-
ate through farming and the bit of  tailoring 
work the woman does is insufficient to cover 
the tuition and healthcare costs for everyone.
While many young people start families as 
cohabiting couples, formalizing a marriage re-
mains something to which most youth aspire. 
However, it was also clear that many think very 
carefully about what is needed before getting 
married. Considerations may be tactical or stra-
tegic, and connected to other opportunities, or 
events. For example, an Igbo woman in Igbari-
am Eziafor, Nigeria, said she decided to marry 
when she was 23 years old, because she was the 
first born and wanted to help her younger sib-
lings through school. She calculated that this 
would be possible because of  the new economic 
activities that marriage was expected to open up. 
A young Nigerian man explained that he wanted 
to have a stable income before marrying:
I have a cousin in Abuja who got married at the 
age of  27 and his income could not feed his wife, 
[…] she visited her parents for food and other 
things so her family could eat. [Therefore] 
marriage is not in my programme presently; 
such a situation [as my cousin’s] would be a 
shame to me. As long as I cannot afford to feed 
additional people, I would not try marriage.
(25-year-old male, Oba Oke, Nigeria)
In his view, marriage and economic progress 
need to go together, and he is not frustrated 
about not having yet married. At the same time, 
entering into marriage is not necessarily the re-
sult of  being ‘ready’. One Ethiopian woman said 
her mother married her off  after the death of  her 
father, and a young man explained that he de-
cided to marry after his father died as he needed 
to maintain the labour capacity of  the house-
hold. Also in Ethiopia, Wondo Genet, a 42-year-
old woman spoke of  how her father had tried to 
shield her from ‘marriage through abduction’ – 
when a young man ‘steals’ a young woman 
away from her family – by twice relocating her. 
He eventually decided to marry her off  so he 
could at least choose her spouse.
Yet even in cases of  marriage through 
abduction, some negotiation on the part of  
young women can be observed. For instance, a 
20-year-old woman in rural Wondo Genet, Ethi-
opia, explained how she was abducted by her 
current husband when they were both in their 
mid-teens. Her father sued the man in court, 
saying it caused her to drop out of  school, but 
she was adamant that the reason she stopped 
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school in Grade 5 was her parent’s lack of  finan-
cial support:
My husband was not punished; we reached 
reconciliation through elderly persons in the 
area. I just said ‘I am now married and I cannot 
reverse it’. Since he said that he would support 
my education I did not say no to the marriage.
Since the husband had some barbering skills, 
both their parents supported the couple to start 
a barbershop. The husband then paid for the 
woman’s barber training in the nearest large 
town. They run the barbershop together and 
managed to get involved in khat production 
through sharecropping using hired labour, 
which then enabled them to buy mobile phones 
in the city and resell them in their barber shop. 
She elaborates:
By saving money from what we are getting now, 
we plan to buy land and build our own house, we 
think, in Hawasa town. If  that is not possible, we 
might build it in Basha town. We want to expand 
all activities including the sale of  mobile phones. 
He [her husband] says that he would continue his 
education, but he is more interested in his work. 
He wants to educate me and our child.
(20-year-old female, Wondo Genet, Ethiopia)
Young women and men describe how education 
is more likely to be a factor to consider in their 
decisions about marriage than it was for their 
parents’ generation. In the words of  a Nigerian 
woman:
When my parents were young, they were under 
their parents. Education was not much, if  you 
manage to finish Grade 6, you had tried and you 
could stop there. But now, we want to further 
our education, we want to do this and that.
(21-year-old female, Igbariam Eziafor, Nigeria)
A number of  young women and men in Ethi-
opia who had relatively better incomes, for ex-
ample two men from Wondo Genet, one 26 and 
the other 28 years old, reported wanting to 
postpone marriage and family life in order to 
pursue their education. A 28-year-old Nigerian 
man explained how he resisted pressure to get 
married even though his parents felt he already 
had sufficient income. He first wanted to pur-
sue more education and expand his tailoring 
business and his farming. Across all research 
sites, young people valued education and linked 
attaining more education to enhanced social 
standing (see Chapter 7, this volume). Even if  it 
did not lead to a ‘proper’ job, education helped 
them to gain respect.
The many examples of  how young women 
negotiate marriage, other aspirations and social 
status show the gendered nature of  the transi-
tion to adulthood. Almost all married women 
interviewed had children and were no longer 
‘youth’ in socio-cultural terms, while they were 
still considered so in terms of  chronological age. 
If  they had married in their early teens, they had 
transitioned directly from childhood to adult-
hood. Overall, it was clear that young women 
have less influence than their male counterparts 
over when they marry, although the examples 
given above illustrate how some can neverthe-
less negotiate educational opportunities follow-
ing marriage. In Nigeria, some young men who 
were interviewed were renting a room in town 
together while engaged in petty trading and run-
ning small-scale businesses. While this offered 
an ‘in-between’ way of  obtaining relative auton-
omy, it was clear they too desired formal mar-
riage and their own homes. Young unmarried 
females generally had less room for manoeuvre 
to live independently from their families, except 
for moving away to pursue education. Parents 
preferred that their daughters live with older sis-
ters or other relatives if  they worked away from 
home.
While the vast majority of  young women 
interviewed in all sites aspire to have a better in-
come, either through farming or other activities, 
for them work is not their sole avenue to adult-
hood. Many feel they will reach adulthood once 
they are married and bear children. In other 
words, if  they were ‘waiting’, it was more about 
waiting for marriage and/or childbirth, irre-
spective of  the work they were doing. For men on 
the other hand, being an adequate provider was 
more closely connected to earning a good 
income and having respectable work. Their 
‘waiting’ was about work that was sufficiently 
remunerative and respectable.
In Nigeria, several women reported that 
they had some degree of  autonomy over their 
earnings, whether they were married or not, 
and this shaped their ideas about future possibil-
ities for education and work. A single, 25-year-old 
Yoruba woman from Idi Amu was adamant: 
‘I will definitely be a supportive wife, but my 
husband will not be controlling my money.’ In the 
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same site, a married, 25-year-old woman with 
two children declared she controlled the earn-
ings from her farming and gari processing:
Though he [her husband] doesn’t manage my 
money nor have power over my money, it is me 
who willingly supports him. And one thing I do 
is that before I use my money for anything, my 
husband must know about it.
Another 30-year-old female in Igbariam Eziafor, 
Nigeria, reported that at the age of  29 she suc-
cessfully negotiated with her husband to start a 
National Certificate of  Education (NCE) course.
Active citizenship
Our government, both state and federal, are not 
concerned about the welfare of  the youth, and 
that is why you still find very old men and 
women ruling in government.
(23-year-old male, Igbariam Eziafor, Nigeria)
In many rural areas, young people are far away 
from centres of  power, and even from ‘local’ au-
thorities, and opportunities for interactions with 
state actors are limited. This does not mean 
young women and men are unaware of  govern-
ance issues in their countries. In some places, 
rural youth are acutely aware of  disparities and 
‘hierarchies in citizenship’ that limit the oppor-
tunities available to them. This was observed in 
northern Uganda, where involvement of  the na-
tional army in the region’s armed conflict was 
seen as a deliberate attempt to undermine Acholi 
identity, as this ethnic group is linked with the 
political opposition. In Nigeria, citizenship sta-
tus was reported as a factor that shaped oppor-
tunities. In Osun State for instance, some young 
people felt that being labelled as ‘indigenous’ or 
‘settler’i affected their farming opportunities, as 
it is easier for indigenes to access land. For in-
stance, a young male indigene said:
I have more opportunities as an indigene of  this 
community than immigrants. We are the ones 
assisting them [incoming migrants]. Some 
immigrants have plans before migrating to this 
place, and we do not see most of  them as farm 
labourers, except those that are good at 
harvesting palm kernels. Any other farming 
activities like cultivating and harvesting arable 
crops are mostly carried out by the indigenes of  
this community. Also, some of  them are 
commercial transporters. We love most ethnic 
groups and we treat them like indigenes.
(22-year-old male, Oba Oke, Nigeria)
Young settlers recounted how only forest land is 
made available to them, which takes time and 
money to clear before it can be cultivated. 
A 27-year-old man in Oba Oke reported that be-
cause of  this, settler youth were ‘discouraged’, 
and he himself  wanted to move to Benue State 
where he thought commercial farming would be 
both possible and profitable.
In Ethiopia, field research was conducted 
within a year of  Abiy Ahmed becoming Prime 
Minister in April 2018, which marked a new era 
in Ethiopian politics. While some young people 
were unaware of  any changes except in the lead-
ership, many commented that the current situ-
ation was ‘more free’ and they could now speak 
more openly about political issues. They ex-
pressed hope that the country would now be 
peaceful and that the economic situation would 
improve. Among their expectations of  the new 
government were improvement in services such 
as health and education, and job creation. Yet al-
ready within a year of  the new administration 
being in place, frustrations were expressed about 
the lack of  visible change in rural areas. In the 
words of  one young woman:
There isn’t any change; nothing has changed in 
our life so far. We have not seen any change in 
the market under the ganda administration. […]  
I want a better life. What else do we want? No, it 
[the administration] does not bring us land; it 
does not bring us salary. [...] It is true that for 
those who are educated, their salary may be 
raised. [...] But […] land is already held by 
people; from whom will the government take 
[land] and to give it to those who do not have it?’
(27-year-old female, Kuyu, Ethiopia)
A 30-year-old young man in Kuyu had com-
pleted Grade 9 and stopped because, according 
to him, members of  the security forces made it 
difficult for students who were accused or sus-
pected of  political activism. He had lived in three 
different towns outside his own region to pursue 
paid work opportunities and engage in politics. 
For example, he had mobilized with others to 
protest against the government before Abiy 
Ahmed became Prime Minister, and he lost 
many friends who the government regarded 
as ‘dissidents’. He had been imprisoned for 
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3 months for his activism, and during this time 
he started writing appeal applications for him-
self  and others. He also worked to improve his 
writing skills. At the time of  this research in 
2018–2019 he was trying to settle down and 
take care of  his three children by running a 
‘drinking house’ offering drinks produced by his 
wife. He also occasionally earned money as a wage 
labourer at construction sites and had just 
started sharecropping. Meanwhile, he was 
earning some money for ‘writing charges’ for 
local court cases, motivated by his earlier 
human rights work: ‘I serve my community 
through my writing skills while my community 
serves me by giving me an income.’ Before the 
change in government, he challenged corrup-
tion in the kebele, for instance in its allocation of  
aid, land and support for farming, claiming he 
was often excluded from support as a result. 
Hoping Abiy Ahmed’s government would lead 
to positive changes, he said:
I expect much from this government. I hope this 
government will work for the people fairly, 
contrary to the previous government which 
used to trick people in many ways. I do not 
expect this government to provide me with food, 
but rather to facilitate conditions in which I can 
work, and what to use to work. Previously, I was 
excluded from political participation, but now  
I am selected as a committee member in the 
kebele for active political participation.
(30-year-old male, Kuyu, Ethiopia)
With political activity being more concentrated 
in urban areas, few of  our respondents were ac-
tively engaged in formal politics. There are also 
few channels through which to influence what 
matters in their lives, and if  they do exist, they 
are dominated by the older generations. The in-
stitutions that govern access to land provide a 
powerful example, and in northern Uganda they 
are a real concern. Here, the first port of  call for 
settling land disputes is customary leaders and 
elders, who provide few opportunities for young 
people (or adult women) to have a say. In turn, 
young people accuse them of  corruption and 
nepotism. They spoke of  how some land disputes 
are ‘inherited’ from their parents and other clan 
members, and reported that they are victims of  
threats, violence and theft as a result. These dis-
putes sometimes have implications beyond the 
ability to access land. One young man in Awach 
told us how he was taken out of  secondary 
school in town because his family wanted him to 
farm, specifically to prevent the land being 
claimed by another clan. While rural, more 
marginalized populations in general are far re-
moved from loci of  decision making, and poorly 
represented, for young people an additional 
hurdle is that their age further limits their op-
portunities to take part. This challenge is more 
profound for young women. There was a clear 
sense among some that they might never be in a 
position of  influence. Besides the few who aspire 
to become ‘politicians’, the feeling is that rural 
people overall do not enjoy full and substantive 
citizenship.
Conclusions: Claim Making  
and Waithood Negotiation
Qualitative research from twelve sites across three 
countries in SSA demonstrate that waithood is 
not about waiting or lack of  engagement with the 
labour market, but rather about hard work, nego-
tiation and claim making. Young people actively 
negotiate different aspects of  their lives, from vari-
ous educational and work opportunities to mar-
riage and other social relationships, social norms 
and expectations. Indeed, they are all looking for 
(better) economic opportunities that can increase 
their earnings. Yet they are also searching for 
more social recognition and respect for whatever 
they are doing, and actively seek to enhance their 
social standing by exercising agency in non-work 
domains, such as education, marriage and care 
of  relatives.
When research directly engages with rural 
young people and their perspectives on work, it 
shows many do not reject rural livelihoods, but 
rather want opportunities that enhance the con-
ditions in which farming and other rural work is 
carried out. It also shows that some negotiate 
their parents’ expectations about when they 
should marry, which challenges the ‘work in 
order to marry’ understanding that is so central 
to the waithood argument.
It must be reiterated that Honwana’s discus-
sion of  waithood is more nuanced than the claim 
that all youth are stuck: she acknowledges and 
elaborates the multiple economic and civic–political 
activities in which young people are involved. 
Moreover, she points at the structural conditions 
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that adversely affect the opportunities available 
to young people. However, the emphasis on 
young people’s inability to enter the labour mar-
ket and the way the concept of  waithood has 
been appropriated by policy actors has produced 
a narrative on youth and work that is far too 
narrow and does not reflect the realities of  rural 
SSA. Policy approaches continue to be domin-
ated by skill building and entrepreneurship 
programmes that cannot change the adverse 
structural conditions in which rural young people 
find themselves.
Note
i In Nigeria the term ‘indigene’ is used to refer to individuals who are considered to be the ‘first’ or indigen-
ous inhabitants of a particular place, while ‘settlers’ migrated into the area at a later point in time. In many 
states of Nigeria, these labels are contested. The Constitution of Nigeria distinguishes between settler and 
indigene groups, though ambiguities remain and have resulted in contestations over rights, dependent 
upon the settler and indigene status, thereby leading to conflict (see Akanji, 2011).
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Introduction
This chapter explores the futures that rural 
young people imagine for themselves, and how 
they relate to both their current engagement 
with the rural economy, and the narrative that 
suggests a widely held desire to abandon agricul-
ture and rural areas. Commenting on this narra-
tive, White (2012) suggested that any reluctance 
among young people was likely due to the un-
attractiveness of  the agricultural sector in its 
‘current state’. He suggested various reasons 
why young Africans may be turning their backs 
on agriculture, including: ‘deskilling’ and the 
low status of  farming and rural life; poor rural 
infrastructure and lack of  government invest-
ment in the sector; and the (increasing) difficulty 
young people have in accessing land. Since this 
publication, other authors have contributed fur-
ther ideas – and some data – as to whether and 
why young people may be turning away from 
agriculture and rurality (see also Chapter 3, this 
volume).
In addition to hard work, low status, limited 
returns and lack of  land, some authors have 
pointed to higher level concerns. For example, 
Moore (2015) reports that young people may be 
concerned that farming offers only limited op-
portunity to contribute to their community or 
country. This is in line with findings by Yeboah 
et al. (2017), that secondary students in Ghana 
had a strong ‘social ethos’, with jobs being more 
desirable if  through them young people could 
‘make the world a better place’. For Gastineau 
and Golaz (2016), young people in Africa find 
rural areas have little appeal. They report that 
there is a shift or a discrepancy between gener-
ations, with young people being more educated, 
more mobile, and more open to the world (e.g. 
through the propagation of  information and 
communications technologies, ICTs), and aspir-
ing to a different type of  life than that of  their 
parents. This links to Leavy and Hossain’s 
(2014) notion of  a ‘generational break’ in aspir-
ations, largely due to the difference in educa-
tional levels.
On the other hand, research over the past 
decade has provided a somewhat more nuanced 
picture of  youth aspirations, where young 
people, depending on the context, may have a 
more neutral, or even quite positive view of  agri-
culture and rural life. For example, in Burundi, a 
country where 95% of  the rural population is 
involved in agriculture, farming is still seen as 
desirable way of  life, and as one of  the few realis-
tic livelihood options (Berckmoes and White, 
2014). Despite the challenge of  ever decreasing 
plot sizes, young people still aspire to farming 
futures, but hopefully under better conditions. 
In Zambia, young people carefully considered the 
pros and cons of  agriculture and rural life, and 
still wished to engage in agriculture, especially if  
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they could use animals for draught power, use 
more fertilizer and have access to electricity 
(Daum, 2019). Also working in Zambia, An-
dersson Djurfeldt et al. (2019) report that rural 
youth generally want to farm, particularly in a 
more modern and professional manner based on 
technical knowledge and skills. Kristensen and 
Birch-Thomsen (2013) report similar condi-
tional aspirations. However, making this a real-
ity hinges on young people’s ability to access 
land; where this is not possible, young women 
and men face difficulties in gaining independ-
ence, and so seek off-farm opportunities. In a 
sense, these findings link to a recent analysis of  
data from the School-to-Work-Transition Sur-
veys (SWTS) of  the International Labour Organ-
ization (ILO), which included students (aged 
15–29) from 11 African countries (OECD, 
2017). The main takeaway from this study is 
that the students’ views about their futures are 
linked to their social standing in society: less-
well educated young men generally aspire to 
lower skilled jobs while those with more educa-
tion aspire to more highly skilled jobs. It is not-
able that younger students also generally aspire 
to high-level jobs. Finally, Sumberg et al. (2017) 
used Q Methodology to explore two questions 
with rural secondary students in Ghana: ‘What 
explains young people’s attitude toward farm-
ing?’ and ‘What should be done about young 
people and farming?’ Different perspectives are 
evident, focusing variously on the young people 
themselves and their desire for modern jobs; so-
ciety’s lack of  respect for farmers; the need to 
modernize farming; and the lack of  services and 
facilities in rural areas. The key conclusion of  
this study is that across both genders, young 
people have a largely negative attitude toward 
farming; but that this negativity is rooted in 
quite different perceptions and understandings. 
Some of  these perspectives may be amenable to 
interventions such as awareness raising and 
training, others not. This suggests the need for a 
more targeted approach to policy and pro-
grammes that seek to address youth employ-
ment through the agricultural sector.
In this chapter, we seek to bring greater 
understanding of  young rural Africans’ per-
spectives on their futures. We draw on two com-
plementary sources of  data. The first is a study 
carried out under the Agricultural Policy Re-
search in Africa (APRA) programmei in three 
sites (one each in Ghana, Zimbabwe and Tanza-
nia) where commercialized agriculture is rela-
tively well developed (Yeboah et al., 2020). The 
second is the work funded by the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in 16 
sites across Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Côte 
d’Ivoire (see Chapter 2, this volume). Both stud-
ies focused on current engagement with the 
rural economy, how young people imagined 
their futures, and what they think might stop 
them from realizing the futures they imagine for 
themselves. We are particularly interested in 
whether young women’s and men’s imagined 
futures align with the orthodoxy suggesting that 
young people are not interested in agriculture 
and rural life. Beyond imagined future economic 
activities, including farm and non-farm, we ex-
plore their imaginings in relation education and 
migration. Rather than using the term ‘aspir-
ations’, which can imply a desire for the future 
that is not necessarily situated within a social 
context, in the remainder of  this chapter we use 
the concept ‘imagined futures’. Essentially, in 
various ways, young people were asked: ‘How do 
you imagine your future’?
The chapter is structured as follows. The 
next section provides a more detailed explor-
ation of  the notion of  imagined futures. Methods 
are then discussed, followed by findings. The last 
section is a discussion and conclusion including 
key implications for policy and research.
Framing Young People’s Imagined 
Futures
Much has been written about the aspirations of  
young people in SSA (Leavy and Smith, 2010; 
Anyidoho et al., 2012; Locke and te Lintelo, 2012; 
Petesch and Rodríguez Caillava, 2012; Bernard 
and Seyoum Taffesse, 2014; Kosec et al., 2014; 
Leavy and Hossain, 2014; Favara, 2017; Mausch 
et al., 2018; Verkaart et al., 2018). The focus on 
aspirations undoubtedly captures some aspects of  
young people’s dreams, musings and hopes about 
their future. However, the concept of  aspirations 
has also been critiqued for being vague, lacking 
conceptual precision, and failing ‘to draw a com-
pelling link between future goals or outcomes and 
young people’s agentive efforts to work towards 
them’ (Hardgrove et al., 2015, p.163).
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The focus on aspirations, and especially the 
suggestion of  a ‘poverty of  aspiration’ has also 
been critiqued as putting the blame on young 
people and ignoring or downplaying structural 
constraints (McKendrick, 2017; White, 2019). 
Work that has explored the possibility of  affect-
ing aspirations through policy (Kosec et al., 
2014) also reflects a similar instrumental ap-
proach meant to address individuals’ aspiration 
deficits.
It has been argued that the notions of  im-
agined futures and imagined selves offer valu-
able alternatives to aspirations (Markus and 
Nurius, 1986; Hardgrove et al., 2015). As a very 
simple example, imagine two female students in 
a rural secondary school. The first is asked what 
she aspires to, and she responds that she wants 
to be a lawyer, end of  story. The second is asked 
how she imagines her future, and she responds 
that she imagines herself  as a lawyer, working 
alongside her auntie, who is herself  a successful 
lawyer and who has offered to help her to enter 
the profession. Importantly, rather than the 
more individualized concepts of  ‘aspirations’ 
and ‘motivation’, imagined futures are typically 
theorized in a relational way that understands 
youth agency and intentionality to be socially lo-
cated, and to be shaped both by past experiences 
and contemporary circumstances. In other 
words, such imagined futures are themselves the 
products of  young people’s ‘perceived, struc-
tured positions in society’ (Hardgrove et al., 
2015, p.164).
Apart from illuminating the identity posi-
tions that youth would like to embrace as they 
grow older and the social structures that frame 
these, youth narratives about their imagined fu-
tures also provide considerable insights into ‘the 
internalized socio-cultural values’ that young 
people hold (Hardgrove et al., 2015, p.164). In 
Bourdieusian terms, this implies that a young 
person’s articulation of  an imagined future re-
flects the value systems that permeate a particu-
lar field and provides insights both to the habitus 
of  the individual – i.e. the social process through 
which individuals become socialized (Bourdieu, 
1984) – and the different capitals (economic, 
cultural, social and symbolic) that are accorded 
significance within their particular context 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). As a ‘struc-
ture of  preference’, an imagined future can be 
considered a product of  the ‘individual collective 
history of  agents’ and their positioning within a 
particular field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, 
p.123). In other words, an imagined future tran-
scends a naïve separation of  structure and 
agency, which is often implicit in the discussion 
of  aspirations.
From these perspectives, questions about 
how realistic or realizable an imagined future 
might be, or about the difference between aspir-
ations and expectations, are not particularly 
relevant. Such questions are indicative of  the 
tendency in youth studies to treat social construc-
tions, that should be understood in relational 
terms, in overly realist or substantialist ways (Bes-
sant et al., 2020). As Ball et al. (1999) note, an 
imagined future can be ‘relatively clear, relatively 
stable and relatively possible’ or ‘vague, relatively 
unstable and beset with uncertainties’. Import-
antly, rather than questioning the credibility of  
their participants’ imagined futures, analysis by 
Ball et al. (1999) stresses the importance of  family 
capitals in making some imagined futures sound 
realizable, in contrast to others that remain vague 
and poorly articulated.
It is the social and cultural capitals that be-
come ingrained through exposure to a more or 
less privileged background, that allow some par-
ticipants to talk with ease about the particular-
ities of  their imagined futures, whereas others 
have little practical awareness of  the field so can-
not show mastery of  it. In Bourdieu’s terms, in-
dividuals in this latter group lack a ‘feel for 
the game’. Here again, we see the relevance of  
Bourdieu’s understanding of  the mutually con-
stitutive relations of  habitus, field and capitals in 
the production of  the social, as opposed to 
more individualistic understandings of  the self  
(Bourdieu, 1984).
Research drawing on imagined futures has 
been influential within education and studies 
focusing on the transition from education to 
employment (Ball et al., 1999; Hardgrove et al., 
2015; Stahl et al., 2020). As Stahl et al. (2020) 
state, the concept lends itself  to an analysis of  
the gendered construction of  possible selves, 
and what forms of  femininity and masculinity 
are privileged in the overlapping ‘regimes of  
value’ (Skeggs, 2011) that are obtained within 
the social landscapes framing youth livelihoods. 
Based on such understandings, a central part of  
the research in both the studies reported on 
here was to seek out how rural youth imagined 
158 T. Yeboah et al. 
their futures, with respect to their lives in gen-
eral, their work and their education.
Methods
This chapter draws on two complementary 
sources of  data focusing on how youth engage in 
the rural economy of  SSA. First is the APRA 
Youth Policy Study carried out in three commer-
cialized rural agricultural sites in three country 
contexts: Ghana (Techiman North District, Brong 
Ahafo Region), Zimbabwe (Mazowe District, Ma-
shonaland Central Provence) and Tanzania (Kilosa 
District, Morogoro Region). The focus of  the study 
was on the steps and pathways through which 
young people came to engage with the commer-
cialized rural economy and the outcomes asso-
ciated with their efforts. Data were collected 
through individual interviews, with 35, 42 and 
40 interviews being completed in Ghana, Tanza-
nia and Zimbabwe, respectively. The same inter-
view schedule was used across the three sites 
covering: (i) the background of  the interviewee; 
(ii) a history of  her/his economic activities; and 
(iii) plans for the immediate and more distant 
future (see Yeboah et al., 2020).
Second is the IFAD Youth Research project. 
As detailed in Chapter 2 (this volume), this study 
included field work in 16 sites (four sites per 
country) in Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Côte 
d’Ivoire. The sample included young women and 
men with different educational experiences. 
Data were collected through life history inter-
views, livelihood interviews and photo–voice 
interviews with approximately equal numbers of  
female and male youth. All three types of  inter-
view asked about how the interviewee imagined 
her/his future. There were also a number of  
sex-segregated focus group discussions (FGDs) 
that explored youth livelihoods, the participants’ 
imagined futures and how both were gendered, 
and the significance of  education to young 
people. A number of  adults were also interviewed.
The Imagined Futures of Rural  
Young People
The futures that rural young people at sites in 
Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania imagined for themselves 
centred around: (i) expanding and/or diversifying 
current economic activities; (ii) accumulating 
wealth or assets; and (iii) acquiring further educa-
tion and obtaining a professional or salaried job.
Expanding and/or diversifying current 
economic activities
As highlighted in Chapter 3 (this volume) the 
majority of  young people are involved in farm-
ing and/or livestock production in one way or 
another, often combined with other non-farm 
income-generating activities. Across all coun-
tries and sites, a central feature of  the futures 
that many young people imagined for them-
selves was the expansion and/or diversification 
of  current economic activities.
For most young people in Uganda, and for 
many in the other sites, this meant that agricul-
ture was important in their imagined futures 
(Table 9.1 and Appendix Tables 9A–9D). Over-
all, agriculture was more likely to be important 
in the imagined futures of  men rather than 
women (in most contexts, women were more 
likely to give importance to non-farming activ-
ities), and individuals with less education. In 
Nigeria, agriculture was more important in the 
imagined futures of  young people in ‘cold spots’ 
compared to those in ‘hot spots’, i.e. areas of  
relative market disengagement and stagnation 
versus areas of  more commercial activity and 
dynamism (Chapter 2, this volume, lays out the 
definitional criteria for these areas).
Some individuals foresaw increasing the 
scale of  production, while others imagined di-
versifying into new, more lucrative crops, and a 
few imagined specializing, for example by estab-
lishing plantations of  cashew, kola or oranges. 
For many, these plans for expansion and diversi-
fication are unexceptional: a modest increase in 
the area of  land farmed or the number of  head 
of  livestock kept, or for example, starting out in 
poultry production. Others imagine a more ex-
pansive engagement with agriculture:
I want to be a great farmer, cultivating rice and 
cowpea. [...] I will increase my scale of  operation in 
the next 5 years. I will enter into commercial 
farming, by that time I will be matured financially. 
I will employ people to manage my farm, I will only 
come around to supervise the farm.
(29-year-old female, Umumbo, Nigeria)
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I like every part of  farming, cultivating maize, 
and teff. I planned to leave farming in the past 
but now it is benefiting so that I will do more in 
farming. I want to focus on cultivating teff and 
maize by renting-in the land and using selected 
seeds and chemical fertilizers. Farming is 
profitable and I think I will bring economic 
change. […] Yes it [farming] is sufficient. We 
don’t buy food from the market. Now, my 
income will be rising fast. Particularly, if  I 
cultivate using the application of  chemical 
fertilizers and selected seeds, my income from 
farming will be increasing and sufficient to feed 
my family. Thus, I hope that there will be good 
things in farming. I can feed my family well and 
produce surplus for the market even.
(25-year-old male, Kuyu, Ethiopia)
Some young people frame their future interest in 
farming as part of  their identity and heritage. 
For example, the 26-year-old male university 
graduate, teacher and farmer from Idi Amu and 
Igbokiti, Nigeria, who was quoted in Chapter 8 
(this volume), said he could not drop farming: ‘It 
is built into me.’
Particularly in Tanzania and Zimbabwe, a 
number of  young women and men who are not 
currently involved in agriculture imagined 
themselves starting their own farms. For example, 
a 22-year-old male in Zimbabwe who already 
owns a bar, plans to farm on land given to him by 
his mother. He said he has seen his neighbours 
succeed in farming and he wants to try it.
If  farming is important in the imagined 
futures of  many young people, in general, it is a 
very different kind of  engagement with agricul-
ture that they imagine. Particularly in Uganda, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire these young 
people imagine that their future farming will 
involve little if  any manual work (‘digging’). In-
stead they imagine themselves in supervisory or 
managerial roles, with the day-to-day work 
being left to hired labour.
Not everyone imagined a farming future, not 
even as a manager of  hired labour. For these indi-
viduals farming was too physically demanding, 
tiring or stressful, or the income was too little.
I do not like farming. […] I don’t have the 
strength to do so. […] The work is quite tiresome. 
When I return from work each day, I am so tired, 
and I would have to go the next day. […] If  I have 
nothing else to do, then I will go back to 
farming.
(21-year-old male, Igbariam Eziafor, Nigeria)
No, for the little I am doing, if  I get a better thing 
going, I will leave it [farming]. There is no land 
here to use. The people of  Igbariam community, 
like the people of  Eket, do not have enough land 
to farm. Farm work! Ana aputa aputa, ina abanye 
abanye. [If  people are running away from 
farming, and you are entering in to farming.] If  
opportunity comes, I will go to school; I don’t 
want to go back to farm again.
(25-year-old female, Igbariam Eziafor, Nigeria)
Right now, if  I have money, I’d buy rice in [large] 
quantities to keep it and then I’d sell it later, so 
that it helps me to move ahead in my trading. 
[…] Me, I want to establish business as my base… 
I want to stop working in the fields.
(28-year-old female, Daloa, Côte d’Ivoire)
Young people who operated small businesses 
(many of  whom were also involved in farming) 
imagined that these ventures would expand. 
Those who worked from street stalls or other in-
formal structures, for example, imagined formal-
izing their businesses by moving into permanent 
and legal premises. This would make them less 
vulnerable to harassment by local officials, and 







Uganda Awach [relatively Hot] 92
Luweero [relatively Hot] 78




Ethiopia Wondo Genet [relatively 
hot]
35
Bora [relatively hot] 71
Jabi Tehnan [relatively 
cold]
52
Kuyu [relatively cold] 38




Idi Amu [relatively cold] 69
Umumbo [relatively cold] 59
Côte 
d’Ivoire
Soubré [relatively hot] 38
Odienné [relatively hot] 44
Daloa [relatively cold] 27
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would signal an important socio-economic 
achievement. In Tanzania, young people im-
agined expanding their businesses by either in-
creasing the number of  workers, the stock of  
merchandise, or opening up additional shops in 
surrounding areas. The fact that the Tanzania 
site, Mvurwi, is a thriving commercial centre and 
could provide a viable base for expansion into sur-
rounding areas, likely informs these imaginaries. 
A managerial imaginary similar to that noted 
above for farming, was also evident in relation to 
a whole range of  non-farm activities including 
shops, transport, building rental, catering and 
charcoal production.
Um, in any case, I know that in the future,  
I won’t do carpentry. […] Well, when I say that, 
it’s not that I won’t have a workshop, but to say 
that I’ll work as a carpenter, I don’t think so.  
I have other projects in mind. […] Well, doing 
commerce… when I say doing commerce,  
[I mean] a hardware store, and a small shop as 
well, if  God wants it so.
(28-year-old male, Daloa, Côte d’Ivoire)
For some individuals, future involvement in 
agriculture is articulated in terms of  food se-
curity, identify and heritage, for others, im-
agined engagement in farming at a larger 
scale reflects ambitions to accumulate the fi-
nancial resources to start or expand non-farm 
enterprises. The businesses reported in these 
imagined futures, including house painting, 
selling of  building materials, trading in live-
stock, a mobile phone repair shop, a small res-
taurant, and constructing accommodation to 
rent out, are to be based in rural areas or in 
small towns.
The link between farm and non-farm eco-
nomic activity is at the heart of  the imagined fu-
tures of  many young people. As a young man in 
Idi Amu, Nigeria, put it: ‘Once the plantation is 
established, it’s a cool source of  income which 
can generate money to invest in other busi-
nesses’ (24-year-old male). A young woman 
from Zimbabwe said:
I expect to operate my own business. I expect to 
open my own takeaway [food] shop if  I get 
money. All I need is a place, some plates and a 
refrigerator. I have no timeline in which I can 
achieve this, I just hope I can generate more 
money so that I will be able to operate my own 
business. The only challenge is to generate 
enough capital. To counter this challenge, I have 
ventured into farming this year. I planted my  
1 ha of  maize on my father’s plot.
(25-year-old female, Mvurwi, Zimbabwe)
In the name of  God, a good shopkeeper is better 
than a great farmer! A little shop on the side, 
with a bit of  livestock keeping. [With] that  
[I will] sort myself  out, because I’ve already lived 
a bit [out of] a shop; well I know how to go about 
it. Now, if  I get a little problem at the shop,  
I’ll use the livestock keeping to sort myself  out.
(29-year-old male, Korhogo, Côte d’Ivoire)
Migration is one aspect of  diversification that 
figures prominently in the imagined futures of  
young people, particularly in Nigeria and Côte 
d’Ivoire (Table 9.2 and Appendix Tables 9A–D).
For some young people, migration is very 
much about accessing job opportunities and bet-
ter services, and in this sense their imagined fu-
tures echo the dominant narrative that young 
people want to leave rural areas.
Like in 2 years’ time, as soon as I get enough 
money to pay rent for a shop and 
accommodation, I will leave this community. 
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[…] I no longer want to stay here. For instance, 
sewing clothes in this community is seasonal 
but when I migrate to an urban area, I will have 
clothes to sew throughout the year.
(30-year-old female, Umumbo, Nigeria)
Here is a village; we don’t have much income-
earning activities, there is no steady electricity; 
when you finish education, no job opportunities. 
The security situation in the country is bad.  
At least [in the USA] there will be steady supply 
of  electricity and job opportunities.
(25-year-old female, Igbariam Eziafor, Nigeria)
In fact, I don’t like remaining in the same place 
so much; it gives me a headache. I prefer to go 
somewhere – maybe return to Abidjan. Since  
I was in Abidjan before, I’ll return to Abidjan.
(25-year-old male, Daloa, Côte d’Ivoire)
The city [Bouake, the second largest city in Côte 
d’Ivoire] being a bit big, one can have many 
social relations and do many things. That’s what 
we imagine here, we can do many things over 
there. […] Here, it’s going to the field that 
interests us. […] Umm, there aren’t enough 
things in Zievasso, because here we can’t, we 
can’t even have social relations. We can’t do 
anything if  it’s not working in the fields.
(22-year-old male, Odienné, Côte d’Ivoire)
[…] It’s Paris […] because it’s pretty; […] it’s the 
good life over there. […] There are apartment 
buildings, not mud huts, everything is built 
vertically; […] there are no fields there. […] Well, 
you live as you want […] you’re comfortable.  
[…] Because when I’ll be there, I’ll be respected 
[…] when I’ll come back here […] they’ll say, she 
came back, the daughter of  that person has arrived. 
[…] No, no, she got a job there, she got hired […].
(21-year-old female, Soubré, Côte d’Ivoire)
Some parents are supportive of  these ambitions: 
‘There is no parent that will want their children 
to come back to this village except those who did 
not know where else to go again’ (40-year-old 
female, Igbariam Eziafor, Nigeria).
For other young people, moving to and 
investing in nearby towns is part of  an im-
agined future that continues to have a strong 
rural orientation, with agriculture continu-
ing to play an important role. And still others, 
particularly in Nigeria, see migration as a 
way into more modern agriculture: ‘People 
of  this community like farming and also in 
Osun State as whole, but they do not practice 
mechanized farming like they do in Ilorin’ 
(25-year-old male, Oba Oke, Nigeria).
Accumulating wealth or assets
Across all the sites in the seven study countries, 
both young women and men imagined futures 
in which they had accumulated valued assets 
such as land, farm inputs, cars, a building plot 
and housing. A number suggested that these as-
sets represented ‘development’ or a ‘civilised’ 
life, while a 27-year-old man from Zimbabwe 
suggested that to be a real man you needed to 
have your own place, and not always be rent-
ing.ii The contrast between an asset-poor present 
and an imagined asset-rich future came through 
a photo–voice interview with a young man at 
the Umumbo site in Nigeria. Looking at a picture 
he took, he said:
This is a picture of  a beautiful house and a nice 
car. In that house, everything is complete 
including toilet and bathroom. The kind of  
person I feel in this picture is very wealthy and 
successful man that is very influential in the 
society. […] The reason why it’s better is that 
currently I don’t have money, I don’t live in a 
good house; I live in a mud house built with a 
bamboo tree but this one [my imagined future] 
shows that development has come and that  
I have built a nice house.
(19-year-old male, Umumbo, Nigeria)
The importance of  building a house was men-
tioned repeatedly, due in part to the fact that 
many of  the young people are currently living 
with a parent or a friend, or renting accommo-
dation. Some young people imagine that owning 
a house would be less expensive than renting, 
and the savings could be invested in further eco-
nomic activity. Many young married women live 
in their husbands’ home, but imagined building 
their own dwelling to give them more security. 
One 30-year-old woman in Butuntumula, 
Uganda, mentioned that she was currently 
building a house for herself, of  which her hus-
band had no knowledge.
In Zimbabwe, young people imagined be-
coming landowners either through the Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP; see 
Scoones et al., 2010) or by purchasing land. 
They explained that holding some form of  land 
title could open doors – to credit or government 
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subsidies for inputs, machinery, seeds and so on. 
Input schemes run by the Zimbabwean govern-
ment, like Command Agriculture and the Presi-
dential Input Scheme, only provide subsidies to 
farmers who have a ‘paper’ that formalizes their 
relationship to their land.
Further education and obtaining  
a professional or salaried job
As highlighted in Chapter 7 (this volume) many 
young people reported having to stop their for-
mal education early because of  financial con-
straints. Across all sites, additional education 
was an important part of  many young people’s 
imagined futures, although markedly less so in 
Ethiopia (Table 9.3 and Appendix Tables 9A–D). 
Overall, education was more likely to be import-
ant in the imagined futures of  women, individ-
uals who were younger, and those who already 
had relatively more education.
Young people – both those who have done 
well in school and many who had previously 
dropped out and imagine returning – regard 
education as instrumental for gaining professional 
or salaried employment. Jobs with government 
or private firms are particularly important in 
the imagined futures of  those who are more 
educated or are working toward additional 
educational qualifications. The specific jobs 
mentioned included pharmacist, banker, 
secondary school teacher, veterinary nurse, 
gynaecologist, accountant, engineer and polit-
ician, among others.
After I complete my education, I will be a 
government employee. […] I [want to] serve as 
judge and in other positions. […] I want to be a 
leader, a leader of  the country. I will reach to a 
good status. I also think that I would be Prime 
Minister.
(27-year-old male, Wondo Genet, Ethiopia)
My uncle [is a lawyer]. […] They dispense cases 
and justice for people. They are referred to as 
very learned people because they read a lot of  
books to be able to dispense judgement. They are 
highly regarded, with so much respect in the 
society.
(19-year-old female, Oba Oke, Nigeria)
Education is the key that can open up such 
possibilities:
Farming cannot offer me what education can 
offer. Educated people can be rich but farming is 
not like that. When you have graduated and 
obtained a certificate, then you start looking for 
a white-collar job.
(20-year-old female, Kuyu, Ethiopia)
Schooling is more important because it will give 
me a continuing source of  livelihood, it does not 
fade. You can always use your certificate to get 
any good job at any time. Farming, it can fade. If  
you do it and you are ageing, you might not be 
fit to continue with farming. But with your 
education and certificate you can get paid work 
and have some money, you can hire people to do 
farm work for you. That is the reason why 
schooling is more important.
(25-year-old female, Oba Oke, Nigeria)
The advantages of  white-collar employment 
were contrasted with the demands of  farming:
Education can make you pensionable when you 
grow old while farming will not. It can also 
make you train your children in school and 
other businesses in life. In the case of  death, 
maybe when one’s husband dies, one who is a 
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civil servant can use money from her salary to 
train her children, but farming is not like. 
Farming gets old once the owner is old and these 
are the reasons education is good.
(18-year-old female, Oba Oke, Nigeria)
In contrast, for individuals who are a few years 
older, or who have already started a family, the 
focus tended to be on vocational training that 
would allow them to move toward an imagined 
future in which they raise their current activities 
to a new level, or move into new activities.
Well maybe some vocational training in salon 
work would improve on what I already know. 
However, the major constraint is lack of  money 
to do this. My responsibilities are so many, and 
right now my children’s education is a priority 
over mine.
(34-year-old female, Awach, Uganda)
The work that I feel I should be doing since I am 
growing older […] if  I can get some strength or 
ability I should get a training in carpentry or 
building construction.
(32-year-old male, Awach, Uganda)
Among those who imagined securing profes-
sional work through education, some still saw 
their future selves being involved in farming and 
the non-farm rural economy. For example, one 
young woman was studying computing but had 
a family background in farming. She imagined 
working as a civil servant, having a hairdressing 
salon, and also farming:
Even if  I have all the money in the world I 
cannot stop farming. I will still consider farming, 
but this time more mechanized farming and I 
will use fertilizer to increase yield.
(28-year-old female, Oba Oke, Nigeria)
Another who was training to be a teacher said 
that alongside teaching she imagined herself  
specializing in rice cultivation, because of  its 
returns:
I would like to combine my work with rice 
cultivation, to make ends meet and help my 
family. [...] I would like to stop farming other 
crops because there is lots of  stress in farming 
other crops, while they don’t give many returns.
(21-year-old female, Mucwini, Uganda)
In Nigeria many young people imagined com-
bining a salaried job with larger scale mechan-
ized farming that was carried out away from 
their respective communities which had little 
available land. Others imagined giving the land 
out on a sharecropping basis. A young man from 
Umumbo, Nigeria, who was presently studying 
biochemistry at degree level, imagined himself  
employed as a biochemist and developing a busi-
ness career, while also investing in farming.
Closely linked to the imaginary of  further-
ing their own education is a vision of  the future 
in which these young people can ensure the edu-
cation of  their own children. For those who al-
ready have children, educating them is now a 
higher priority than furthering their own educa-
tion. The considerable importance of  educating 
offspring in the imagined futures of  the young 
people is to ensure that their children do not 
have to toil and ‘suffer’ in the same ways that 
they have. One woman from Nigeria explained 
why she was not encouraging her children to fol-
low her into farming:
Hahahaaa! No, I’m not. I’m only trying to put 
them in civil service. […] I sponsor them to be 
educated and that will qualify them to get 
white-collar job as far as God is in control.
(42-year-old female, Umumbo, Nigeria)
A young woman from Ethiopia said:
We rather focus on educating our kids, now it is 
too late for us to go to school at this age. If  we 
both go to school, who will do our jobs on which 
our family livelihood depends? Education and 
work do not go together; you have to sacrifice 
one to achieve the other. It is impossible to do 
both of  them together.
(28-year-old female, Bora, Ethiopia)
Moving from the present to the future
To move towards the futures they imagine for 
themselves, young women and men must navi-
gate a variety of  obstacles, of  which the most 
commonly cited was a lack of  financial capital or 
credit. As noted in Chapter 7 (this volume), 
across all the countries and sites, the absence of  
immediately available funds was the most com-
mon explanation given by young people for ter-
minating their formal education. It was also a 
block to the additional education and training 
that is part of  many imagined futures.
The issue here goes beyond a simple lack of  
cash. As explained by a young man in Ethiopia, 
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re-entering education can affect ongoing income- 
generating activities, and thus result in a double 
financial burden:
Education is very important. I do not have 
anything hindering my decision except the issue 
of  money, because education is too expensive 
and I fear losing my customers in my orange 
business.
(23-year-old male, Kuyu, Ethiopia)
This extra burden is expected to be particularly 
important for those who are already responsible 
for children, siblings or ageing parents. Some 
young people acknowledged that, due to finan-
cial constraints, they would likely have to adapt 
their plans for further education in order to 
manage the financial burden.
Even if  you get financial support it is not 
convenient to work and learn at the same time. 
Because you have to learn during the whole day, 
you cannot get money to pay for house rent and 
other expenses even if  you get some support. So, 
to pursue education there should be at least be 
full support, but that is not possible. It is better to 
work with the education you have obtained.
(23-year-old male, Kuyu, Ethiopia)
The challenge of  finance goes far beyond educa-
tion, and in one way or another it permeates 
almost all young people’s discussions of  their 
futures. A 27-year-old man in Zimbabwe, for 
example, complained that despite having a dam 
close to their farm, they could not afford to invest 
in irrigation equipment, purchase inputs, and 
‘upgrade’ into fully mechanized commercial 
farming. A 35-year-old male migrant who had 
settled in Tuobodom, Ghana, and who engaged 
in commercial tomato farming, imagined buy-
ing cows and goats in the north and transport-
ing these to Accra for onward sale. However, he 
acknowledged that without finance this would 
not be possible. A 25-year-old man from the 
same location who was working as a farm la-
bourer, imagined becoming a professional driver 
in the near future, although he was quick to rec-
ognize the need to first gather resources to se-
cure a driving licence. A 26-year-old man in 
Awach, Uganda stated:
Electricity supply can limit me in the welding 
business because it might require a lot of  money 
to sort it out. A building to put the machines can 
also be a problem, and also acquiring the 
grinding and cutting machines.
We recognize that from the young people’s per-
spective, pleading poverty (or lack of  financial 
liquidity) in an interview with researchers might 
be easy, or perhaps even expected. It is also clear 
that in many situations, between ongoing 
economic activities, inputs from family and par-
ticipation in savings groups, small amounts of  
capital are often available to start, maintain or 
expand farming or other activities (Flynn and 
Sumberg, 2017, 2018). Nevertheless, the young 
people are pointing to an important and perva-
sive tension between discourses highlighting 
youth entrepreneurship, innovation and ‘farm-
ing as a business’ (see Chapter 6, this volume) 
on the one hand, and young people’s experiences 
of  constrained access to financial resources on 
the other.
In addition to finance, for some young 
people, moving toward their imagined futures 
means navigating gender and other social 
norms, which are linked to broader narratives 
about women and men. For example, in Uganda 
there was a strong sense among young men that 
women focus on marriage and men on financial 
independence; while in the eyes of  young women 
generally, men are seen to be smoking, drinking 
and gambling, while they themselves are more 
focused on the future.
However, as is often the case, there is a gap 
between cited norms and actual lives and liveli-
hoods. For example, some young people in 
Uganda observed that ‘there are women who 
think like men and have the same vision as men, 
and they focus on all kinds of  work including 
those normally reserved for men’. Even though 
in all sites some jobs are seen to be ‘for men’, one 
woman in Uganda observed: ‘If  I study or learn 
how to do it, then I could try and challenge the 
men at this job.’ A young woman from Jabi 
Tehnan village, Ethiopia, was less sanguine:
The place given to women is not that good.  
I mean that people in this area do not adequately 
support the expectations that women have. They 
feel women do not properly accomplish things.  
I am encouraged to do activities because of  the 
support from my parents and my brothers. Other 
people start rumours about me, that I am going 
to do this or that activity. Seeing women as 
inferior and unable to accomplish a certain goal 
is prevalent in this area. I think this perception 
may hinder the implementation of  my plans.
(26-year-old female, Jabi Tehnan, Ethiopia)
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A final set of  hurdles identified by young people 
might best be described as hazard or idiosyn-
cratic shocks, including drought, illness, death 
and unexpected family obligations, as well as 
theft and customers not honouring their debts. 
A 20-year-old man in Tanzania explained that 
his money goes to helping his parents, and this 
hinders him from moving towards his imagined 
future. This is the other side of  the coin of  the 
support from family and friends, from which so 
many of  the other young people reported bene-
fiting. In Zimbabwe, two producers (26-year-old 
female and 27-year-old male) spoke about wea-
ther and climate change as important chal-
lenges to their future agricultural prospects. 
Without the ability to irrigate, they expect farm-
ing to become increasingly risky. One of  these 
individuals recently experienced drought in one 
year and heavy rain in another (the El Niño and 
La Niña phenomena) which resulted in a major 
setback.
It is clear, and it was often remarked upon 
by the young people, that for many of  them 
movement toward their imagined futures is 
likely to be slow and difficult. Some lack the cap-
ital and strong social networks, and in some 
ways their situation resembles certain aspects of  
waithood. Others are already on their way: they 
remain positive, stressing the importance of  
hard work, focus and determination, savings, 
and strong social networks.
Discussion and Conclusions
Perhaps it should not be a surprise that young 
people who are centrally engaged in the rural 
economy, often by combining agriculture and 
non-farm work (see Chapter 3, this volume; Ye-
boah et al., 2020), imagine futures for them-
selves that are still largely rural, and in which 
agriculture continues to play an important part. 
Nevertheless, at least in some locations, these 
imagined futures pose a challenge to the ortho-
doxy that large numbers of  African youth can-
not wait to leave the countryside. This does not 
however mean that all is well among young 
people in rural SSA, or that the promise of  the 
‘rural prosperity gospel’ is finally coming good.
It is true that many young women and men 
imagine futures for themselves in which agri-
culture continues to play an important part 
(see also Kristensen and Birch-Thomsen, 2013; 
Berckmoes and White, 2014; Daum, 2019; 
Yeboah et al., 2020). Yet this should not be inter-
preted simply as young people actively choosing 
‘to be farmers’ or to have ‘a career in farming’. 
Their imagined futures, while largely rural and 
small-town focused, contain two important and 
related wrinkles in relation to agriculture. First, 
in the vast majority of  these futures, farming 
and/or livestock is combined with other, non-
farm economic activities, from salaried jobs 
through to catering, petty trading and brick 
making. The young people are envisaging what 
have been called ‘mixed’, ‘portfolio’ or ‘diversi-
fied’ livelihoods: but strikingly, it is not clear 
whether agriculture is the mainstay or the 
‘side-hustle’ (Mwaura, 2017). In other words, 
while farming is part of  the picture, it is most 
often not as the ‘full-time farmer’ whose image 
and presumed motivations inform much agri-
cultural policy and underpin the assumptions of  
both agricultural research and development 
programmes (Sumberg et al., 2004).
Second, in many imagined futures the en-
gagement with agriculture is as manager or 
supervisor of  hired labour. As imagined by some 
young people, this would amount to farming at 
arm’s length by a busy, town-based manager of  
multiple enterprises. In a sense these young 
people are aligning their futures with current 
discourses around ‘telephone farmers’ (Leen-
stra, 2014) and ‘medium-scale farms’ (Jayne 
et al., 2016, 2019). In Nigeria, the common ref-
erence to ‘large-scale mechanized farming’ by 
young people points in the same direction. 
Again, this imaginary of  future farming raises 
fundamental questions in relation to many as-
pects of  agricultural and rural development, 
such as the role of  labour-saving technologies 
and the likely implications for investment in al-
ternative farming systems (e.g. low mainten-
ance tree crops versus food crops) and other 
forms of  productivity-enhancing technology.
Formal education – its poor quality, being 
forced to leave early, and the strong desire to do 
more – is the backdrop against which both cur-
rent activities are undertaken and futures are 
imagined. Despite the many disappointments 
relating to formal education, the idea of  con-
tinuing or restarting education or vocational 
training figures prominently in many imagined 
futures. For many young people this is about 
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Notes
i The Agricultural Policy Research on Africa (APRA) is a 5-year programme, funded by the UK Department 
for International Development (DFID), focused on pathways to agricultural commercialization. See: https://
www.future-agricultures.org/apra/ (accessed 26 January 2021).
ii ‘Kuti uve murume unofanirwa kuvanemusha wako, haikono kugara uchilodger.’ [To be a real man you 
needed to have your own place, and not always be renting] (27-year-old male, Zimbabwe).
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tainly deserves more research attention.
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Table 9A. Uganda comparison across sites: imagined futures (IF).a
Sex Age Educationb
F M 18–21 22–25 26–29 30–33 P P+ S S+ Overall
Awach [relatively hot]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 93 92 91 100 80 100 100 89 89 88 92
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 100 88 100 100 90 75 92 100 89 88 92
Migration is important in IF (%) 14 28 18 44 0 25 15 22 11 50 23
Education is important in IF (%) 86 64 91 78 70 38 62 78 78 75 72
N (individuals) 14 25 11 9 10 8 13 9 9 8 39
Luweero [relatively hot]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 72 86 86 60 87 89 75 80 84 70 78
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 96 86 100 87 93 89 92 100 84 100 91
Migration is important in IF (%) 56 24 57 33 27 67 42 20 37 60 41
Education is important in IF (%) 36 29 57 53 13 11 17 40 42 30 33
N (individuals) 25 21 7 15 15 9 12 5 19 10 46
Mucwini [relatively cold]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 94 83 69 100 93 100 87 100 92 71 88
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 75 88 100 78 73 67 67 83 100 86 83
Migration is important in IF (%) 0 8 8 11 0 0 0 0 8 14 5
Education is important in IF (%) 38 58 77 67 20 33 33 17 83 57 50
N (individuals) 16 24 13 9 15 3 15 6 12 7 40
Butuntumula [relatively cold]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 67 64 71 50 60 80 67 100 50 75 65
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Migration is important in IF (%) 8 27 29 33 0 0 33 0 30 0 17
Education is important in IF (%) 67 27 57 83 20 20 0 0 70 50 48
N (individuals) 12 11 7 6 5 5 3 2 10 8 23
aColumn totals exceed 100% because multiple options were flagged as important in the respondent’s imagined futures.
bP = some primary education; P+ = some primary education plus some additional training; S = some secondary education;
S+ = some secondary education plus some additional training.
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Table 9B. Ethiopia comparison across sites: imagined futures (IF).a
Sex Age Educationb
F M 18–21 22–25 26–29 30–33 None P P+ S S+ Overall
Wondo Genet [relatively hot]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 17 55 13 17 71 – – 50 0 30 40 35
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 100 100 100 100 100 – – 100 100 100 100 100
Migration is important in IF (%) 33 9 50 17 0 – – 50 0 30 10 22
Education is important in IF (%) 92 91 88 100 86 – – 100 100 80 100 91
N (individuals) 12 11 8 6 7 – – 2 1 10 10 23
Bora [relatively hot]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 62 82 44 100 88 83 50 85 50 50 100 71
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 92 55 89 0 75 67 50 69 50 100 100 75
Migration is important in IF (%) 15 55 22 100 25 50 50 38 50 17 0 33
Education is important in IF (%) 31 18 44 0 13 17 0 23 50 17 100 25
N (individuals) 13 11 9 1 8 6 2 13 2 6 1 24
Jabi Tehnan [relatively cold]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 30 73 0 100 43 67 100 50 67 38 100 52
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 100 73 100 80 86 67 100 50 67 92 100 86
Migration is important in IF (%) 40 55 0 40 57 100 100 50 67 38 50 48
Education is important in IF (%) 0 55 25 40 14 67 0 0 67 23 50 29
N (individuals) 10 11 4 5 7 3 1 2 3 13 2 21
Kuyu [relatively cold]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 42 33 38 25 100 33 0 57 50 30 25 38
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 92 100 100 88 100 100 100 86 100 100 100 96
Migration is important in IF (%) 33 42 25 50 100 17 100 14 0 50 50 38
Education is important in IF (%) 25 17 38 13 0 17 0 14 0 20 50 21
N (individuals) 12 12 8 8 2 6 1 7 2 10 4 24
aColumn totals exceed 100% because multiple options were flagged as important in the respondent’s imagined futures.
bP = some primary education; P+ = some primary education plus some additional training; S = some secondary education;






Table 9C. Nigeria comparison across sites: imagined futures (IF).a
Sex Age Educationb
F M 18–21 22–25 26–29 30–33 Train P P+ S S+ Overall
Oba Oke [relatively hot]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 23 57 27 55 40 – – 100 50 67 28 41
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 100 86 100 91 80 – – 100 100 100 89 93
Migration is important in IF (%) 62 50 64 55 40 – – 100 0 67 56 56
Education is important in IF (%) 62 43 82 36 20 – – 100 0 33 61 52
N (individuals) 13 14 11 11 5 – – 1 2 6 18 27
Igbariam Eziafor [relatively hot]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 38 38 50 40 33 0 0 0 50 60 33 38
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 100
Migration is important in IF (%) 46 31 50 40 17 100 100 0 0 20 44 38
Education is important in IF (%) 77 62 100 80 17 100 100 0 50 60 72 69
N (individuals) 13 13 4 15 6 1 1 0 2 5 18 26
Idi Amu [relatively cold]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 38 100 78 73 40 100 100 100 0 67 74 69
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Migration is important in IF (%) 69 38 67 55 40 0 0 100 100 67 47 54
Education is important in IF (%) 38 62 78 27 40 100 100 0 0 67 53 50
N (individuals) 13 13 9 11 5 1 1 1 2 3 19 26
Umumbo [relatively cold]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 62 57 44 60 75 75 – 100 100 33 64 59
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 85 86 89 80 75 100 – 50 100 89 86 85
Migration is important in IF (%) 31 43 44 10 75 50 – 0 0 33 50 37
Education is important in IF (%) 54 71 78 70 75 0 – 0 0 78 71 63
N (individuals) 13 14 9 10 4 4 – 2 2 9 14 27
aColumn totals exceed 100% because multiple options were flagged as important in the respondent’s imagined futures.
bTrain = Training only; P = some primary education; P+ = some primary education plus some additional training; S = some secondary education;
S+ = some secondary education plus some additional training.
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Table 9D. Côte d’Ivoire comparison across sites: imagined futures (IF).a
Sex Age Educationb
F M 18–21 22–25 26–29 30–33 None P P+ S S+ Overall
Soubré [relatively hot]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 27 46 22 43 40 67 50 40 50 27 50 38
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Migration is important in IF (%) 73 69 78 71 40 100 50 60 0 91 100 71
Education is important in IF (%) 73 62 78 71 60 33 100 40 50 73 50 67
N (individuals) 11 13 9 7 5 3 4 5 2 11 2 24
Odienné [relatively hot]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 38 46 31 50 50 100 20 60 100 50 50 44
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 100 92 100 100 100 50 100 100 100 83 100 96
Migration is important in IF (%) 62 77 77 63 50 50 70 60 50 83 50 68
Education is important in IF (%) 62 46 69 38 50 0 70 40 0 67 50 56
N (individuals) 13 13 13 8 2 2 10 5 2 6 2 25
Daloa [relatively cold]
Agriculture is important in IF (%) 9 40 0 60 18 50 0 36 0 29 50 27
Non-farm is important in IF (%) 91 87 100 100 73 100 100 73 0 100 100 88
Migration is important in IF (%) 55 53 60 100 36 50 50 64 0 43 50 54
Education is important in IF (%) 45 73 60 60 64 75 67 36 0 86 100 62
N (individuals) 11 15 5 5 11 4 6 11 0 7 2 26
aColumn totals exceed 100% because multiple options were flagged as important in the respondent’s imagined futures.
bP = some primary education; P+ = some primary education plus some additional training; S = some secondary education;
S+ = some secondary education plus some additional training.
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Introduction
The research presented in this book uses quali-
tative and quantitative analysis to address the 
dominant narratives and ‘conventional wis-
dom’ about youth and the rural economy in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as they have been 
configured in recent academic and policy litera-
ture. Throughout, we have sought to carefully 
consider the conceptualizations embedded in 
these narratives, their empirical foundations, 
and their implications for policy. Our findings 
lend support to some elements of  the standard 
stories, while they challenge others. However, 
even where we find broad support for dominant 
narratives, we conclude that there is need for 
more nuance than is generally offered in short-
hand treatments of  ‘youth’ questions. This crit-
ical revisiting of  the storytelling around youth 
in rural Africa has important ramifications for 
policy framing and discourse, as well as policy 
content. This final chapter synthesizes the em-
pirical findings described in the previous chap-
ters and sets out their discursive and practical 
implications for policy relating to youth, agri-
cultural and rural development.
Synthesis
The broad story of  contemporary rural youth in 
SSA that emerges from the research is one of  
livelihood building under severe and persistent 
constraints. Having been buffeted as children by 
forces beyond their control – including wide-
spread poverty, parental illness or death, family 
break-up or civil conflict – young women and 
men are then let down by formal education. The 
quality of  education provision is low, and many 
are forced to leave school early because it is sim-
ply not affordable. This is despite having worked, 
often from an early age, to help pay their school 
fees and support their households. Although 
many young people see it as normal to combine 
school and work, others recognize that this jeop-
ardizes their educational progress. The deeply 
gendered rural opportunity landscapes they 
encounter offer few prospects for remunerative, 
secure or decent work, to say nothing of  salaried 
employment. However, through their own hard 
work and with the support of  their families and 
social networks, these young people set about to 
build their livelihoods, and in some cases accu-
mulate assets, in contexts where infrastructure 
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is poor and services lacking, and where gendered 
social norms and strong social hierarchies restrict 
room for manoeuvre, particularly for women.
These livelihoods reflect shifting patterns of  
engagement with the rural economy, combining 
unpaid caring and domestic work with farming, 
non-farm wage employment and/or non-farm 
self-employment. The informal and seasonal 
nature of  much of  this economic activity has 
given rise to endemic precarity, where work is 
characterized by risk, limited financial reward, 
instability and lack of  protection (Sumberg et al., 
2020). Livelihood building extends well beyond 
the labour market, however, with young people 
navigating the challenges of  securing accommo-
dation and land, furthering their own education, 
caring for parents and siblings, and negotiating 
relationships, marriage, children and citizenship, 
as they strive for social adulthood. The futures 
they imagine for themselves usually involve ex-
pansion of  their current activities and/or diversifi-
cation into other employments, often including 
larger-scale, more modern agriculture. In many 
of  these imagined futures young people are 
farming and running their businesses as man-
agers of  hired labour. Many also imagine restart-
ing or furthering their education to boost their 
chances of  securing a professional wage job 
and/or improving agricultural productivity. Mo-
bility and migration also figure in many im-
agined futures: in some contexts, the focus is on 
nearby rural towns with the idea of  maintaining 
a firm base in the rural economy, while in others 
it is imagined as the more classic flight to larger 
urban centres.
In other words, for the vast majority of  young 
people in the study sites, their engagement with 
the rural economy in the early stages of  livelihood 
building is best characterized as hard work in the 
face of  hazard – personal, financial and environ-
mental. However, the broad outlines of  the story 
above are not universal, and we acknowledge that 
while the opportunity landscape is limited in most 
places, it is not equally limited everywhere. There 
are real spatial differences in opportunities (Abay 
et al., 2020), as well as socially constructed and/or 
mediated differences. Drawing on Roberts (1968, 
2009) our broad-brush picture supports the prop-
osition that the job (and broader livelihood) oppor-
tunities available to rural young people in SSA 
emerge from multiple ‘opportunity structures’ that 
act to create distinct routes into the labour force 
and/or social adulthood. Indeed, these opportunity 
structures, emerging from a web of  determinants 
including place, family origins, gender, ethnicity, 
education and labour market processes, were a 
central concern of  the research.
A fundamental insight emerging from op-
portunity structure theory is that neither poor 
young people, nor poor adults, typically choose 
their jobs in any meaningful sense: ‘they simply 
take what is available’ (Roberts, 1977, p.3). This 
raises important questions about the preoccupa-
tion with youth aspirations in the development 
literature, and with the individual choices and 
decisions of  young people in relation to work 
and livelihoods. The point is certainly not that 
everything is predetermined, but rather that 
most young people in rural SSA actually have 
relatively little room to manoeuvre. Thus, while 
some profess a deep attachment to farming, for 
many others it is the obvious (and perhaps only) 
‘choice’ that allows them to assure food security, 
earn some income, and forge a potential path to 
social adulthood. Similarly, the ‘choice’ between 
selling charcoal or selling dried fish in the mar-
ket, or between making bricks or doing day la-
bour, is not irrelevant, but it is unlikely to result 
in significantly altered financial or social out-
comes. While some imagine prosperous futures, 
where they are running (sometimes several) 
successful businesses and/or farms, or are en-
gaging in white-collar professional work and are 
accumulating considerable material wealth and 
social status, it remains to be seen whether they 
can transform these imagined futures into reality.
Our intention is not to reify the notion of  
opportunity structures. Indeed, apart from what 
is obvious – better-off  young people generally 
have more options; women and men have differ-
ent options; migrants generally have fewer op-
tions (although this depends on their networks); 
and areas of  higher potential offer more options 
than areas of  lower potential – we see relatively 
little indication that opportunity structures 
work to finely differentiate how young people 
engage with the rural economy. Rather, within 
and between sites, and across an array of  social 
variables (gender, age, education and so on) 
there are very strong similarities in the ways in 
which young people engage with and affect the 
rural economy. Most young people combine 
some farming with one or more other common, 
low-skill, low-investment, low-technology and 
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low-return economic activities. This lack of  di-
versity in patterns of  engagement with the rural 
economy reflects a severely depleted opportunity 
landscape – resulting from poor infrastructure, 
limited purchasing power, poor policy and so on – 
as opposed to any generalized lack of  ambition, 
skill or capital among young people. In such 
contexts, it is not surprising that young people 
are not the innovative drivers of  change in the 
farm or non-farm economy, even if  this is how they 
are often portrayed (cf. Sumberg and Hunt, 2019).
Implications
The broad synthesis outlined in the preceding 
section, reflecting field work in 21 sites across 
seven SSA countries, and as elaborated in the 
chapters of  this book and other recent publica-
tions (Sumberg and Hunt, 2019; Sumberg et al., 
2019; Abay et al., 2020; Carreras et al., 2020; 
Chamberlin and Sumberg, 2020; Crossouard 
et al., 2020; DeJaeghere, 2020; Glover and Sum-
berg, 2020; Oosterom et al., 2020; Yeboah et al., 
2020) suggests that it is now time to reconsider 
both the framings and narratives that underpin 
policy, as well as policy content. In the sections 
that follow we explore the implications for policy 
framing and discourse, policy content, research 
and development practice.
Issues framing and discourse
Perhaps the most obvious, but also the most far 
reaching, implication of  the outcomes of  this re-
search is the urgent need to reframe the ‘problem’ 
of  Africa’s rural youth, so that it is no longer ‘all 
about youth’ and their individual and collective 
deficits (lack of  skills, lack of  interest in hard 
work, lack of  interest in education and so on). An 
alternative framing is now required that puts the 
economy and its inability to provide decent employ-
ment (for young people and all rural residents) 
centre stage (Sumberg et al., 2020). This framing 
must emphasize the need for structural change, 
and link this directly to an appreciation of  the 
central role of  opportunity structures – from op-
pressive gender norms, failed education policy 
initiatives and patriarchal–gerontocratic local 
institutions, to poor infrastructure – in shaping 
young people’s livelihood trajectories and out-
comes. In making explicit the embeddedness of  
young people in broader networks of  social, eco-
nomic and political relations, such a framing will 
foreground interventions meant to promote 
structural change in the broadest sense, and will 
nudge the current generation of  low-impact, 
youth-specific projects aside.
A second implication is that (actual or 
threatened) mass out-migration by rural young 
people must be dislodged as a core element of  
policy discourse. Yes, some young people want 
to – and do – leave; in some locations, this might 
have demographic significance. However, mil-
lions and millions of  young people keep one or 
both feet in rural areas as they move on in life, in 
pursuit of  better livelihood and educational op-
portunities, and social status. The fact that for 
many, neither their current economic activities, 
nor their imagined futures reflect the archetyp-
ical image of  a full-time ‘family farmer’ is irrele-
vant, except in so much as this outdated image 
continues to underpin problem framing and policy.
Similarly, more care is needed in the way 
the notion of  ‘waithood’ is being uncritically 
integrated into policy and public discourse. Spe-
cifically, the claim that the majority of  young 
people are stuck in permanent waithood is far 
too broad, while the supposed link between la-
bour market participation and social adulthood 
is far too narrow. The labour market is only one 
of  many routes to social adulthood for young 
women and men, and this multiplicity of  path-
ways needs to be reflected in both policy and 
public discourse.
As rural youth show great determination in 
their struggles to complete their education, they 
often combine schooling and paid work, and in 
many cases use the income from their work to 
cover the costs of  their education. This avenue for 
educational progression is more open to young 
men who often have relatively more freedom to 
engage in paid work, whereas young women can 
be more confined in contexts of  strongly patri-
archal–gerontocratic institutions that lead them 
into early childbearing and marriage.
Finally, while a deficit model of  African 
rural youth is at the core of  dominant framings, 
there is also a counter tendency to reify the in-
novative and transformational capacity of  
young people. The former is as misplaced as the 
latter. Policy narratives that suggest young 
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people are poised (or can be positioned) to trans-
form agriculture and the food system more 
broadly, are unrealistic and counterproductive 
(Glover and Sumberg, 2020). While superficially 
these narratives might appear as a great vote of  
confidence in young people, they can also be 
seen as a discursive offloading of  responsibility 
on to their young shoulders – to create their own 
jobs, to save the agricultural sector, to make the 
food system sustainable and to build the nation.
Implications for policy
The findings presented in this book generate a 
number of  implications for the focus, content 
and targeting of  policy. Here, we elaborate the 
key insights for education and some other key 
policy areas supporting the livelihoods of  rural 
young people.
Clearly there is much room to improve edu-
cation policy as it relates to rural SSA. For ex-
ample, making primary and secondary education 
accessible to all remains an unfinished project, 
despite the great leap forward in primary enrol-
ment resulting from concerted action to address 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) extend the 
ambition that education should be ‘affordable’ to 
all across the whole life course – including access 
to vocational and tertiary education. Gender 
equality is also a key element of  these goals, and 
this is also far from being realized. The fact that in-
ability to meet the costs of  attending school con-
tinues to stop many rural young people from 
continuing their formal education is nothing less 
than a catastrophic policy failure. Indeed, unless it 
is addressed, the more recent focus on quality in 
education, and how it should be measured and 
improved, will do little for rural children or the 
next generations of  young people. The findings 
also point to a demand for vocational and tech-
nical training. However, given the desire and need 
of  many rural young people to combine further 
training with demands of  ongoing economic and 
caring activities, this must be provided in flexible 
and/or part-time modes. More research may clar-
ify the kinds of  complementary interventions that 
would best enable rural young people to take ad-
vantage of  existing or augmented educational 
resources.
The call for attention to quality education is 
fully justified and the broad aims of  the SDGs are 
to be applauded. However, the metrics of  quality 
proposed in the SDGs remain too narrowly fo-
cused on attainment. Student assessment data is 
notoriously problematic and importantly, such 
measures do not speak to the broader ambitions 
of  the SDGs. These broader ambitions can only 
be addressed with a much clearer recognition of  
the historical, ideological and patriarchal under-
pinnings of  education policy and practice, that 
result in the promotion of  ideals of  life, transi-
tion and work that are alien to most rural set-
tings. The assumption of  a linear trajectory from 
schooling into work, and the devaluing of  un-
paid and domestic work are prime examples. 
These underpinnings are also reflected in the 
discriminatory and disempowering dynamics 
that arise from the gendered landscape of  educa-
tion. Again, the focus on internationally com-
parable metrics of  quality is misplaced as long as 
these underpinnings are left unexamined.
The research supports calls for a root-and-
branch interrogation of  school curricula with a 
focus on how they, and the whole schooling sys-
tem, valorize (or denigrate) particular kinds of  
work and reproduce particular gender regimes. 
This interrogation should also address ‘voca-
tional’ fields and locally relevant knowledge. At-
tention to differences in education systems that 
reflect different histories would also be valuable 
for understanding how the skills, vocational and 
employability agendas might be better inte-
grated into mainstream schooling. Indeed, the 
content and skill specificity of  formal education 
are already being questioned, with one example 
being the increasing investments in vocational 
skill training projects, outside mainstream 
schooling, aimed at young people (e.g. training 
of  ‘agripreneurs’). This is despite the fact that 
the evidence reviewed by Fox and Kaul (2018) 
‘casts serious doubt on the efficacy and value of  
training interventions to help youth enter for-
mal wage employment’.
In relation to young people’s work in agri-
culture, the findings assembled in this book offer 
solid support for the idea that in one way or an-
other, large numbers of  rural youth engage in 
crop and/or livestock production, and many 
combine this work with other economic activ-
ities. Further, both farming and livestock pro-
duction have important places in the futures 
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that many young people imagine for themselves – 
even in rural areas which may be seen as rela-
tively undynamic. However, as noted above, in 
these futures these young people are not seeing 
or identifying themselves principally as farmers, 
or as having wholly agrarian livelihoods. Rather, 
theirs is often an arm’s length, managerial or ex-
ecutive vision of  engagement, with the manual 
work being done by hired labour, and farming 
being one of  multiple economic activities. In ef-
fect, Africa’s young people are developing their 
own unique take on the ‘farming as a business’ 
ideal that has been so heavily promoted over the 
last two decades. Specifically, they seem to be pla-
cing less emphasis on a model that assumes the 
key process underpinning any move to busi-
ness-oriented farming will be the progressive spe-
cialization and professionalization of  a hands-on 
‘farmer’. The young people’s alternative vision, 
with their future selves as an (often) town-based 
manager at its centre, has more in common with 
the caricature of  distant ‘telephone farmers’, dir-
ecting farm operations through their digital de-
vices. This vision poses important challenges in 
key areas of  agricultural policy, including training 
and skills, employment, agricultural extension, 
and technology development and promotion. 
Here, young people may indeed be setting the 
agenda, and if  so, it will be important that policy 
makers and programme designers remain flex-
ible and in close touch with those on the fore-
front of  change. This implies greater attention to 
who is able to access advisory services, both 
through existing systems and emerging digital 
variants. If  the majority of  young people en-
gaged in farming are not household heads, then 
perhaps making agronomic extension more ac-
cessible to household dependents rather than ex-
clusively to household heads would be advisable. 
This has implications for extension services that 
are tightly tied, for example, to cooperatives or 
other farmers’ organizations, which may priori-
tize household heads or landlords because they 
are members.
The promotion of  entrepreneurship is one 
of  the preferred responses to the rural youth em-
ployment problem. However, across the agricul-
tural commercialization hot and cold spots that 
were included in our study, there is relatively lit-
tle evidence of  young people engaging with 
value chains or ‘farming as a business’. Nor is 
there much evidence that they are engaging in 
non-farm activities that require more than min-
imal levels of  skill, investment or technology. 
This is not because they lack the capacity to do 
so, but because of  the absence of  rural con-
sumers who need and can afford a more diverse 
and costly range of  products and services. Fur-
ther, the findings show that basic material fac-
tors such as the lack of  roads and transport 
options hamper trade and mobility; whereas 
mobile money apps may go some way to facili-
tate financial transactions, they are certainly 
not available to or used by all. The critical as-
sumption is that the structural conditions and 
opportunities are in place such that entrepre-
neurship – conceived as something more than 
simply low-level self-employment – makes sense. 
Yet it appears that this assumption cannot be sus-
tained when it comes to the majority of  rural 
areas. Entrepreneurship may be lucrative for a 
few young people in some places, but programmes 
that promote ‘entrepreneurship for all’ must now 
be designed with and accompanied by a large 
dose of  honesty and realism.
More broadly, it is time to reflect critically 
on the increasingly common interventions that 
combine entrepreneurship training with ‘finan-
cial inclusion’. This coupling is most often em-
bedded in a three-part belief  system – that 
agricultural value chains offer opportunity; that 
youth are innovative; and that digital technol-
ogy is a rural game changer. Individually, these 
beliefs are either meaningless (e.g. youth are in-
novative) or they are appropriate only in some 
contexts and for some young people. As a gen-
eral belief  system or programming framework it 
has little value, yet as long as the focus is on 
small-scale, youth-targeted projects it will likely 
prove difficult to shift. In any case, more evi-
dence on the impacts of  tying training to finan-
cial interventions is needed (Fox and Kaul, 
2018). The new framing discussed in the section 
above, with its focus on structural constraints to 
decent work, should help guide such research, 
and in so doing, open up space for a fundamen-
tal rethink of  the training and skills agenda 
(Sumberg et al., 2020).
A final policy area highlighted by the find-
ings in this book is that of  social protection. 
While rural residents generally are poorly 
covered by social protection programmes, young 
people may be particularly vulnerable. It is clear 
they face hazard as they go about building their 
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livelihoods. These vulnerabilities are not associ-
ated with high-risk, high-return entrepreneurial 
endeavour, but rather everyday events like sickness 
(of  themselves and family members), accidents, 
theft, business collapse because of  customer 
non-payment, drought and so on. To recover from 
such events, individuals and young households 
may need to liquidate assets or use savings that 
cannot then be reinvested in farming or for start-
ing and expanding new ventures. The findings 
show that the experience of  hazard can also 
have major knock-on effects such as a child 
being withdrawn from school. There is an im-
portant opportunity to explore social protection 
interventions – beyond, for example, crop insur-
ance – that could help protect young people, and 
all rural residents, against these downside risks. 
Such interventions could also, of  course, have 
potentially strong synergistic effects with exten-
sion, education, training, and other investments 
targeting youth in the variable and risk-prone 
rural context that we find to be so pervasive.
Implications for research
Chapter 2 (this volume) and the research re-
ported in the other chapters of  Youth and the 
Rural Economy in Africa: Hard Work and Hazard 
amply illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of  
the frameworks, methods, data and analytical 
approaches that underpin current knowledge of  
young people’s engagement with, and co-creation 
of, the rural economy. Here we highlight some 
specific steps with the potential to significantly 
increase the quality and relevance of  the evidence 
base, and thus contribute positively to knowledge, 
policy and practice.
First and foremost there is a need, and an 
opportunity, to bring a broader set of  perspec-
tives to the discussion of  rural youth livelihoods 
in SSA. For example, too much research, policy 
and public discourse, and youth-oriented devel-
opment practice, does not draw on or engage 
with the large, diverse and challenging, yet 
highly relevant, literature from the field of  youth 
studies. In his recent book Agriculture and the 
Generation Problem, Ben White (2020) demon-
strates the benefits of  integrating insights from 
youth studies.
While nationally representative household 
surveys provide valuable insights into the eco-
nomic activities of  rural young people, it is also 
recognized that these same household-based 
survey instruments may not fully capture youth 
activities. For example, do the farming activities 
of  young people show up reliably in the plot ros-
ters of  the household? As discussed in Chapter 6 
(this volume), the low level of  plot management 
assigned to household dependents (other than 
spouse(s)) suggests that there may be systematic 
omissions. Two other questions deserve at-
tention. First, how well are transitions (i.e. 
household formation, starting in farming, 
school-to-work, and migration) and path de-
pendencies captured, and how might they be 
better interrogated in empirical work? Second, 
how can data be realistically collected on tem-
porally and spatially variable livelihood engage-
ment, including labour allocation to different 
activities, and income? This is not a new ques-
tion, but despite having been raised over dec-
ades, it has still not been adequately addressed. 
A final concern (also raised in Chapter 6, this 
volume) is how well collective agency (to which 
youth contribute) is conceptualized and meas-
ured in these surveys.
A second, related area that deserves more 
attention is how the insights arising from quali-
tative research instruments can both be more 
creatively integrated with quantitative analyses, 
and more effectively inform policy. As high-
lighted in Chapter 2 (this volume) much of  the 
qualitative research on youth in SSA relies on an 
extremely limited range of  methods. Digging 
deeper into the qualitative toolbox, more meth-
odological innovation, and new approaches to 
analysis and synthesis will likely be key to 
greater policy impact. For example, more cre-
ative mixing of  quantitative and qualitative 
approaches may be used to better observe incipi-
ent change and innovation, and their social and 
technological dynamics. Along similar lines, 
new methodological approaches are needed to 
identify and sample sites of  economic dyna-
mism, i.e. areas undergoing rapid transform-
ation, which may be atypical in a statistical 
sense, but can be very informative about how 
young people negotiate change.
Now we turn to three areas arising from the 
research reported in Youth and the Rural Economy 
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in Africa: Hard Work and Hazard that deserve fur-
ther attention:
• How do rural people – young and old, 
women and men – understand notions of  
work and decent work; and how do these 
understandings affect their engagement 
with school and training, present economic 
and domestic activities, and imagined fu-
tures? In particular, this question should 
explore the implications for young women 
of  their significant burden of  unpaid work, 
both domestic and reproductive, and the fact 
that, in many locations, they are expected to 
marry outside their natal homes.
• More research is needed around the nexus of  
home, school and work within rural SSA 
contexts. This should examine in more depth 
the processes of  schooling, and pay attention 
to differences in curriculum and the gender- 
and class-based imaginaries of  work that 
these reproduce. A related question is around 
the meaning of  quality education to young 
women and men, and adults, and the gender 
dimensions of  quality education.
• Third, while there are real differences be-
tween rural places, how do these differences 
matter for youth livelihoods and imagined 
futures? In fact, this was a central concern 
of  our research, but our framework of  hot 
spots and cold spots was apparently not 
strong enough to provide clear insights. The 
descriptive patterns of  youth economic en-
gagement and imagined futures were largely 
indistinguishable across hot versus cold 
areas. On the other hand, in some sites there 
were signs that social stratification was sig-
nificant, and a stronger focus on how such 
stratification plays out in youth livelihood 
building would be valuable. Another tack is 
to think more carefully about how to define 
economic remoteness and dynamism. It is 
possible that the same criteria (e.g. popula-
tion density, distance from markets) map 
on to very different realties in different 
countries, or that economic vibrancy is too 
complex to be captured by simple character-
izations. More empirical work would help to 
clarify this.
Practice
In terms of  development practice, Youth and the 
Rural Economy in Africa: Hard Work and Hazard 
points to two simple guidelines. First, as argued 
previously, practitioners need to be extremely 
cautious about youth-specific arguments and 
the youth-targeted interventions these are used 
to justify. While it is obviously true that ‘youth 
are the future’, their future is unlikely to improve 
through piecemeal interventions that support a 
small number of  young people for a short period 
of  time, without shifting opportunity structures. 
Focusing on opportunity structures and struc-
tural conditions requires programme continuity 
and coordinated, national and subnational ap-
proaches. Second, it is critical to work with, not 
against, the grain of  family and social relations, 
as in most cases they allow young people to ac-
cess key resources. This will also serve as a re-
minder that while interventions are often framed 
narrowly around economic activity and employ-
ment, young women and men build their liveli-
hoods and move toward social adulthood 
through hard work on many fronts – including 
caring, relationships, education, children and 
civic action.
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